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Many scholars celebrate the emancipatory potential of alter-globalisation networks. This 
thesis tests this claim, using a case study of the Global Call to Action against Poverty 
(GCAP), and analysing what the powers which constitute this network reveal about the 
powers 0/ it. GCAP is one of the largest networks of its type, mobilising nearly 175 
million people on a single day in 2009 via national coalitions of civil society 
organisations in 115 countries. The PhD research focuses on two of these national 
coalitions in India and Malawi, as well as GCAP's broad governance structures, and 
utilises semi-structured and ethnographic interviews, participant observation and 
documentary analysis. The data was analysed through a methodological frame of 
governmentality and post-governmentality literatures, to analyse the full range of 
discourses and agencies which construct GCAP. The thesis interrogates the agency of 
GCAP through an exploration of three power-related themes, namely: the relationships 
GCAP enacts with processes of statist and neo-liberal hegemony; how GCAP develops 
relations of solidarity across distance; and the manner in which GCAP constructs subjects 
of legitimation. The thesis finds that GCAP embodies a monitored subjectivity vis-A-vis 
statist and neo-Iiberal hegemonic power, yet also retains a monitory agency on those 
powers. It furthermore finds that relations of solidarity developed in GCAP between 
areas of structural advantage and disadvantage are imbued with both colonial and post-
colonial discourses, which simuhaneously buttress and contest neoliberal discourses of 
managerialism, resource-dependency and the fetisbisation of 'the poor'. These different 
sets of relations construct GCAP with a contingent, contradictory, yet at times 
emancipatory and transcendent subjectivity. By creating a snapshot of an alter-
globalisation network in diverse social contexts, this thesis reveals the ways in which the 
power of such networks is uneven and immanent, dependent upon confluences of the 
various internal and external powers which constitute them 
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INTRODUCTION 
"Something is happening here, but you don't know what it is, do you, Mr. Jones?" 
(Bob Dylan, Ballad of a Thin Man. 1965) 
In the 20 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall. something has been happening to 
progressive and public non-state actors. They have expanded and proliferated; they have 
been suggestive of the unification of diverse peoples across national and regional 
boundaries in common cause; they have claimed recognition of their campaigns in 
multilateral reforms and international treaties on everything from the regulation of 
landmines to the de-regulation of the internet. They have, some argue. prefigured 
equitable and emancipatory alternatives to neo-liberal and market-driven globalisation. 
Their power has grown with the explosion of cheaper communications technologies and 
the availability of 24-hour news in many parts of the world. Globalisation has stretched 
and intensified the social relations which enable these non-state actors to hold states and 
international organisations accountable from every comer of the world. However. 
continuing and growing socio-economic disparities call into question these actors' 
effectiveness, whilst public disagreements over aims and strategies call into question the 
degree to which such actors represent coherent positions on the impacts of globalisation 
and neo-liberalism. as well as the position of marginalised groups in constituting these 
positions. Many commentators appear to have taken the appearance and proliferation of 
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these non-state actors as good in and of itself, without interrogating the internal dynamics 
which constitute them. This thesis addresses this issue, in relation to the following 
question: 
What do the powers in alter-globalisation networks reveal about the powers of them? 
That I have called these actors 'alter-globalisation networks' represents the intellectual 
journey I have taken through this thesis. The research I have carried out concerns the 
powers which constitute these networks, and what this reveals about their potentials and 
limitations for prefiguring more equitable social relations in a globalised world. It is 
relevant to note that simply reaching the point where I could talk about 'aher-
globalisation networks' straightforwardly and without caveat represents the culmination 
of more than three years of being dissatisfied with other popular and scholarly labels for 
these networks, and the belief that the names we give things are important, for what they 
allow us to say and think about them. This speaks to a broader theme which this thesis is 
in part designed to address: that the analytical categories which have dominated the field 
of research on international, transnational and global activism, protest, and advocacy do 
in fact quite often close down, to different degrees, critical engagement with these actors, 
obscuring the realities of the processes and activities that constitute them and underpin 
their particular fonns ofnormativity and agency. 
Something is happening here ... conce}>lual clarity 
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Several scholars have provided what appear to be analytical frameworks for 
understanding alter-globalisation networks. I will introduce some of these in greater 
detail further on in this introductory chapter. For the moment I wish to explain my own 
choice of term for these actors i.e. alter-globalisation networks.· I deploy this term 
through this thesis in an attempt to provide a framework for these actors which allows us 
to understand their full range of agencies, and the powers which they are productive of 
(in terms of discursive and/or material influence) and shaped by. This is something which 
I wiD argue that other proposed frameworks do not do particularly effectively. Firstly, I 
contend that these actors provide or pre-figure alternatives to contemporary and dominant 
modes of neo-liberal and market-driven globalisation. This is not to argue that such 
alternatives are necessarily radica~ or even progressive, but that they do arise from 
critiques of the basis and/or impacts of dominant modes of globalisation. Importantly 
though, I desist from labelling these actors as necessarily 'global' (something which other 
scholars in this field fail to always do; see for example, Kaldor, 1999; 2003; Cohen and 
Rai, 2000; Bandy and Smith, 200S; Bevington and Dixon 2005; Saunders and Rootes, 
2(06), as this suggests a semi or actually coherent field of social relations in which these 
actors interact. I will argue in this thesis that this is a way of conceptualising space, and 
1 The term 'alter' globalisation' bas been deployed by scholars as an alternative to 'anti' 
globalisation in an attempt to illustrate the acceptance by activists of globalisation in general, but their 
rejection of nco-liberal forms of globa1isation in particular (see, for example Featherstone, 2003; Broad and 
Cavanagh, 2006; Mouffe, 2007; Sassen, 2oo7b; Reitan, 2(08). However, these authors regularly refer to the 
alta"-globalisation movement. The distinction between this and my deployment of alter-globa1isation 
networks will become apparent over the coming paragraphs. 
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'the global' as being pre-socia~ which thus ignores the way that space is socially 
produced. 
Secondly, I contend that the proliferation of such actors over the past 20 years relies on 
them either being networks, or networked2. In other words, they are both produced by 
networks of social relations, again, not necessarily all progressive and emancipatory, and 
belong to more onto logically verifiable networks of organisations and actors with whom 
they internet on a regular basis. Given the uneven nature of these networks I will 
therefore not be relying on a 'network of networks' imaginary, deployed by amongst 
others Castells (1999a; 2000) and Della Porta (2005). This imaginary arguably flattens 
social relations (Routledge, 2003: 45) by imagining that these processes uniformly 
replace a space of different places with spaces of place-dissipating and unfIXing gmss-
rooted flows (Castells: 1999b). In the context of this study, this imaginary is also slightly 
tautological; whilst accepting that social reality is networked (unevenly), it does not 
necessarily reveal very much about the flows of power within networks to talk of a 
'network of networks'. I will instead deploy networks as a set of (uneven and 
exclusionary) inter-organisational, individual-organisational and inter-personal 
relationships (Diani, 1992: 109) which constitute alter-globalisation actors, adding to this 
2 The term 'alter globalisation movement' is therefore not considered useful in \D1derstanding the 
agency of actors of the type being considered here. This is because 'movement' implies a bounded entity 
which closes off potential sets of constitutive relations seemingly outside that entity. In addition to the 
scholars in the previous footnote who have talked about the 'alter-globalisation movement', there are many 
others who talk about the 'global justice movement', or the 'movement of movements' (see, for example, 
Cohen and Rai, 2000; Buttel and Gould, 2004; Della Porta, 2005; Maiba, 2005; Osterweil, 2005; Sa\D1ders 
and Rootes, 2(07). All of these conceptualisatioos imply a bounded space, and, it will be argued, do not 
provide a rigorous enough framework for \D1derstanding the full agency of these actors. 
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though the 'external' relationships which also constitute the forms of knowledge these 
actors possess. These latter relationships include those with statist and other powerful 
hegemonic3 actors and their discourses. Furthermore, I do not take networks to imply a 
uniformity of membership-type or affect. Alter-globalisation networks invoke and deploy 
a number of subjects, sites, tactics, strategies and characteristics. These intersect with 
each other to create context-specific one-otT campaigns, united coalitions and loose sub-
networks. 
Lastly, I want to frame the manner in which I will refer to the state throughout this thesis. 
In fact, I will not nonnally refer to the state, but rather statist formations, hegemony and 
discourses. I here adopt Hix's (1998) contention (made in relation to the European 
Union) that under contemporary conditions of globalisation the state has been re-worked, 
and that what we might think of as 'the' state cannot be thought of as a fixed and stable 
entity, but a form of rule and norms-governing. Indeed, one might argue that this has 
always been the case to greater or lesser degrees4. This also relates to the way I will be 
referring to neo-liberalism, and in particular neo-liberal hegemony, distinguishing it from 
statist hegemony. I will be making this distinction in order to stand back, at least 
momentarily, from the assumption that statist hegemony is always neo-liberal in 
character. I will therefore distinguish between statist and neo-liberal hegemony in this 
Various interpretations of hegemony and their implications for construing aJter-globaJisation 
networks will be discussed in Chapter Two. 
4 Whilst Hix provides what appears to be the most functiooaJ overview of these discussioos, for 
more theoretical explorations 00 the ambiguous and networked form of the state under conditioos of post-
modernity and globaJisatioo (which collapses the idea of the state as a pre-given) see Badie and Birnbaum, 
1979/1983; Mitchell, 1991; Pringle and Watsoo, 1992; Majone, 1994; Levy, 2006. 
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thesis because I wish to leave open the possibility that alter-globalisation networks may 
have relationships with forms of statist hegemonic power other than that of neo-
liberalism. So whilst it is true that statist powers may operate against neo-liberal 
hegemony, such statist powers do still operate under hegemonic logics (even if it is not of 
the neo-liberal type) which might be contested by oppositional civil society groups and 
alter-globalisation networks. For example, whilst counter hegemonic regimes in 
Venezuela or Bolivia may garner support from many alter-globalisation networks, the 
regimes of North Korea or Iran are unlikely to attract similar levels of support. 
Which alter-globalisation network? 
This research takes a case study approach, cognisant ofthe fact that, given the very broad 
definition of alter-globalisation networks developed above, no case study could ever be 
representative of alter-globalisation networks per se. Nonetheless, the network 
considered in this research, the Global Call to Action against Poverty (GCAP), is an actor 
which by many measures would be considered extremely significant. It maintains a 
presence in 115 countries; it claims to have mobilised 2% of the world's population on 
one day in 200Ss; and it was the organisational umbrella behind the 2005 UK Make 
Poverty History campaign. More information about GCAP and the processes which led 
me to choose it as the case study for this research will be provided in Chapter Four. 
, http://www. whiteband.orgiActionitake-actionigcap-mobilisation-200S/stand-up-200S/mofe-than-
116-million-people-2013-nearly-2-of-the-world20l9s-population-2014-stand-uo-against-poyerty - accessed 
on 14/01109 
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COJlCell1s and amuments; ChApters One. Two and Three 
The frameworks which have been developed to understand actors like GCAP in the past 
fifteen years include 'global civil society' (Keane, 2001: Kaldor, 2003), the 'global 
justice movement' (Cohen and Rai, 2000; Saunders and Rootes, 2006), 'movement of 
movements' (Della Porta, 2005; Newman, 2007), 'transnational advocacy networks' 
(Keck and Sikkink, 1998), and the 'anti capitalist movement' (Gilbert, 2008). All of these 
terms frame alter-globalisation networks in different ways, and provide a rich set of 
conceptual tools with which to analyse the kinds of activism and protest that have grown 
around the world in the post-Cold War period in the pursuit of socio-economic justice. 
Many of these frameworks are also explicitly normative. In Chapters One and Two I will 
explore this in more detail and the limitations this involves for some of these frames 
when understanding the everyday processes and relations which constitute and are 
produced by alter-globalisation networks. These literatures provide important reference 
points for the study of power in alter-globalisation networks, and its implications for their 
potentials and limitations. 
In Chapter One I consider one group of scholars who have been particularly influential in 
the literature and practice of aher-globalisation networks6, who I call 'liberal 
6 Particularly, it should be noted, the practices of important constituent members of GCAP, which 
emerged and coalesced around the 2005 Make Poverty History Campaign. The campaign was criticised by 
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cosmopolitans'. Coalescing around a framework of alter-globalisation networks which 
understands them as constituting a global civil society (even if not explicitly stated as 
such), I argue in this chapter that liberal cosmopolitanism is over celebratory of the 
potentials and powers of alter-globalisation networks, positing them as autonomous, 
deliberative, democratic and pre-figurative of a post-Westphalian, citizen-led democratic 
order. The framework of analysis which liberal cosmopolitans provide is therefore found 
to contain a number of significant gaps. It posits a diffusion of power away from the state 
and statist formations to non-state actors, but fails to provide an analysis of how statist 
powers have been reworked and now represent a diffuse network of hegemonic power 
(and the constraints and opportunities this provides for aher-globalisation networks). 
Linked to this, the liberal cosmopolitan framework is unable to provide a contextualised 
understanding of the legitimacy and representivity of alter-globalisation networks, and 
the degree to which they do, rather can be presumed to, provide spaces of deliberation 
and alternatives to neo-liberal globalisation to be enacted. This is especially the case 
given the degree to which they may be penetrated by diffuse statist and neo-liberal 
hegemonic formations. 
In Chapter Two I explore another important set of scholars who have sought to 
understand the agency (both actual and potential) of alter-globalisation networks. 
'Radical aher-globalisationists' draw on a range of structural and post-structural theories 
some for embodying the kind of Liberal cosmopolitanism which I will analyse in Chapter One (see 
GorriDge and Rosie, 2006), for example, by the way in which African performers were sidelined from the 
main 'Live 8' concerts (a criticism which circulated widely in the media at the time). 
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to provide a potential framework for understanding alter-globalisation networks, and are 
more convincing than the liberal cosmopolitans in doing so. It remains the case, though, 
that the normative commitments of radical alter-globalisationists establish binaries 
between counter-hegemonic and post-hegemonic 7 renditions of the conditions in which 
aher-globalisation networks operate, and ofthe strategies they should operationalise. This 
again closes down understandings of alter-globalisation networks which might resonate 
between and/or transcend these positions (for example, the degree to which alter-
globalisation networks might work both inside and outside statist formations). I argue 
that adopting a radical alter-globalisationist approach only allows an imaginary which 
views one or the other of its binaries as being authentically radical. This is particularly 
the case with regard to the nonnative positions adopted by thinkers considered in this 
chapter for the relationship between alter-globalisation networks and their externalities 
(i.e. the state and nec-liberal hegemony). 
In Chapter Three I draw together what is productive from the fust two chapters in 
addition to further theoretical reflection in order to develop my own epistemological 
framework for understanding what the powers in alter-globalisation networks might 
reveal about the powers of them. I attempt to collapse the distinctions between alter-
globalisation networks and the market, or the state, which are set up by both liberal 
cosmopolitans and radical alter-globalisationists, in order to develop a framework which 
is grounded, non-prescriptive, yet retains a normative commitment to the progressive 
I will fully explicate these terms in Chapter Two 
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ideals claimed by alter-globalisation networks and scholars of them I argue that in 
collapsing these distinctions we avoid making overtly normative judgements which 
obscure the complex agencies of alter-globalisation networks. We also inevitably end up 
viewing these agencies through a prism of power and space - which power relations 
construct these networks, and which power relations are alter-globalisation networks 
productive of! What kind of spaces do these power relations produce? I further develop 
three core prisms through which these questions of relationality are refracted (and which 
are thus reflected in the constitution of the data chapters): (i) the relationship between 
alter-globalisation networks, statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations; (ii) the 
interaction between cosmopolitan and post-colonial discourses and practices; and (iii) 
assessing the 'location' of alter-globalisation networks (i.e. to what degree are these 
networks embedded in the imaginations of the activists and organisations which 
constitute them?). 
Methodo}oi,Y and Research Design 
Chapter Four performs several functions. The chapter begins by detailing the rationale 
and contributions of this research. I note the lack of research conducted into power in 
alter-globalisation networks, particularly of the discursive kind (this distinction will be 
explored further in this chapter) with most studies focussing purely on the power o/them 
This study seeks to address this gap in the literature by first investigating the powers 
which constitute alter-globalisation networks, but also by linking this directly to the 
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powers of them The research also contributes to the so far small set of litemture which 
seeks to investigate alter-globalisation networks in contexts of structural inequality. 
There are many studies which focus on alter-globalisation mobilisations and protests in 
Europe or North America, but far fewer in contexts of socio-economic deprivation 
(Henry, Mohan and Yanacopulos, 2004: 850). 
I then continue to outline a series of research questions which flow from my core 
question and which guided my research. These questions are: 
Central Research Question 
i) What do the powers in alter-globalisation networks reveal about the powers of 
them? 
Sub-research Questions 
i) In which ways can alter-globalisation networks be understood as 
oppositional? 
ii) Which processes of exclusion and inclusion constitute alter-globalisation 
networks? 
iii) Where are alter-globalisation networks? 
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I continue by outlining my epistemological approach to the key concepts of power and 
space employed in this study, which is relational, drawing on a Foucauldian analysis of 
power (Foucault, 1969/2002; 1982/1994; 2000; Knights and Willmott, 1982; Wickham, 
1986) together with post-governmentality approaches which focus on the agency of 
practices, and processes ofre-subjectification (Clegg, 1989: 204-205; Callon and Latour, 
1981; CalIon, 1986; Law, 1992; Latour, 2005; Allen, 2004). 
Following this, I introduce the focal case study of this research, the Global Call to Action 
against Poverty (OCAP). I narrate my encounter with GCAP as the result of focussed 
exploration of alter-globalisation networks together with the odd serendipitous moment, 
and argue that GCAP represents a significant alter-globalisation network, even if this 
does not make it necessarily representative. I furthermore introduce the manner in which I 
approached GCAP as a unit of analysis. Being constituted by coalitions of NOOs, 
International NOOs (INoos), trade unions, social movements, faith groups and other 
civil society actors in liS countries, each with its own distinctive modus operandi, meant 
that however I chose to study GCAP carried implications for the results that would be 
generated. I ultimately decided to conduct case studies within my case study, focussing 
on two particular coalitions, in Malawi and India. Two coalitions were chosen in order to 
provide a 'deep' rather than 'broad' study, whilst these two coalitions in particular were 
chosen because they provided interesting areas of contrast which shed light on a number 
of GCAP's constitutive relationships, because they would ensure that this study was 
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located in areas of structural disadvantage, and more instrumentally, because they both 
allowed me to conduct this research in English. 
My approach to GeAP as a unit of analysis reveals the distinctively qualitative and 
'deep' approach I wanted to take with this research. I justify this approach and the 
research methods I employed to conduct this study of GeAP as the chapter progresses. 
These methods included semi-structured and ethnographic interviews, participant 
observation and an analysis of texts produced by GeAP as a global network as well as by 
the case study coalitions I included in the study. These methods carry significant 
limitations, which are acknowledged. I also recount here the manner in which my 
'choice' of methods was iterative and shaped by the activity ofactuaUy doing research. 
Explorations - H~moDY' Cosmo,politanism and Leeitimation 
My explorations of GCAP are presented thematically, across three chapters. In Chapter 
Five I discuss GCAP's relationship with statist formations and neo-liberal hegemony, 
what one might crudely call its 'external' relationships. In Chapter Six I discuss the 
interactions between imperialistic and post-colonial cosmopolitan discursive and 
interpretative orientations, in the context of the relationships between the various 
organisations which constitute GCAP. In this case, the focus of the chapter is on what 
one might crudely call GeAP's 'internal' relationships. In Chapter Seven I seek to 
'locate' GCAP through the subjects whom GCAP's core texts construct as being both 
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authentic, and therefore legitimating ofGCAP's claims. This is analysed in an attempt to 
understand how GCAP is embedded in the imaginations and practices of these subjects, 
and what this means for an understanding of alter-globalisation networks as global, 
national or local. 
In Chapter Five then I fmd GCAP's relationship with statist and neo-liberal hegemonic 
formations to be complex and contradictory, highly conditioned by the spaces in which 
GCAP interacts with and converges with these formations. I argue that this relationship is 
a monitory one (i.e. a form of relation which sees subjects both monitor and be 
monitored), which creates the conditions for both transformational and co-optive 
relations with statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations. GCAP's close working 
relationship with the United Nations Millennium Campaign (UNMC) is highlighted as an 
example of this, and is shown to have uneven affects in the two case study coalitions in 
India and Malawi. In India this relationship contributes to an oppositional and in part 
transformative monitory relationship between the coalition there and the Indian 
government. In Malawi, though, GCAP's relationship with the UNMC is part of a larger 
story about the discursive and ontological power of the Millennium Development Goals 
to order and monitor the imaginations and practices of members of that coalition with 
regard to poverty eradication and social justice. 
In Chapter Six I seek to explore the relations of inclusion and exclusion which constitute 
GCAP. I begin by focussing on the role lNoos play in both the national coalitions and 
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GCAP more broadly, finding examples of both the emancipation of marginal discourses 
(particularly in the case of Dalit and Adivasi struggles in India) and domination. I then 
move on from individual examples of these dynamics to explore the relative success or 
failure of INoo visions of GCAP. I find that the INoos narrated GCAP in two main 
ways, firstly, by measuring GCAP's success quantitatively (how many people GCAP had 
mobilised), and secondly, by establishing 'authentic' marginalised groups on behalf of 
whom GCAP worked, but who were nonetheless not expert enough in their own 
authentically poverty-stricken lives to speak for themselves. I argue that this perspective 
is drawn from a particularly imperial discourse of cosmopolitanism, which seeks to close 
down the 'suffering others' who are deemed to be in need of salvation, and is a rendition 
of GCAP which was particularly successful amongst coalition participants in Malawi. 
Coalition members in India, though, appeared to draw on their own cosmopolitan 
discursive resources, which were far more embedded in anti-neo-liberal and post-colonial 
imaginations. I argue that these different forms of cosmopolitanism interact and fuse with 
each other in GCAP unevenly, producing non-linear resuhs, and new relations of both 
inclusion and exclusion. 
Chapter Seven represents the drawing together of the previous two data chapters, as they 
both contribute to the issue of 'locating' GeAP. In this chapter, I illustrate how through 
its core texts, GCAP constitutes itself as not merely representing, but also being located 
in, the population groups of the most marginalised, and the national coalitions which are 
affiliated to it. This affords GeAP the opportunity of claiming itself as authentic and 
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legitimate, and to claim the successes of national coalitions even where it is hard to find 
GCAP's involvement in them. Whilst GCAP is credited with opening up spaces for 
collaboration between types of civil society actors who might not normally have worked 
together, beyond this, GCAP's presence in the subjects and network nodes it claims it is 
constituted through is found to be highly problematic. Amongst coalition members in 
Malawi GCAP is largely absent from their imaginations of what they are involved in, or 
at best distant and detached. Coalition members in India on the other hand reveal GCAP 
to be ill-fitting and irritating to the context in which they work. I therefore argue that 
GCAP appears to be a discursive network, and in this respect has to do battle with other 
powerful discourses seeking to shape civil society responses to poverty eradication, and 
produce the spaces in which these discourses enact themselves. These discourses are both 
radical (post-colonial, social movement discourses - see Chapter Six) and less so (statist 
and hegemonic discourses - see Chapter Five). 
Inmlications 
In Chapter Eight I summarise the core arguments of the thesis and discuss the 
implications of the data for alter-globalisation networks more broadly. The argument here 
follows the logic of the data chapters, i.e., by addressing the implications of the research 
through the prism of statist, cosmopolitan and discursive-spatial relations. 
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In the first case, I argue that whilst GCAP exhibited a highly uneven and largely 
problematic form of monitory oppositionality, it was the very ambiguity and immanence 
of this type of relation which also revealed its unstable potential. I argue that alter-
globalisation networks must always be in relations to that which they are in alterity to, 
and are thus always monitoring as well as being monitored. The more self-conscious such 
networks are to these relations therefore, the more they can take advantage of and re-
work them. 
With regard to GCAP's interacting forms of cosmopolitanism, I argue that alter-
globalisation networks are not inclusionary because they are cosmopolitan, but that they 
may in fact incubate several forms of fusing, resisting and reinforcing cosmopolitan isms, 
each replete with their own inclusions and exclusions. Cosmopolitanism therefore 
appears as an other-regarding discursive resource, itself constructed through various 
interpretative repertoires (Billig et al, 1988; Edley, 200t). It is these interpretations which 
give cosmopolitanisms their discursive power, always particular and distinctive. 
Cosmopolitanism therefore becomes more akin to an analytical tool with which to assess 
the normativity of alter-globalisation networks, rather than a universal prescriptive 
agenda which all alter-globalisation networks should subscribe to. That GCAP embodies 
different forms of cosmopolitanism is a case for qualified optimism for the state of alter-
globalisation networks more broadly, and suggests that such networks might be learning 
(slowly, iteratively) the lessons of critiques that were levelled at other similar networked 
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actors such as Jubilee 2000 (which accused them of being at times largely INoo led and 
exclusionary - see Mayo, 2005; Yanacopulos, 2009). 
In locating alter-globalisation networks, I argue that what we really do is discover the 
degree to which they are legitimate and representative of those they claim to speak for. 
On a normative point, I claim that if alter-globalisation networks are going to ensure that 
they are present in the subjects they argue constitute them, they must recognise and be 
ever-aware of how these subjects are always co-present with other potentially co-optive 
actors, i.e. statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations, or colonising cosmopolitans. 
Aher-globalisation networks must therefore recognise that they are engaged in processes 
of immanence, or 'always becoming' (Massumi, 2002; Newman, 2007: 42), which 
require constant navigation in order to ensure the greatest degree of legitimacy possible 
for their actions and claims. I argue that this is an inherently inclusive process, which can 
only expand the potentialities of alter-globalisation networks to enact emancipatory 
alternatives to neo-liberal globalisation. 
In terms of answering the core research question of this thesis then (What do the powers 
in alter-globalisation networks reveal about the powers of them?) I argue that alter-
globalisation networks are constituted by a multiplicity of productive power 
relationships, which means that it is not possible to talk about the effects of alter-
globalisation networks in the singular. Their powers 10 are entirely dependent on the 
manner in which the powers which constitute them in different sites converge. The 
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powers of alter-globalisation networks therefore might be the manner by which they 
provide opportunities to expose neo-liberal and structural powers to manipulation through 
convergences. These opportunities are not always taken though. because ofthe dynamics 
of these powers in particular sites, yet the opportunities exist nonetheless. I further argue 
that alter-globalisation networks need therefore to be sensitive to the manner in which 
what may appear to be a power-exerting relationship in one convergence space may be 
power-constraining in another context of convergence to which it also contributes. This 
happens because convergence is inevitably differentiaL dependent on the reJative powers 
of the different productive reJations which combine to constitute the space. Indeed, it is 
this inevitable differentiality which lends alter-globalisation networks their potential to 
navigate power (Allen, 2(04), to take advantage of certain relations in specific contexts, 
but to outflank them in others where to engage with them would resuh in being 
dominated by them 
This chapter has provided an overview of this thesis. In short, Chapters One and Two 
provide a critique of existing frameworks for understanding the constitutive powers of 
8 I will explore the nature of convergence and how it relates to this project in greater detail in 
Chapter Three. Briefly, convergence is treated as the constituent aspect of any spatial arrangement. It is 
also treated as contingently productive of new or re-worked and re-subjectivised social relations. Paul 
Routledge and his colleagues have carried out the most applicable work around convergence in relatim to 
social movements and alter-globaJisation networks (see Routledge, 2003a; Cumbers, Routledge and 
Nativel, 2007; Cumbers and Routledge, 2009), although Kohn perhaps puts it most succinctly when she 
argues that "The 'global' makes no sense except as the convergence of different localities" (2003: 163). See 
also Butler (2008: 47), and especially Massey (2005: 191), whose discussioo of the coalescing social 
trajectories which construct Londoo as a cosmopolitan/exploitative financial centre does not deploy the 
specific term 'coo vergence' , but nooetheless speaks to the themes outlined above. 
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alter-globalisation networks; Chapter Three develops a more suitable theoretical 
framework for such an analysis; Chapter Four outlines the methodological implications 
of this framework and the design of the research; and Chapters Five, Six and Seven 
analyse the empirical data collected. Why, though, does any of this matter? Changing 
social realities for the most marginalised is not simply a matter of good will. The 
impotence many of us feel in the face of natural or human-made disasters, whether near 
or far, testifies to this simple fact. This research matters because it illustrates the limits of 
good wilL and simultaneously the potential of serious reflection and horizontaL strategic 
decision making to alter-globalisation networks. Another world is possible (George, 
2(02), but it's a treacherous route, requiring a lot of hard work. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Liberal Cosmopolitans and Global Civil 
Soclat" 
1 . 1 Introduction 
As I have already suggested in the introductory chapter, there are a number ofways in 
which commentators have attempted to categorise alter-globalisation networks like 
GCAP, and in doing so have translated these networlcs into particular visions of how, 
where and why fundamental socio-economic change should occur. These normative 
visions are at times far from explicit, and whilst I will argue that they can be productive 
of certain ways of thinking about alter-globalisation networks, they also serve to close 
down other ways of understanding them, drawn from alternative theoretical traditions as 
well as from the empirical study of them 
In this section I propose to clarify the suggestions I have made in this regard by focussing 
on the m>st categorical of all the conceptualisations that have been developed to explain 
alter-globalisation networlcs, that of global civil society (GCS). There are three important 
caveats here: firstly, that not all of the arguments engaged with in this chapter refer 
explicitly to global civil society. Whilst all of the theorists considered and critiqued do 
provide a framework for understanding alter-globalisation networks as global 
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phenomena, these frameworks frequently emerge from their epistemologies of national 
civil societies per se. The second caveat is that GCS is a category which has broader 
reach than alter-globalisation networks. Its theorists claim that it also analytically 
incorporates markets and the state (Keane, 2001; Kaldor, 2(05). Nonetheless, as will be 
shown, alter-globalisation networks do represent a significant actor which the GCS 
framework claims to satisfactorily explain in normative terms, representing and 
prefiguring new forms of global democracy (Beck, 1997; Falk, 1999; 2(05). Lastly, GCS 
theorists do not represent a homogeneous theoretical whole. There are many differences 
between, for example, the celebratory cosmopolitanism of Ulrich Beck (1997) and the 
more measured understandings of the structural constraints placed on people living in 
poverty characteristic of Richard Falk (1999; 2(05). 
Furthermore, not everyone who I will be calling a GCS theorist would necessarily accept 
the label. Other language used to categorise alter-globalisation networks is also 
sometimes deployed. In Falk's case for example, he is much more prone to the term 
'globalization from below' (1999: 127-137). I will argue though that writers such as Falk 
do share common assumptions with other writers who use the term GCS more explicitly. 
Namely, they share an implicitly liberal epistemology, and tend to celebrate the 
globalisation of progressive social networks as a precursor to some kind of global (often 
institutionalised), democratic evolution. In doing so I will argue that they create a narrow 
understanding of the agency of aher-g)obalisation networks, which prevents a fuller 
interrogation of their potentials and limitations. This is because liberal cosmopolitans 
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establish alter-globalisation networks as being a check on statist and neo-liberal 
hegemonic power. as prefiguring a new democratic order. and of representing the global 
as an autonomous, bounded site of progressive political change. 
An important point needs to be made here; those who have celebrated and heralded the 
rise of alter-globalisation networks have done so because of the promise they see in 
'grassroots' activism and collectivity. In this way, writers such as Kaldor, Keane, Falk or 
Beck might be more correctly labelled as deliberative, rather than liberaL cosmopolitans, 
distinguishing them from the more top-down liberal institutionalist cosmopolitans (Bray, 
2009) such as Held and McGrew (2003) or Archibugi (2008). As Dryzek notes, though, 
many deliberative democrats have become 'liberalised'. As a response to this 
phenomenon, he argues that: "Deliberative democracy should involve a continued quest 
for democratic authenticity, rather than easy accommodation with the prevailing liberal 
political economy" (2000: 8). Thus, whether their normative stance regarding alter-
globalisation networks is predicated on the belief that they can underpin a deliberative 
'citizenship of the world' (Nussbaum, 1996), or on the other hand help legitimate a 
Kantian notion of a democratic world state (Held and Guibernau, 2001; Held and 
McGrew, 2(03), the writers on GCS considered in this chapter can all be referred to as 
liberal cosmopolitans, as it is their "easy accommodation" (Dryzek, 2000: 8) with 
liberalism and liberal institutions which lends these thinkers their distinctive approach to 
GCS. This chapter will focus on the former of the groups just discussed, those with a 
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more deliberative and 'grassroots' focus, as it is these writers who speak more directly to 
the powers of alter-globalisation networks. 
The core liberal cosmopolitans I will discuss in this chapter broadly share a normative 
approach to global politics which manifests itself in specifically liberal theories of the 
drivers of transformative socio-economic change (Jargely ascribed to GCS - what it 
represents and its potential) which have certain theoretical and ontological implications. 
liberal cosmopolitans make two broad theoretical projections in particular. The first of 
these outlines the emancipatory nature of the spaces created by alter-globalisation 
networks and the relationships between these spaces and diffuse, territorially un~fIxed 
statist and neo-liberal hegemonic governing powers. The second broad theoretical 
projection made by liberal cosmopolitans establishes a binary of and relationship between 
cosmopolitanism and particularism, where the particular is constructed as 'uncivil', and 
in need of some form of salvation by a cosmopolitan benefactor. Furthermore, these 
theorisations lead to claims about the characteristics of the actors which constitute GCS, 
that they are progressive and emancipatory. This has implications for how GCS as a 
category leads us to only very specifIc understandings of the agencies, potentials and 
limitations of alter-globalisation networks. 
I will now therefore discuss the GCS category in relation to each of these areas. I will 
begin with a brief discussion of the main features of GCS theory and draw links to liberal 
political and social theory. After this I will explore how, so constructed, GCS proposes 
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particular and normative understandings of GCS' s relationship to statist and neo-liberal 
hegemonic power, and the relationship between cosmopolitanism and particularism, 
based on its liberal imagination. It will be argued throughout that the claims which 
emerge from such an imagination are ultimately limited in their ability to provide 
analytical purchase for the study of alter-globalisation networks. 
1.2 Global Civil Society - Liberal Roots. 
It is important to stress that what I do not intend to do here is claim a kind of liberal 
essentialism about the concepts which construct the GCS category, nor the theorists that 
propose them (apart from anything else, such an essentialism would be paradoxical in a 
discussion of liberalism). Indeed, it is important to be aware that the theorists I will 
consider here (to greater and lesser degrees to be sure) are no liberal dogmatists. What I 
do propose then is that several key concepts of the GCS category do share a great deal 
with both classical and modern forms of liberalism. Indeed, in making this claim I am 
taking up the assertion of other critics of GCS theorists who have also engaged this 
critique (Cbandhoke, 1995; Heins, 2(05), although not in as great detail as I propose to 
do here. Heins for example argues that "GCS theorists [base their approach] on 
normative values of the old liberal idea of civil society as a counter-balance to the state" 
(2005: 186). This then is where I take my point of departure in this section. If GCS is 
based on liberal values, then it is important to understand which values in particular these 
are, and how an appreciation of these values helps us to deconstruct the category ofGCS 
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in such a way that we can assess the potentials and limitations of it for understanding and 
exploring the agencies of alter-globalisation networks. 
There is no core definition ofGCS which exists in the literature, although some common 
features can be elucidated. Kaldor argues that GCS represents a new form of politics, 
which .... .is both an outcome of and an agent of global interconnectedness" (2003: I), 
whereas Heins (2005) argues that the idea ofGCS is one which promotes the primacy of 
non-state actors as the agents that will perfect the world. What follows is an attempt to 
distinguish five key concepts which constitute GCS as a framework, and to 
simultaneously illustrate their grounding in liberal political and social theory, and the 
limits this places on GCS as a category within which an analysis of alter-globalisation 
networks can be framed. After outlining these five key features and briefly examining 
their limitations, I will reflect in more detail on the implications of this liberal 
epistemology for understanding the usefulness of GCS as an analytical category for the 
study of alter-globalisation networks. 
1.2.1 Post Westphalianism 
At first it may seem that the claims of many liberal cosmopolitans that we live in a post-
Westphalian era (or at least are witnessing the end of the Westphalian age) (Beck, 2000: 
74) may appear distinctly illiberal. After all, this is in part based on the premise that 
national electoral politics, the bedrock of modem liberal representative democracy 
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(Axtman, 1996: lOw36), is losing its relevance (Falk, 1999: 131). Gray, a classical liberal, 
illustrates how this seeming contradiction can be resolved. He asserts that liberalism's 
core project bas always been conceived of as " ... the response of modem men to an 
historical circumstance in which, because the traditional social order has passed away, the 
powers and limits 0 f governments need redefmition" (1986: 90-91). Indeed, if we view 
GCS's postwWestphalianism not simply descriptively, but also prescriptively, then one 
can see the influence of Kant in these ideas, who equally proposed a postw Westphalian 
world order in response to what he saw as the anarchy and violence ofthe international 
order ofnationwstates (Fine, 2003). 
Viewed in this light we can see GCS's postwWestphalian project in distinctly liberal 
terms. Kaldor seems to make this explicit when she argues that GCS represents a 
withdrawal from the state towards more global systems of rules and governance, in the 
face of the decreasing ability of individual states to address many contemporary issues 
(2005: 107). Similarly, Falk identifies the primary sites of struggle over directions in 
world policy not at the level of the state but at the institutions of the United Nations 
(1999: 133). This is what makes the GCS postwWestphalian perspective distinctly liberal9; 
the belief in and the re-siting of the social contract to some form of global system of 
governance which a global civil society will help legitimate. This then is how GCS 
9 As opposed to other post-Westphalian visions (i.e. Fraser, 2(07), which arguably do not derive 
from this Liberal cosmqKllitan perspective. In deriving from other ideological traditions (in Fraser's case, a 
more radical ideological tradition), they make the case for a more people, rather than institution centred 
response to political crisis. In doing so, such other forms ofpost-Westphalianism make the Liberal nature 
ofGCS's post-Westphalianism even clearer. 
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theorists establish alter-globalisation networks as a check on post-modern neo-liberal and 
statist hegemonic power, whilst ignoring the potential implication of these networks in 
those same relations of power. This will be explored further on in this chapter, although 
for now it is enough to speculate on the degree to which such an imagination of alter-
globalisation networks leaves us with a possibly overly-optimistic account of their 
agencies. 
1.2.2 Deliberative, Peaceful and Teleological 
Another important constitutive concept of GCS which reasserts its categorical liberality is 
that of the teleological development of peace and deliberation which GCS is said to 
represent. In Kaldor's terms, GCS represents the contemporary expression of a certain 
historical development of civil society, situated as a force 'from below', which rejects 
revolutionary violence and does not seek nation-state power, but which instead seeks to 
link up with other like-minded groups beyond national borders and make claims based on 
internationally agreed human rights and social norms. Originating in the 1980s in Eastern 
Europe and Latin America, and facilitated by technological advancements in travels and 
communication, this conception of civil society formed the basis for the development of 
today's GCS (Kaldor, 2005: 106-17). It is this kind of historical idea ofGCS which leads 
Falk to distinguish between the "civil" NGOs and social movements of GCS, and the 
''uncivil'' transnational actors behind the September 11 tb attacks on the United States 
(2005: 75), and which leads Keane to claim that "Violence is undoubtedly among the 
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greatest enemies of global civil society, whose tendency to non-violence stems partly 
from the fact that its participants more or less share a cosmopolitan outlook" (2001: 38). 
Rendering GCS with a particular historical and teleological development in this way then 
asserts a boundary between who is included in civil society (and by extension GCS) and 
who is not. 
Kaldor argues that these practices of non-violence and the public use of reason and 
deliberation, which have always been inherent to civil society, have now been globalised 
and thus represent a victory for deliberative democratic movements (2003: 3). It is hard 
in this sense not to draw parallels with Fukuyama's teleology of liberal democracy in his 
book 'The End of History' (I993). In more explicitly liberal terms, Macmillan argues that 
liberalism's faith in the reconcilability of interests makes it a markedly pacifIstic system 
of thought (1998: 13), whilst Gray claims that civil society is marked by the diverse and 
sometimes incompatible world visions which can co-exist peacefully within it (1993: 
314). Importantly, this co-existence is presumed possible within concurrent institutional 
and structural coordinates i.e. it does not require the radical reordering of the social order. 
It is again not hard to see this overriding faith in the ability of social compatibility within 
the current social and structural order in the work of GCS theorists (this will become 
clearer in sub-section 1.2.4). Their conception of civil society is based on the ability of 
potentially conflicting visions of the social good to peacefully co-exist and synthesise. 
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This is a distinctly liberal vision of civil society, in both Hegelian terms 10, and, Lockean 
also 11 when viewed as constitutive of a new global order of rules and governance 
(Kaldor, 2003). Conceptualising aher-globalisation networks in this way assumes an 
equally accessible deliberative space which actors enter by virtue of their 'civility'. This 
overlooks the way that alter-globalisation networks may be structured by social relations, 
which deny access to certain groups, and which also define their 'civility', or inclusivity. 
This once again leaves a question over the applicability of GCS theorists to 
understanding the agency of the actors whose agency they claim to explain. 
1.2.3 The rational self directed agent 
It is a core belief in both classical and modem liberalism that the human individual "has 
disposition over his talents, abilities and labour" (Gray, 1986: 63). The individual is self 
directed and rational (Manning, 1976: 16). Keane, however, a key GCS theorist, critiques 
more radical interpretations ofGCS (see Chapter Two) as placing too much emphasis on 
the autonomous nature of that space, distinguished from state and market. He argues that 
they underplay the determined nature of GCS (200 1: 28). This would appear to contradict 
10 I am not claiming an intrinsic Liberalism to the w<rk of Hegel here, but rather a way of reading 
Hegel that can be seen to support a certain incrementalism in imagining political progress, althoogb I am 
aware there are other m<re radical ways ofreading Hegel in this regard (see Singer, 1983). 
II In certain respects this vision of global civil society is similar to Hegel's conception of the 
organic community, where the hist<ricai contlict between the individual and the collective is synthesised 
through socialisation into the comm1Dlity and a rationally developed basis for remaining dutiful to the 
institutions of that community (Singer, 1983: 34-35). In other respects, the conception of global civil 
society as prefiguring a more institutionally democratic world <rder is distinctly Lockean. Locke believed 
that democratic institutions only arose out of a dialectical relationship with an active civil society 
~anning, 1976: 22) 
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my assertion that GCS is informed by a liberal understanding of the individual as rational 
and self directed. Keane's critique of more radical perspectives though does not prevent 
him from asserting that GCS is comprised of many thousands of" ... self-directing or non-
governmental institutions and ways oflife" (ibid: 23). 
A reading of the other liberal cosmopolitans considered here reveals similar conceptual 
approaches to the role of rational agency in constructing GCS as a category. Falk also 
makes the claim that GCS is comprised of voluntary associations and citizens, and argues 
that the "inner mobility" of the modem individual is indicative of our constant struggle to 
"fmd our place" (1999: 75), whilst Kaldor very unambiguously bases her conception of 
GCS on ''the agency of people who make history" (2005: III), who, through access to 
institutions and open debate, will encourage policy-makers to act in the interests of all 
(Kaldor, 2003: 107). Such a conception of self-directed inter-subjective rational 
deliberation posits GCS once again as a category of liberal concepts. The liberal theorist 
Manning, for example, asserts that "the motive force of society and the energy for social 
reform originate in the spontaneity of the independent mind and the power of the 
liberated will" (1976: 16) and that "progress f. .. J will originate in the form of individual 
contributions to the great debate on man's condition conducted in free and liberal 
institutions" (ibid: 21). Such statements resonate very strongly with the vision of GCS 
articulated by liberal cosmopolitans as being constituted by free-thinking, rationally self-
directed agents. However, the autonomy associated with GCS renders it as a distinct and 
transcendent social field divorced from place-based constraints. This ignores the manner 
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in which alter-globalisation networks may derive their agency from factors and locales 
beyond their immediate appearance which questions the degree to which they can be 
thought of as self-directed or rational actors. 
1.2.4 Incremental change and claims-making 
Manning claims that in liberal thought "progress has been and will continue to be made 
in the quality of human life, but, from the liberal point of view, all such progress will be 
piecemeal and gradual." (1976: 21). I have already discussed how Kaldor (2005) 
especially, ahhough not uniquely, re-sites civil society from national to global 
governance arrangements. Implicit in this must be a recognition therefore of the claims-
making nature of GCS. Furthermore, as also argued above, GCS is conceived by liberal 
cosmopolitans as a deliberative space of reconcilability. It is likely therefore that any 
claims-making advanced from this space must be done incrementally. 
Indeed, many of the liberal cosmopolitans considered here advance similar ideas about 
the incrementaL claims-making nature of GCS. Falk contends that GCS advances a 
criticaL but non-rejectionist, stance towards economic globalisation, seeking to regulate it 
to correct social injustices (1999: 136). Echoing this position, Keane argues that GCS 
should not be seen as the "natural enemy of political institutions" (2001: 36). 
Furthermore, Falk holds out what might be considered to be a highly liberal hope that one 
day the forces of global capital may moderate the content of their programme as a 
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response to the critique ofGCS (1999: 152). This once again rules out any analysis of 
alter-globalisation networks enacting relations of oppositionality or escape from 
dominant hegemonic powers. 
1.2.5 The Peaceful Market 
The work of John Keane in particular gives weight to the last of the main constitutive 
concepts of the GCS category that I will consider here. Keane asserts that civil society 
grew out of medieval urban centres, themselves formed around the market place. It was 
in these centres that civil society first found the space to be free from the absolutist state 
and to hold it to account (2001: 28). Keane therefore argues that capitalism has been, and 
remains, a key constitutive force ofGCS, and that, in response, GCS is a key constitutive 
force of capitalism. Whereby capitalism has provided the technology and innovation to 
energise GCS, GCS provides the family ties (for example, transnational migrants), 
community associations and shared social and linguistic norms without which capitalism 
could not survive (ibid: 31). 
Such an analysis is not necessarily liberal. As will be explored in subsequent discussions, 
the relationship between alter-globalisation networks and global capitalism is not a 
straightforward one, and shares some of the features described here by Keane. What 
marks this rendition out as distinctly liberal is Keane's assertion that global capitalism 
carries with it an essentially positive social potential. Whilst noting the poor human rights 
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record of some for-profit actors, he argues that most global businesses have a shared 
interest in the spread of peace and democracy - "Their chief executive officers, for 
instance. do not like working within the deathly shadows ofknee-capping, abduction, or 
murder" (ibid: 33). This reveals a liberal-institutionalist view of the benefits of the free 
market as a key guarantor of liberty (although clearly the historical preference by 
Liberals for state-managed capitalism reveals the limits they themselves see in free 
markets). Gray contends that the market is unique in its ability to ensure peace between 
potentially conflicting individuals and agents. due to the compulsion to equilibrium 
which market signals are said to produce. Thus the spread of free market capitalism is 
argued to be key to guaranteeing peace amongst such conflicting agents (1986: 69). 
However, this perspective only recognises the desirability of political rights and 
freedoms, whilst relegating the social, economic and environmental rights which often 
appear less well-regarded by transnational corporations (see Broad and Cavanagh, 2(08). 
This pure focus on political rights leads Keane to claim that global capitalism has 
contributed to the kinds of social capital and cultural diversity which act as one of the 
guarantors of civility and peace within GCS (2001: 33), something which, as will become 
clear in the following sections and chapters, is a questionable claim, and which overlooks 
the manner by which capitalist logics also serve to disempower the potentially radical 
subjectivities of alter-globalisation networks. 
J. 2. 6 A Concluding note on the Liberalism of GCS theorists 
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In this short section I have argued that the imagination of GCS provided by the writers 
considered here draws on a distinctly liberal political and social epistemology (this is 
what justifies the first half of the term 'liberal cosmopolitan 12». In summary, their body 
of thOUght can be argued to contain five (not necessarily exclusive) constitutive liberal 
concepts, namely: post-Westphalianism; deliberative, peaceful teleology; rational agency; 
incremental claims-based change; and the peaceful nature of the market. It is not my 
contention here that the thought of Keane, or the other liberal cosmopolitans I have 
considered, is underpinned by a commitment to free market ideology, just as it has not 
been my contention that GCS as a category is essentially liberal. Rather, it could be said 
that the liberal cosmopolitan rendition ofGCS represents one iteration (amongst many) of 
liberal thought as a response to current structural conditions. Understood as such it is 
possible to contend that the five constitutive concepts of the GCS category discussed 
above, and their liberal characteristics, illustrate an atrmity between GCS as a category 
and various liberal ideas about the market, individua~ state, peace and the global order 
which I have explored here, even if these are not necessarily considered to be exclusively 
constitutive of GCS as a category. As I will shortly argue, though, this Liberal affinity 
does have important implications for the theoretical and ontological claims implied by 
liberal cosmopolitans about GCS. The following sections will deal with these claims, and 
will begin to shed light on the extent to which they are useful in helping to analyse the 
agency of alter-globalisation networks. 
12 An exploration of the second half of this term (cosmq>olitan) will follow later on in the chapter. 
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1.3 The Theoretical and Ontoloiical claims ofthe Liberal Cosmopolitans 
As just discussed, this section will address the theoretical and ontological claims implied 
by the liberal cosmopolitans for GCS. This is important to understand as it provides a 
way of judging the merits ofGCS as an analytical tool for the study ofalter-globalisation 
networks. These claims broadly concern the various ways in which alter-globalisation 
networks implicitly and explicitly are constituted by and manage different relations of 
power. The two broad areas of claims that I will consider here are: the relationships 
between aIter-globalisation networks and statist and neo-liberal hegemonic power as 
rendered in a GCS framework; and the tensions between the cosmopolitan visions and 
particularistic demands which alter-globalisation networks are said to transcend by GCS 
theorists. These two areas invoke both theoretical claims which frame these issues (which 
build on the liberal cosmopoIitics of GCS theorists), as well as ontological claims about 
the actors and forces which constitute them Both claims are largely the result of the 
liberal epistemology which was discussed previously, and the following sections will 
explore in much greater detail the severe limits this epistemology places on a full 
understanding of tile agencies ofalter-globalisation networks. 
1. j. 1 Statist and Neo-liberal Hegemony 
This section will address how liberal cosmopolitans understand the relationship between 
statist and neo-liberal hegemony, and alter-globalisation networks. Hegemony will be 
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considered for the moment in both strictly Gramscian13 and more post-structuralistl4 
termsl5. This is to allow for a full analysis of how liberal cosmopolitans relate to the 
concept(s) of hegemony. According to liberal cosmopolitans, what is the relationship 
between GCS and statist and neo-liberal formations, and what light does this shed on how 
the actors within GCS are conceived to challenge dominant modes of implicit authority? 
This section will therefore explore how the answers to these questions shed light on how 
GCS can be used to understand the agencies of alter-globalisation networks, and the 
relationships these agencies embody between such networks and statist and neo-liberal 
hegemony. 
As might be expected from a perspective which draws on a liberal imagination of the 
state, statist formations (i.e. both nation-states, or, where it is held that the nation-state is 
increasingly irrelevant, global governance structures) are held to "playa positive-sum 
role in protecting, funding, and nurturing non-profit organisations in every part of the 
earth where there is a lively civil society" (Keane. 2001 :35). Furthermore, as explained in 
13 As to the manner by which one group of interests seeks to dominate other interest groups 
(Gramsci, 1971: 57), through balancing their competing interests (Day, 2005: 8) or liquidating them 
(Gramsci, 1973: 57). This view of hegemony sees "power concealed in the legitimate status-quo trappings 
of society's structures, rules. class mechanisms. and cultures. prevent[ing] conflict from arising" (Hardy 
and O'Sullivan, 1998: 456) 
14 As to the manner in which there is no hidden truth which can be revealed to those whose interests 
are being 'balanced' or 'dominated'. There is, in essence, no 'external' power, which can be overthrown; 
no delineation between the state on one hand, and society on the other (Mohan, 2002: 9). Hegemony is 
therefore unpredictable and uneven. simultaneouslyauthorless (Ferguson, 20(0) yet omnipresent, but 
contestable in that omnipresence. This is why hegemony is at once both all-pervasive if embodied fully by 
the social actors it works through, and because of this, re-workable and subvert-able also. See Laclau and 
Mouffe. 1985: 180; Hardy and O'Sullivan, 1998; Danaher, et ai, 2000: 49; Mohan and Stokke. 2007: 5S8; 
Gilbert, 2008: 137. 
I' Both of these approaches will be brought into more detailed conversation in Chapter Two 
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my discussion ofGCS and liberalism, GCS is constructed by liberal cosmopolitans with a 
distinctly post-Westphalian stance. Beck. in particular. has argued that what he calls the 
"container" theory ofthe state (1997: 23) has now been shattered by globalisation (ibid: 
24) - "Even urban rummagers live in and from the garbage of world society, and remain 
linked into the symbolic circuits of global culture industries" (ibid: 66). Whilst one could 
move from this position to conceive of new statist formations in a number of ways, 
liberal cosmopolitans tend to look towards the sustenance and evolution of existing 
institutions of global governance as the bedrock of a new global democracy (Beck, 1997: 
129-155; !(aldor, 2005: 107; Falk, 1999: 133). 
This discussion points towards two issues worth further exploration. Firstly, that 
governance structures, whether national or globaL at least carry the potential to be 
facilitative of civil society and/or GCS; and secondly, that the nation-state is becoming 
increasingly irrelevant to the everyday lives of populations around the world. Within the 
context provided by these two claims, alter-globalisation networks thus represent the key 
element ofGCS which will represent the needs and demands of those populations. 
In that liberal cosmopolitans foster a belief that national and global governance structures 
carry the potential to be facilitative for civil society andlor GCS, such a conceptualisation 
appears to be productive to a certain point, but leaves us unable to fully capture processes 
of hegemonic dominance. Kaldor, for example, explains that GCS has its roots in the pro-
democracy movements of 1980s Eastern Europe. She argues that these movements gave 
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voice to ordinary citizens struggling for their rights. The advent of cheap travel and 
communications technology has now connected such struggles together in the field of 
GCS (2005: 106). Cbandhoke, though, offers an alternative perspective on this history 
which illuminates gaps in the liberal cosmopolitan conceptualisation of the modes of 
hegemonic control which civil society actors sometimes operate within. Pointing to the 
fact that the explosion of civil society activity in Eastern Europe occurred simultaneously 
with the re-fashioning of the term by the World Bank16, Chandhoke argues that state and 
civil society are in a symbiotic relationship, whereby the state sets the limits of political 
discourse in response to the transgression of previously set limits. Chandboke argues that 
an emancipatory civil society is created in these moments of transgression. but it is quite 
often the case that civil society does not transgress these boundaries, and is in fact 
defined by them (1995: 9). This means the agency of alter-globalisation networks must be 
viewed within the webs ofhegemonic power in which they operate. 
Chandboke also shows how the space of civil society is one which is often disciplined 
and abnormalising. Codes of 'polite' behaviour and etiquette discipline individuals and 
social formations (ibid: 186), whilst the space of civil society becomes "a neutralized 
space, it neutralizes those forms of politics which are outside stipulated limits, or those 
which question the composition of the sphere." (ibid: 187). Furthermore, Chatterjee 
distinguishes between the idealised, or 'fictive' notion of civil society, and the everyday 
16 Thus questioning the degree to which the pro-democracy movements of Eastern Europe arose 
autonomously, rather than because it was expedient for them to do so in the eyes of nco-liberal statist 
powers like the World Bank 
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governmentality of 'political society'. According to Chatterjee, civil society describes the 
relationship between the birth of the nation-state in the West, which required engaged 
citizens to monitor and participate in the nascent state, and its people, who fulfilled this 
function. The birth of the nation-state in most of the world, however, occurred in the 
context of colonial rule, which had already instituted a system of governmentality which 
segmented people into administrable population groups along lines of ethnicity and tribe. 
These people were not citizens, but subjects, and were not required to participate in the 
state. Whilst the early anti-colonial struggles were initially energised by republican ideals 
of the citizen, the notion of the developmental state, encouraged by international donors 
and NGOs, re-instituted colonial methods of governmentality, creating population groups 
along lines of health, wealth and education, ostensibly so they could be 'cared' 
for/administered by the state (2004: 36-38). This does not necessarily result in the 
reduction of democratic possibilities for people. Chatterjee reveals the opposite in his 
work around the slums of Calcutta, where such subjects have re-subjectified themselves 
to take advantage of governmental processes (ibid: 77). 
These understandings of the relationships between the state and subjects have 
ramifications for the ideas and applicability of GCS to the study of alter-globalisation 
networks. The notion ofGCS assumes a participative role for alter-globalisation networks 
and the actors which constitute them in the various formations of global and regional 
governance. Whilst I do not necessarily share Chatterjee's view that civil society is a 
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fictive and irrelevant notion everywhere in the post-colonial world17, his idea of 'political 
society' (ibid: 36-38) does problematise the degree to which understanding aher-
globalisation networks through the prism of GCS encourages us to focus too much on the 
power they exert over their objects of contestation. This carries the potential of 
overlooking the degree to which aspects of their subjectivity may be defined by these 
same objects of contestation, and how they form around relations of dependence and 
'care' to national statist powers, and more recent arrangements of global governance. 
We can see how viewing the power of GCS as a one-way process is problematic 
(whereby GCS is the power-exerting force). when we consider GCS's relationship to 
market forces. Where Keane views this set of relationships as largely unproblematic. 
Lipschutz shares Chandhoke's view on civil society more broadly, and concludes that 
this relationship with neo-liberal capitalist logics means that GCS "does little to alter the 
structure of either national or global political economies" (Lipschutz, 2005: 750). This 
means that rather than being a space constructed by organisations through whom the 
voices of individuals can be heard (Kaldor, 2003: 79), and which thus 'speaks to' 
markets. it is as likely that GCS is a space which is constituted by the very injustices 
which it seeks to address. 
17 It is rather Chatterjee's problematisation of the inherent benefits and universal applicability of 
civil society as a conceptual and normative category which I find useful here. In other words, Chaterjee's 
argument assists in understanding that the develq>ment of civil society is not always a good thing in and of 
itself. This theme will be returned to shortly. 
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This discussion helps to identifY a problematic gap in the ontological claims of Liberal 
cosmopolitans, and the way they invoke the subjects of GCS as autonomous self-directed 
actors. Kaldor draws heavily on the work ofKeck and Sikkink on transnational advocacy 
networks (1998; Khagram, Riker and Sikkink, 2002) to populate her vision of the 
progressive and representative elements of GCS (Kaldor, 2003: 95). Transnational 
advocacy networks (TANs) are held to consist of NGOs and social movements which 
hold specifically international institutions to account over international norms (Khagram, 
Riker and Sikkink, 2002: 3-4). TANs are distinguished from transnational advocacy 
coalitions (TACs) which are held to be more coherent and contain greater degrees of 
formal institutionalisation (ibid: 7). For these writers then the subjects of the progressive 
realm ofGCS are non-governmental organisations (NGOs) and social movements. Their 
value is evident to the authors considered in this chapter; Kaldor claims that ''they 
provide an opportunity for voices of grassroots groups to be heard" (2003: 95). Similarly, 
others argue that such networks and coalitions constitute a global democmcy (Falk, 1999: 
133) and open up a " ... tmnsnational space of the moral and the subpolitical" (Beck, 
1997: 26). Keane has further argued that this accessible and democratic space is 
analogous to a living biosphere - ''These ecosystems of Global Civil Society... are 
interconnected. And they are more or less intricately balanced through continuous flows 
and recycling of efforts among ... popUlations of individuals of the same species" (2001: 
24). This suggests that the actors which constitute alter-globalisation networks interact in 
spaces of equality, sharing and human values. 
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These notions can be highly contestable. Massey argues that what we traditionally defme 
as being 'global' is relationally constructed through the daily practices of people and 
institutions in different localities (themselves relationally constructed). As such Massey 
contends that 
"different places will stand in contrasting relations to the global. They are differentially 
located within the wider power-geometries. Mali and Chad, most certainly, may be 
understood as occupying positions of relative powerlessness. But London, or the USA, or 
the UK? These are the places in and through which globaJisation is produced" (2005: 101). 
This challenges Keane's notion of a 'finely balanced' GCS - different spatial 
arrangements are produced by and incubate different sets of power relations, which 
means that one cannot create relationships with other places without taking account of 
one's own actions in constructing them. So, whilst Keane's conception of GCS takes a 
relational perspective, it implicitly flattens or smoothes the processes by which spaces are 
constructed, thereby ignoring the power crucial to these constructions, and how power 
circulates differentially, empowering some more than others. This is particularly the case 
with the NGOs and social movements which populate the progressive elements of GCS, 
operating in different social and political contexts, with different levels of funding and 
historically produced epistemologies of social justice (see NageL 2005; Yanacopulos, 
2009). Translating alter-globalisation networks into a notion ofGCS therefore creates the 
conditions of an uncritical and fIXed assessment of them It ignores how alter-
globalisation networks are constructed as subjects via a differentiated and relational 
process, and problematises any claims to democratic representivity made from within 
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these spaces (Gabay, 2010). This in tum problematises the equalising effect GCS is 
supposed to have on power inequalities within it. If GCS itself is imbued by these very 
inequalities, then how can the alter-globalisation networks which populate it necessarily 
hold out the promise of a more democratic future? This opens up a range of important 
questions regarding accessibility, representivity, legitimacy and authenticity when 
analysing alter-globalisation networks, questions which seem unimportant if viewing 
such networks through the optimistic lens of Liberal cosmopolitanism and GCS. 
In fact both Kaldor (2003: 107) and Keane (2001: 38) explicitly recognise this lack of 
representativity. Yet they nonetheless argue that this is not necessarily problematic. 
Whereas Kaldor claims that the message of GCS is more important tban its internal 
democracy (2003: 107), Keane (2009) has argued for the recognition of a new form of 
'monitory' democracy which seeks to redefine representation. He argues that since 1945 
there has been a proliferation of non-traditional democratic forms, noting over 100 
alternative models (for example, participatory budgeting, truth and reconciliation 
commissions, social forums, etc) whose common function appears to be in their 
'monitory' capacity, i.e. their capacity to monitor traditional (the state) and newer (e.g. 
multi-national corporations) sites of power. Keane argues that democracy has always 
been based on representation and that these new monitory institutions embody new forms 
of representation. The multiplication of sites of representativeness to monitor the exercise 
of power is therefore positive. This is an important step in understanding the extent to 
which GCS as an analytical category helps us to understand the agency of alter-
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globalisation networks. Keane offers a perspective which places the actors which 
constitute these networks (NGOs, social movements, etc) outside of the power of statist 
formations and neo-liberal hegemony. This is because, for Keane, the act of monitoring 
presupposes an active externality to these powers. 
Many criticisms can be made of Keane in this respect. In a Foucauldian sense one could 
query whether the muhiplication of sites of monitory institutions merely represents a 
form of advanced governmentality, where the proliferation of these institutions represents 
the diffusion of statist power over the everyday (Foucault, 198211994, Danaher, Schirato 
and Webb, 2000). This only serves to draw attention to power between organisational 
forms though, rather than within them. As Clegg (1989) argues, organisational forms are 
fluid, in a constant state of contestation as forces within it fight (sometimes literally) to 
fix its representativeness. 'Monitory' institutions therefore do not simply monitor, but 
take on a whole range of other, sometimes contradictory roles. Keane (2009) argues that 
when monitory institutions work well they contest and break down power, but while it 
may indeed be the case, this is a partial picture, as it ignores entirely the potential creation 
and re-creation of new elites and oligarchies. 
Chandhoke is heavily critical of the liberal cosmopolitan conception of civil society as 
purely 'monitory': 
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"The problem with the liberal discourse which privileges civil society is that it .. .is 
profoundly indifferent to the ability or the inability of the inhabitants of civil society to 
participate in the sphere of discussion and debate on equal terms ... far from being havens of 
democracy, peace and good will, civil societies have notoriously oppressed their own 
inhabitants." (1995: 12) 
Pederson further argues that an emancipatory political space is not necessarily rooted in 
civil society, but in the '»ossibilities for groups of the poor to bring about change through 
local organizations" (2002: 15). An emancipatory civil society might be the outcome, but 
the existence of it is no guarantee of social change. This is because of the potential 
always carried within civil society of colluding in and reproducing domination. 
In a discussion of the public role of 'monitory' institutions, then, this means they are 
always being worked through by other actors (such as statist formations) as well as 
working on them. This has implications for the kind of potential for public involvement 
and social change we invest in what are in reality normative concepts deployed by 
Liberal cosmopolitans in this regard, rather than empirically robust cases. It calls for an 
exploration of the actual actors which comprise aher-globalisation networks, rejecting the 
a priori assumption of liberal cosmopolitans that these actors are automatically 
democratic and autonomous from nec-liberal and statist hegemonic powers. 
A number of writers have problematised the kinds of organisations and networks in 
which liberal cosmopolitans invest so much potential for monitoring power, such as the 
NGOs and social movements which constitute alter-globalisation networks. Tembo 
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(2003), Kasfir (1998), and Mohan and Stokke (2007) all question the relevance of 
international NGOs who bring particularly donor-driven and neo-liberal conceptions of 
civil society development to countries where such models are inappropriate, or to 
contexts in which they are harmful to indigenous democratic formations. Mawdsley, 
Townsend and Porter (2002, 2005) assert that this donor agenda is operationalised 
through the reporting systems placed on aid-agency grant recipients, be they international 
or national. This is most damaging, though, in the national context, where Northern 
reporting cultures may be unfamiliar and inhibiting of more indigenously developed 
modes of accountability. 
Indeed, far from enabling ordinary citizens to have their voices heard (Kaldor, 2003; 
2005), Yanacopulos (2009) has noted the manner in which aker-globalisation networks 
can be split by more and less radical ways of framing issues of justice, with international 
NGOs often being those less inclined to adopt the radical positions which reflect the 
desires of the most marginalised. Townsend claims that the moderation of international 
NGO workers can be explained by the notion that those who populate professionalised 
NGOs are subsequently drawn into a "transnational community" characterised by a 
common language of managerialism, reporting and accountability and a desire to 
legitimise their jobs and organisations (1998: 615). Kamat (2002; 2004) explains this in 
ideological terms. She argues that NGOs are deeply implicated in the neo-liberal 
hegemonic project of which the international development agenda is one part. Kamat 
asserts that NGOs and 'new social movements', both of which fit into Keane's notion of 
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'monitory democracy', do not represent a devolution of power from the state as Keane 
would hold, but in fact represent a reproduction of statist and capitalist formations in 
public spaces, what Kamat calis the 'NGO-isation' of public space i.e. increasing 
professionalisation, fiscal responsibility and accountability. Kamat argues that this is a 
victory for capitalist "development hegemony" (2002: 615). Lipschutz argues that this 
'NGO-isation' is in fact a marketisation, and notes the ever increasing discursive affmity 
between many NGOs and private corporations (2006: 17). Furthermore, in more prosaic 
terms, Heins notes that many NGOs are more interested in establishing their formal rights 
with International Governmental Organisations, "since they have reasons to assume that 
by relying on quasi-feudal institutional habits and personal privileges of access they get 
more out of the political game" (2005: 194). In stating this he explicitly criticises Kaldor 
for imagining "that a global civil society based on NOOs can make international 
organizations more attuned to the concerns of ordinary citizens as opposed to states" (op 
cit). 
The literature considered above calis into question the ontological claims made by 
Liberal cosmopolitans that the NGOs, social movements, TANs, T ACs and monitory 
institutions which constitute alter-globalisation networks, and by extension GCS, are 
characteristically progressive, or work in an uncomplicated sense for or on behalf of a 
global citizenry. That these claims are made in the fust place should not be swprising, 
given the liberal cosmopolitan bias which infuses the work of such theorists. Nonetheless, 
it appears that alter-globalisation networks, constituted as they are by the organisational 
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and movement forms considered above, are an assemblage of contradictory and complex 
characteristics, rather than uncomplicated forbearers of a new global democracy. They 
are not merely the historical and teleological subjects of socio-economic transformation, 
although I would not disagree with the liberal coslllOpolitans that they could be, but also 
reproduce structural domination and historical imperial projects. This is not to suggest an 
overly deterministic perspective on alter-globalisation networks and the actors which 
constitute them: as my empirical chapters will show there are clear examples of 
emancipatory practices possible within them, but I do mean to suggest the importance of 
being mindful of all the constitutive relationships which create these networks as subjects 
to be written about and celebrated or otherwise. 
Another important area where Liberal cosmopolitans can be critiqued (in the context of 
the relationship between GCS and statist and neo-liberal hegelllOnic power, and how they 
obscure a fuller understanding of the agencies of aher-globalisation networks) is in their 
belief that GCS is characteristic of a post-Westphalian age. Ugarteche asserts that the 
Westphalian state has 
"sent a rather strong message that it does not plan to pass away in the near future ... There 
exists no global logic that transcends the national interest of the leading natiros, namely of 
the United States ... Power is 'national', has a flag, an army and interests." (2007: 65) 
He continues to argue that aher-globalisation-type actors have had little to no impact, and 
gain minimal coverage with mainstream media outlets because global problems largely 
62 
require national responses (ibid: 68). Bickerton, Cunliffe and Gourevich follow this 
theme when they assert that, whilst there is indeed a contemporary challenge to national-
sovereignty, this has come predominantly from the imperial projects of other nation 
states. Alter-globalisation networks offer no meaningful resistance to such attacks, and so 
"the framework of the sovereign state remains the best means of organizing and 
sustaining the process of politics, in opposition to all that is offered in its place" (2007: 
14). 
The traditional binaries posited between the local and the globa~ the national and the 
transnational, and the universal and the particular, will be engaged with in greater depth 
in Chapter Three. For the moment it is important to state that I do not fully agree with the 
critics just cited above. Depending on the context, the local or the national can be the 
victim of global 'structural violence' (Galtung, 1969; Galtung and HOivik, 1971; Jones, 
2005), but such processes come from somewhere, and these places are often identifiable 
single or multiple locales (Massey, 2005), or circuit nodes (Clegg, 1989), themselves 
multiply constituted. It is thus not a straightforward process and no one side of the debate 
can claim with absolute authority the pre-eminence of the national or the global as the 
site for political struggle. 
This debate has, however, revealed that whilst the liberal cosmopolitan rendition ofGCS 
does allow us to understand alter-globalisation networks as constituted by 'external' 
agents such as statist and global governance structures, and the ways in which these 
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structures may be held to account by alter-globalisation networks, it does not possess the 
critical conceptual tools with which to capture processes of hegemonic or 
governmentalised control, nor the continuing, and in some cases, increasing relevance of 
nation-states. Where Beck accuses those with a fixation on the nation state and national 
contexts of exhibiting 'methodological nationalism' (i.e. being so fixated on the state as 
an autonomous unit of analysis that other more fundamental sociological and political 
processes are ignored), (1997: 87), it is equally possible to accuse liberal cosmopolitans 
of 'methodological globalism' in their enthusiasm for the 'global' as the unique explainer 
of contemporary sociological and political phenomena. Indeed, the positing of the global 
as an autonomous and post-modern social sphere underpins the misplaced liberal 
cosmopolitan notion that alter-globalisation networks necessarily represent a new and 
more hopeful form ofpolitics which transcends historical borders and particularisms. It is 
precisely because the global is not a distinct sphere which can be entered freely, but 
which is made, produced from particular sites, that alter-globalisation networks do not 
necessarily prefigure democratic alternatives, but instead reproduce, or at least are forced 
to work within, hegemonic domination!8. This is yet another example of how the liberal 
cosmopolitan epistemology which underpins GCS contains severe limitations for 
understanding the agencies of alter-glob ali sat ion networks. 
18 A fuller exploration oftbe social production of space and its relevance to understanding the 
agencies of alter-globalisation networks will take place in Chapter Three. 
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This section has problematised the liberal cosmopolitan approach to the relationship 
between alter-globalisation networks and statist and neo-liberal hegemonic power, and 
the implications of this for understanding the agencies, potentials and limitations of alter-
globalisation networks, and for GCS as an analytical category. The next section will 
consider a further set of theoretical and ontological claims made by liberal cosmopolitan 
writers - the relationship between cosmopolitanism and particularism - and what this 
reveals about the potentials of alter-globalisation networks, as rendered by liberal 
cosmopolitans, for transcending politically damaging particularistic divisiveness. 
1.3.2 Cosmopolitanism and Particularism 
Thus far in this chapter I have referred to a rendition of GCS which is characterised by 
the Liberal cosmopolitanism of its main academic proponents. I have spent a great deal of 
time illustrating how to justify the 'Liberal' aspect of this characterisation, but have to a 
degree neglected the 'cosmopolitan' aspect of it. This is in part because the 
cosmopolitanism of the GCS project is so very explicit, in both ethical and institutional 
respects. I have already discussed the Liberal cosmopolitan desire to bolster cosmopolitan 
institutional arrangements of global governance (see section 1.2.4). The ethical 
imperative of cross-border peace and other regarded-ness characteristic of cosmopolitan 
political theory since Kant (1795/2006) is similarly embedded in Liberal cosmopolitan 
thOUght. Keane, for example, argues that GCS is characterised by "a strong dislike of 
war, a facility for languages, or a commitment to ordinary courtesy and respect for 
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others" (2001: 38), whilst Kaldor posits GCS as an arena open to all people (2005: 110). 
It is nonetheless important to consider what a 'liberal' cosmopolitanism might look like, 
and the implications of this for understanding alter-globalisation networks. 
In this section, then, I will be exploring how those who celebrate the development of a 
global civil society imbue the concept with a particular kind of cosmopolitanism which 
has implications for GCS's usefulness as an analytical category for alter-globalisation 
networks. This will be a normative as well as an analytical critique. The two are, of 
course, intimately linked. If we accept the liberal cosmopolitan analysis that GCS enacts 
emancipatory and horizontal relationships of solidarity across social, economic and 
geographical distance, then the normative claim that GCS represents new forms of global 
democracy becomes substantiated. I will argue, however, that the cosmopolitanism of the 
main liberal cosmopolitans considered here only allows for a partial analysis of the 
agencies of alter-globalisation networks. This is because, if accepted on its own terms, we 
ignore the destructive element of liberal cosmopolitanism and GCS. This element 
emerges from the very same normative sources which liberal cosmopolitans claim lend 
GCS its ethical desirability. 
Ifwe accept that alter-globalisation networks are constituted by particularistic nodes, then 
we must expect that these nodes might produce mutual misunderstandings and have 
major differences between them (Routledge, 2003) - "Very often the moral Esperanto 
which slowly emerges in spite of this background ... is not backed up by everyday 
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organizational linkages deserving the name of solidarity" (Heins, 2000: 43). These major 
differences are not necessarily coincidenta~ but produced by the very same forces which 
Liberal cosmopolitans claim have produced their progressive GCS. Colas' (2005) 
research into Maghrebi social movements, for example, reveals the uneven nature of 
GCS, and the manner in which it produces different and sometimes inimical empirical 
realities within the alter-globalisation field. Whilst the factors explaining the emergence 
of Maghrebi social movements are comparable to that of the 'civil' members of GCS 
(Falk, 2005:75), i.e. the inequities of global capitalism, ce ••• they simultaneously stand and 
fight against everything liberals - and indeed other progressives - associate to this sphere 
of world politics" (Colas, 2005: 32). Similarly, Anderson and Rieff make the point that 
the Roman Catholic Church and many other politically conservative Christian 
denominations could, but for their politics of course, be considered as global NGOs or 
social movements (2004: 29), and thus part of the way alter-globalisation networks are 
conceived of by GCS theorists - in terms of Fa1k's 'globalisation from below', for 
instance (1999). This suggests that to understand their agencies, potentials and 
limitations, alter-globalisation networks have to be studied on their own terms, without 
making any a priori assumptions about their cosmopolitan nature. 
As has already been noted, liberal cosmopolitans celebrate the potential of alter-
globalisation networks in creating a new global democratic citizenry. How then, do these 
theorists conceptualise the tensions (referenced above) between the different nodes which 
constitute these networks (the tensions between cosmopolitan and particularistic 
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pretensions), and what ontological claims does this lead them to make about the manner 
in which these tensions are overcome within aker-globalisation networks? To answer 
these questions it seems important to understand the kind of cosmopolitanism liberal 
cosmopolitans propose. both as an explanatory concept and a normative project. This will 
help to identify the analytical limitations ofGCS as imagined by liberal cosmopolitans. 
Liberal cosmopolitans have framed the post-Cold War proliferation of global progressive 
networking and campaigning as the extension and embodiment of what Erskine calls 
"ethical cosmopolitanism" - that which entails a universal scope of ethical concern 
(2002: 457). Similarly. Nussbaum has asserted that the emergence of these networks 
represent that filet that individuals increasingly need "an ability to see themselves as not 
simply citizens of some local region or group but also. and above all, as human beings 
bound to all other human beings by ties of recognition and concern: as 'citizens of the 
world'" (2004: 3). 
The extension of this ethical perspective in practice requires a questionable sense of 
universal similarity across large swathes of humanity. often divided by socia~ economic. 
culturaL as well as geographic distance. When Keane (2001) claims that violence is 
inimical to GCS he does so because he believes that its members (including. if we recall. 
private transnational capital) share a cosmopolitan outlook. Once again it is possible to 
detect here the liberal belief in the fundamental rational co-existence of the human 
experience. which can overcome particularistic power inequalities. 
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This perspective shares much with the (arguably) uncritical cosmopolitanism of Peter 
Singer. Singer asserts that if individuals can show compassion for their compatriots (who 
in many countries consist of many races, faiths, etc), then it is rational to expect them to 
show compassion to anyone, regardless of nationality. It: Singer argues, we accept that 
individuals are likely to act kindly towards their diverse compatriots, then II impartialism 
is not beyond our physical powers. It is not even ... beyond our moral powers. Each of 
us, individually, is capable of acting impartially, even if most of us, most of the time 
choose not to do so" (2004: 27-28). However, Singer's assumption that members of the 
same political community treat each other with respect and compassion is contradicted by 
the lived experiences of people who suffer from structural and individual violence and 
abuse on a daily basis from actors within the national spaces they occupy (Gabay, 2008: 
201). Despite the problems with this justification, Singer (1999) still recommends that 
people with relative wealth should immediately donate this wealth to organisations 
working with people living in poverty, such as Oxfam. 
Kuper argues that Singer's conclusions neglect the relational sense in which we are 
connected, for "where we do not share our everyday lives with people, we interact with 
them through a complex and differentiated web of political and economic relations": 
(2002: 112). This is also a position shared by Calhoun (2002), who illustrates the degree 
to which transnational activists and profeSSionals constitute a class differentiated by 
power and resources from those they purport to work on behalf of i.e. those living in 
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poverty. Singer's solution to world suffering ignores this relational aspect of structurally 
caused poverty. A similarly non-relational approach can be found in the work of two 
significant figures in liberal cosmopolitan thought, Nussbaum (2004), and Appiah (2007), 
both of whom advocate a cosmopolitanism based on learning about distant others, and in 
Appiah's case, to reading foreign newspapers and watching non-English language films 
with subtitles (2007: 2381). This is an approach which is at once both elitist, and appears 
to relegate the structural conditions which resuhs in the college students of North 
America (with whose cosmopolitan education Nussbaum (2004) is concerned) being 
ignorant of the lives of distant others. When Keane suggests that GCS is characterised by 
respect and courtesy (2001: 38), he relies on a similar elitist and non-relational 
cosmopolitan logic. It might be very easy for a relatively weahhy and privileged activist 
to show respect for difference, but this renders as 'uncivil' (Falk, 2005: 75) the anger of 
those who are victims of the very same structures which privilege the weahhy activist. By 
the liberal cosmopolitan logic these 'uncivil' actors represent a particularistic. 
communitarian backwardness which GCS is supposed to overcome. How then can GCS 
be truly cosmopolitan if those who populate it are unable to conceive of the anger 
produced by their structural privilege as belonging to the same social space? As 
established by liberal cosmopolitans. alter-globalisation networks can thus only be 
understood as highly inimical to the inclusion of the most marginalised and oppressed, 
externalising their anger and violence as 'uncivil'. 
70 
Douzinas argues that these exclusions are historical and expected. He claims that the 
Liberal-individualistic approach to cosmopolitan ethics represents the secularisation of 
historical religious eschatology. Whereas the Judeo-Christian notion of the messianic 
figure was to come from outside humanity and lead it into a utopian age, Kant and Hegel 
transferred this messianic agency onto humanity. It was now individuals who could lead 
humanity into utopia. Importantly though, it was also now 'Man', and not God, who got 
to decide what being 'human' meant (2007: 151-177)19. Van de Veer (2002) argues that it 
is this kind of Liberal individualism which transferred to imperial powers, who forged the 
originary of contemporary cosmopolitan practice through the colonial encounter. Indeed, 
others argue that this ancestral individualistic cosmopolitanism is still alive in 
contemporary cosmopolitan practice -
''the fetishization of liberal individualism has, in the past few years, created a cosmopolitan 
imaginary signified by the icons of singular personhood. What represents the spirit of world 
citizenship today? In recent years the answer to this question has not elicited ideas and 
ideals, but philanthropic individuals-Mother Theresa (for her love of the world's poor), 
George Soros (for his economic investment in Central Europe), Ted Turner (for his billion 
dollar contributioo to the United Natioos), the late Princess Diana (for her identificatioo 
with the global issues of AIDS and land mines), and perhaps Bill Gates (for his lordly hold 
on the universe)" (pollock, Bhabha, Breckenridge, 2004: 581) 
The argument I am developing here is that to embody and enact a liberal 
cosmopolitanism, there must be a suffering other which must be excluded and uhimately 
19 Douzinas also recognises the Janus-faced nature of cosmopolitanism, i.e. the possibility of it 
being nm-hierarchical and dominating. I will be addressing the 'other' side of cosmopolitanism in Chapter 
Three (and how it can provide a more optimistic way of understanding the agencies of alter -globalisatim 
networks), the point here being that the form which Doozinas so trenchantly critiques has been the 
dominant strain in Western history through the modern era, and has been heavily influential 00 the thought 
of the Liberal cosmopolitans considered in this chapter. 
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destroyed in order for the liberal cosmopolitan project to succeed. In other words, if a 
liberal cosmopolitan project is to succeed, it must 'save' this suffering other, thus 
reducing and then destroying the identity of it. This is because the aim of the liberal 
cosmopolitan project is for a socio-economically equitable world, where care for distant 
others would be unnecessary, or at least, the need might be extremely minimal. However, 
where constitutive structural inequalities are unacknowledged, the nmch greater 
structural, social, technological and economic power which the cosmopolitan benefactor 
brings to the relationship of care across distance will almost always see the destruction of 
the distant sufferer, either imaginatively (we 'imagine' that our donations to aid agencies 
have solved the crisis, which recedes from our television screens and minds, even whilst 
people continue to suffer and die), or sometimes violently (Iraq was invaded and Iraqis 
killed so that they might be saved)20. 
The liberal cosmopolitan project will therefore be considered unnecessary when all 
suffering others have been eradicated, not though, through the eradication of the 
conditions which cause them to suffer, but through the destruction of their very 
subjectivities, or even their bodies. This is symptomatic of the modem liberal attempt to 
redress the social inequalities which arise from the unfettered pursuit of individual 
freedom (Manning, 1976; Greengarten, 1981). It could be argued, though, that treating 
the symptoms of structural inequality merely maintains the structures of this inequality 
and silences or oppresses those most disadvantaged by it, in the process expanding, rather 
20 These are illustrative and heuristic examples only. 
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than reducing their number. In reality therefore, the libeml cosmopolitan project can 
never succeed, because the very structuml inequalities which constitute it will always 
produce new suffering others to 'save'. The 'salvation' this project is predicated on 
though merely sediments and reproduces the subjectivities of the marginalised. This can 
most often be seen in the imagery of development and conflict fed to potential donors in 
areas of structural advantage, which is criticised for fetishising both the people and places 
of structural disadvantage (Pigg, 1992; Moeller, 1999 Rozario, 2003; Biccum, 2005; 
Lamers, 2005; Wehbi, 2009). Indeed, this seems to describe the colonial 
cosmopolitanism of the imperial civilising mission - distant others were fetishised; 
deemed to be suffering due to a lack of civility. Where such others could not be 
'civilised' (re-subjectivised) they no longer counted under a definition of what was 
deemed 'human' and were thus violently, culturally and physically destroyed. This 
problematises the claims of some, like Keane (2001), or Youngs (2009), who claim that 
cosmopolitanism is an inherently peaceful perspective, explicitly opposed to violence of 
either the direct or structural kind. 
This all suggests we must be mindful of the exclusions aher-globalisation networks might 
enact, rather than assuming a priori (as the liberal cosmopolitan rendition of GCS 
suggests) that such networks enact horizontal and democratic relations of solidarity and 
inclusion For example, whilst the contemporary cosmopolitans of aher-globalisation 
networks do not on the whole carry guns, the inclination to destroy the suffering other is 
not something that has entirely disappeared. Kapur has illustrated the way in which 
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human rights groups have in their representations destroyed the diverse characteristics 0 f 
women in rural India who have suffered domestic violence by firstly establishing 
essential characteristics and behaviours these women share as victims of violence, and 
then drawing connections between such behaviour and the culture of rural India more 
broadly. There is no room in this articulation for an empowered subject - "the victim-
subject collapses easily into Victorian/colonial assumptions of women as weak. 
winerable, and helpless. It also feeds into conservative, right-wing agendas for 
women, which are protectionist rather than liberating" (2002: 19). 
Korf (2007) furthermore illustrates how NGOs packaged up the diverse and sometimes 
conflicting communities affected by the 2004 Asian! African Tsunami for the 
consumption of what one could call 'armchair cosmopolitans' back in the countries 
where these NGOs were receiving donations from Whilst smiling fishermen stood 
holding new fishing rods in television commercials, other communities suffered from 
government censorship and military oppression (especially in Tamil areas of Sri Lanka, 
and in Aceh, Indonesia). For a liberal cosmopolitan project which ignores the structural 
inequality of its own composition to record its success, these oppressions must be 
discursively removed/destroyed. for they otherwise serve as a constant reminder of the 
very inequalities which constitute this particular cosmopolitan project. Importantly, it is 
not my argument here that the liberal cosmopolitan theorists considered in this chapter 
somehow provide a blueprint for the exclusion of certain subjects, but that this 
exclusivity is implied and sometimes unavoidably executed when this kind of frame is 
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enacted by some of the NGOs and movements which constitute GCS and alter-
globalisation networks.21 
For instance, the assertion that structural inequalities matter is made unnecessary by the 
liberal cosmopolitan (non) approach to power within the rational, self-directed 
organisations it summons as the agents of GCS. Whilst there is an acknowledgement of 
power between alter-globalisation networks and other agents in GCS (such as private 
capital), activist and campaign groups themselves are deemed to be the key to a 
cosmopolitan and inclusive world order, and thus escape the analysis of power within. 
Beck celebrates the power of non-state actors to tie statist formations down in a 
Lilliputian metaphor (1997: 72), without investigating how the demands of such groups 
are constituted. Kaldor is equally uncritical when she asserts that GCS represents a way 
of ordinary people to have their voices heard by those with power (2003: 107). 
Nonetheless, Eschle points out that within GCS it is possible that "those in a more 
structurally privileged position reinforce their position by promulgating a movement 
identity and strategy that fails to challenge and even reproduces hierarchies that shape the 
lives of those less privileged than themselves" (2005: 24). This resonates with a liberal 
21 My treatment of cosmopolitanism in this chapter may appear overly nihilistic. After all, if people 
in structurally privileged positions are causing harm by donating mooey to wocthy causes <as illustrated by 
Korf <2(07) for example), then what else is there that can be done? It is impmant then to bear in mind that 
the critique developed here has been of a particularly liberal, individualistic fmu of cosmopolitanism, 
which, whilst it has been dominant amoogst campaigns and activism in structurally privileged cootexts, 
does not mean that it is the ooly form of cosmopolitanism embodied and enacted through alter-globalisation 
networks. In Chapter Three I will be outlining a more structura1ly sensitive form of cosmopolitanism which 
provides a simultaneous and alternative prism through which to analyse the agencies and powers of alter-
globalisation networks, and which allows us to partially escape the destructive paradox outlined in this 
section. 
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cosmopolitan project which fails to take account of the structural conditions which have 
created it and which it therefore perpetuates. How, then, are Kaldor's voices articulated, 
and by whom? And once again, what does this tell us about the emancipatory agencies or 
otherwise of alter-globalisation networks? 
Jones argues that the voices of the most marginalised are rarely heard by the campaigns 
of GCS. This is because regardless of the causes of suffering, structural violence leaves 
the experiences of the very poorest "intensely local, personal and individualized" (2005: 
68). Jones asks how we can expect people locked into such atomized daily struggles for 
survival to organise resistance or political activism (op cit). Jones' arguments emerge 
from her work with people living in extreme poverty in Mozambique, and whilst 
examples such as the Zapatistas (Collier and Quaratiello. 1999; Marcos, 2(01), or the 
Narmada Dam campaigns (Fisher. 1995; Routledge. 2003b) do point towards the 
possibility of resistance amongst the very poorest, Jones' claims still have some validity. 
This is because they call into question the universal sense in which the relationships 
between the particular individuals or network nodes. and the cosmopolitan organisations 
which Beck (1997), Kaldor (2005) and Keane (2009) suggest speak for them, can be 
considered homogenously emancipatory and unproblematic. It furthermore brings into 
sharp relief the "complex and differentiated web of political and economic relations" 
(Kuper, 2002: 112) which underpins relationships with individuals differentiated from 
each other by geographical and socio-economic distance, and calls for a more nuanced 
solution to weahh discrepancies and cuhural (mis) understanding than that provided by 
76 
Singer (2004), Nussbaum (2004) and Appiah (2007). Indeed, lacking this aspect, the 
liberal cosmopolitan approach to the relationships between the cosmopolitan and 
particular pre/tensions which constitute alter-globalisation networks can be found 
analytically and normatively limited in the following ways: 
i) That in seeking to assert a universal 'sameness', liberal cosmopolitanism in 
fact creates the conditions for authoritarianism, as it removes the possibility 
for dissent (Mouffe, 2005: 90_94)22, and requires the discursive, and 
sometimes physical (although these are not necessarily connected), 
destruction of its exclusions. This can be seen most clearly in the manner in 
which Falk dismisses those groups who do not share his progressive project as 
'uncivil' society (2005: 75). 
ii) That it is ahistoricaL and indeed that it has to be. If the actors which liberal 
cosmopolitans summon as the agents of transcendental socio-economic 
change recognise the construction of their 'emancipatory' project as a colonial 
one (Van de Veer, 2002) replete with the structural inequalities which 
constitute both itself, as well as its suffering other, then this project 
immediately shows itself to be part of the problem, rather than part of the 
solution. This would require a total deconstruction of the role of alter-
globalisation networks in contesting and sustaining socio-economic injustice, 
22 Of course, there is a logical pr-oblem in resolving this issue, which is that the inclusion of 
exclusions must also be universal for all those excluded to be included. How can this universality then not 
also be authcritarian? This is a problem which will be addressed further in the next Chapter. 
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not least by those actors themselves, but also the liberal cosmopolitan theorists 
of them. 
This discussion reveals two issues which will be discussed further in both Chapter Three, 
and Chapter Six. The first issue is to do with the binary which liberal cosmopolitans 
establish between cosmopolitanism as a universal ethic of concern and political 
programme of emancipation, and the particularism of rooted communal or national 
interests which might mitigate against such ethics and programmes. To an extent I have 
indulged this binary in this chapter, in order to explore its analytical usefulness for 
understanding the agencies of alter-globalisation networks. I have found that such an 
approach is analytically limited in that it fails to identify the potential destructiveness and 
exclusivity of such networks. It does so because of the assumption of ethical universality 
made by liberal cosmopolitans. Far from being an abstract universal though, it seems that 
liberal cosmopolitanism certainly comes from somewhere particular, in both time and 
space. The implications of this for the analysis of alter-globalisation networks is that it is 
not necessarily correct to view tensions within them as being between 'universal' 
(transcendent) and 'particular' (rooted) interests, but rather universally particular ones 
(i.e. rooted interests with universalising pretensions). This issue will be explored further 
in subsequent chapters, but for now it is relevant to note that by acknowledging that 
liberal cosmopolitanism is a particular cosmopolitan discourse, we allow ourselves the 
opportunity of trying to identify other cosmopolitan discourses embodied in the agencies 
of alter-globalisation networks. 
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The second issue which this discussion has revealed is that the liberal cosmopolitan 
rendition of GCS does not allow for a sustained analysis of power within aher-
globalisation networks. Just like liberal cosmopolitans posit a binary relationship between 
these networks and statist and neo-liberal hegemony, thus concealing the ways in which 
these networks might be ordered by those powers, a perspective which places alter-
globalisation networks in the context of a universally cosmopolitan global civil society 
conceals the manner in which such networks are produced by different discursive 
constructions of their aims, members, tactics and strategies. Again, these issues will be 
further addressed in Chapters Three and Six. 
1.4 ChAPter Conclusion 
This chapter began with the contention that GCS is a category which has been 
predominantly deployed by a group of writers who can be broadly thought of as liberal 
cosmopolitans. I further argued that its distinctive applicability is lent to it by a heavy 
reliance on strands of both classical and modem liberal thought. I have argued that it is 
possible to detect this reliance in the way that the GCS category draws on five 
fundamentally liberal concepts which are: the belief in the rational self-directing 
individual agent; the potential of capitalism to spread peaceful social relations; the 
deliberative power of alter globalisation networks (and the actors which constitute them) 
to speak on behalf of ordinary people; the decline of the nation state; and the potential of 
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incremental claims making to achieve socio-economic change. I have argued that in turn 
these liberal ideas have conceptually framed the way that liberal cosmopolitans, in their 
rendition ofGCS, approach the content of two theoretical and ontological areas of claims, 
namely the relationships between alter-globalisation networks, statist and neo-liberal 
hegemonic power; and the relationships between the cosmopolitan agendas of alter 
globalisation networks and the particularisms of their network nodes and suffering others 
(both in the construction and content of this binary). 
I have argued that the way that liberal cosmopolitans theorise GCS conceptualises the 
spaces of alter-globalisation networks self-referentially, thus ignoring the ways in which 
these spaces can be constituted and disciplined by other social and economic actors. I 
have also argued that Liberal cosmopolitans theorise the territorial state as being of 
decreasing relevance to politics, and re-sites politics to a 'new' global governance 
structure which the members of aher-globalisation networks (and the NGOs and social 
movements which constitute them) hold to account, but that in doing so Liberal 
cosmopolitans ignore the role of hegemony in constructing this politics, and the 
continuing and in some cases increasing relevance of some territorialised state actors. I 
further argued that Liberal cosmopolitans make certain theoretical claims about the 
relationship between cosmopolitanism and particularism which assumes a shared 
cosmopolitan agenda between those who populate GCS. This makes the GCS theorised 
by liberal cosmopolitans a very small and self-referential community, which is unable to 
account for the wide range of particularistic experiences of the actors who constitute GCS 
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and more significantly for this study, alter globalisation networks. Additionally, I argued 
that the liberal coslOOpolitan project, in establishing itself as a universal project, ignores 
the fundamental and particularistic structural inequalities which constitute it, and creates 
a process of destructive othering which results in the discursive or sometimes physical 
silencing of other particularities, although the latter is IOOre of a historical feature. 
Moving forward, then, it is clear that the liberal cosmopolitanism of GCS only has very 
limited applicability in explaining with empirical precision the agency and potential of 
alter-globalisation networks, and in the case of this particular piece ofresearcb, GCAP. 
The preceding discussions, though, do point to some interesting areas of analysis which 
will be further elucidated in the Research Design and Methodology Chapter (Chapter 
Four). For now though, these issues include the degree to which alter-globalisation 
networks monitor and contest hegelOOnic power, and the degree to which alter-
globalisation networks practice modes of cosmopolitanism inimical to and/or pre-
figurative of socio-economic transformation. 
In the following chapter, I will move on to analyse another set of thinkers who have 
developed theoretical and ontological claims about a1ter-globalisation networks, whom I 
shall refer to as 'radical alter-globalisationists'. Whilst my own normative position is 
more closely aligned with these thinkers than has been the case in this chapter, I will 
nonetheless illustrate limitations in their theorisations of particular issues. Once again. 
81 






Where in Chapter One it was relatively straightforward to distinguish the liberal 
cosmopolitans and their conceptual development of GCS from other ideological 
traditions, it is less straightforward when considering the range of formulations that will 
be considered in this chapter. The muddying of post-GCS terminology is not 
coincidental In the previous chapter I argued that liberal cosmopolitans construct false 
binaries between 'civil' and 'uncivil actors' which merely serve to obscure the 
contradictory nature of the actors who would constitute a global civil society. Post-GCS 
theorists. on the other hand, have sought to address this issue by treating GCS as an 
analytical field rather than a normative category (Colas. 2005; Reitan, 2007). This has 
resulted in these theorists trying to analyse and comprehend the actors who populate the 
field of GCS. and to identify those who represent a transformationaVtranscendent and 
thus radical subjectivity. The very term then, 'global civil society'. becomes quite 
unhelpful (and mostly unused) in this regard. as it is not the field, but the actors within it. 
which become the focus of analysis for the theorists considered in this chapter. 
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This chapter will seek to explore the claims and positions of this group of thinkers in 
order, once again, to assess the applicability of their claims to the study of aher-
globalisation networks. Whilst more nuanced than the liberal cosmopolitans, these 
theorists are still motivated by particular normative and ideological beliefs. However, it is 
the case that these beliefs are not quite as straightforward to delineate, and an attempt to 
do so on my part would undoubtedly misrepresent their work. Whereas the liberal 
cosmopolitans draw on quite identifiably liberal ideas, the writers which I will consider in 
this section draw inspiration from a range of structuralist and post-structuralist 
traditions23 whose ideas have, over the course of time, cross-pollinated to produce hybrid 
approaches to alter-globalisation networks. What they have in common is a commitment 
to imagining alternative ways of living and being, encapsulated in the refrain of the 
World Social Forum: 'Another World is Possible!' (George, 2002). It is for this reason 
that I will be referring to these thinkers as 'radical aher-globalisationists,24. 
23 As will become clear in this chapter, in the context of this thesis I Wlderstand these traditions to 
emanate from Gramscian and Anarchist bodies of thought. 
24 I intend this term to reflect the body of thought which has been devel~ by the thinkers I will 
consider in this chapter specifically aroWld aher-globalisation networks. It is not, however, intended to 
represent their wider thought and projects. Furthermore, I want to take this opportunity to distinguish 
between my term for these thinkers, and the way I have labelled the actors under study in this thesis i. e. 
alter-globalisation networks. The word 'radical' becomes important here, particularly in regard to its 
historical relationship to the traditions of thought considered in this chapter. Whilst deeply conservative 
alter-globalisation networks can embody transcendent or revolutionary subjectivities, these do not bear 
much relation to the form of emancipatory and politically progressive projects associated with the traditions 
of structuralist and post-structuralist thought considered here (even if, in fruition, not all of these projects 
have proven to be quite as inclusive and emancipatory as they were promised to be). Thus radical alter-
globalisationists are theorising alter-gJobalisation networks in an explicitly radical, transcendent and 
emancipatory/progressive context, which does not necessarily apply to aU alter-giobaJisation networks (for 
example, Al Qaeda Wldoubtedly envision a transcendent and alternative type of globalisation (and can thus 
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Whilst this hybridisation of ideological thought has not produced a distinct category 
similar to the way I argued GCS was constructed, there remain important ideological 
affiliations and distinctions between groups of radical alter-globalisationists, which are 
useful to delineate both for understanding this group of thinkers, as well as the 
distinctions between them and the Liberal cosmopolitans. In this way it will become clear 
how radical aiter-globalisationists offer several approaches to the analysis of alter-
globalisation networks, the applicability of which will be measured in this chapter. 
Two distinct radical alter-globalisationist groups can be identified as what I will here call 
hegemonic and post-hegemonic. What I mean by this distinction is that for one set of 
radical alter-globalisationists (see Bandy and Smith, 2005; Reitan, 2007; Mouffe, 2005; 
Gilbert, 2008) transcendental radical and progressive change will only come about by 
interacting with dominant, hegemonic power (be that neo-liberal or more broadly statist), 
and by creating a counter to such hegemonic power. As I will show, this involves 
creating relations of solidarity and influence between potentially counter-hegemonic 
groups. It is for these reasons that I refer to this group of thinkers as hegemonic, because 
as well as creating a counter-hegemonic bloc, the very act of building links between 
otherwise disparate groups might in itself be considered hegemonic, in that it involves 
channelling relations of influence (Gilbert, 2008: 220) and hierarchy (Day, 2005: 215). 
be considered as an alter-globalisation network), yet would not be considered emblematic of emancipatory 
and progressive socio-economic transformation by the radical alter-globalisationists considered bere). 
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This is, in a sense, what hegemonic power looks like (Gilbert, 2008: 220)25. Post-
hegemonic thinkers (see Day, 2005; Pickerill and Chatterton, 2006; Newman, 2007) on 
the other hand, more influenced by Anarchist traditions of autonomous struggle, reject 
the desirability or necessity of contestation with statist and neo-liberal powers for a 
transcendent, radical and progressive political project. They similarly reject creating 
relationships of solidarity when that involves influencing the strategies of other groups, 
on the grounds that this would recreate relationships of hierarchy and oppression. Instead 
they recommend creating spaces ofaltemative living (ahernative to statist and neo-liberal 
power, conceived not in relation to, but in independence from them) to which others 
might be attracted, although not forced or persuaded to join. 
An example of the hegemonic/post-hegemonic distinction, and how it produces a useful 
working distinction for this analysis, goes as follows: the work of Hardt and Negri (2001; 
2004) has been widely criticised for being a too deterministic (Mouife, 2005: 108-115; 
Gilbert, 2008: 163-164) and class-subjectivist (Day 2005: 5-6) account of aker-
globalisation networks. One might expect therefore that these critics share some kind of 
normative and analytical affmity. It becomes clear upon closer analysis, though, that fauk 
lines exist between them Mouffe (2007), for example, has said that: 
2~ It should be noted that if the notion of hegemony can be extended from natim states and 
intematimal organisations to nm-state neo-Iibenl capitalist actors (COX, 1992). then we should not dismiss 
the idea that alternative forms of hegemonic power can be channelled by and through aJter-gJobalisatim 
networks. After all, the role of alter-globalisation networks, according to the hegemonic thinkers 
considered in this chapter is to provide a counter-hegemOllY. The methods utilised by these networks to 
build this counter bloc can be therefore nothing but hegemonic. 
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"I have seen a film that was made in Germany, cal1ed "Was Tun?". It's about the alter-
globalisation movement and the influence of Hardt and Negri in it. At the end of the film, 
the fiImmakers ask both of them: "so, what is to be done?" And Negri answers: "wait and 
be patient". And Hardt's answer is: "follow yoW' desire". This is their kind of politics and I 
seriously do not think that this is enough .• Just wait, the development of capitalism is going 
to bring about the reign ofthe Multitude,.n (Miessen and Mouffe, 2(07) 
Mouffe's critique of Hardt and Negri therefore centres on their refusal to engage in 
strategy and explicitly confront the formal institutions of neo-liberal hegemony, 
embodied in national or global institutions (2005). This echoes Gilbert's (2008) own 
critique of Day, who also advocates a politics of refusal with regard to the formal 
institutions of the state (Day, 2005: 66-83) and believes that people will follow where 
alternatives to neo-liberalism are shown to exist (iibid: 215)26. It is thus clear that this 
triumvirate of critics do not share a normative approach. Viewed through a prism of 
hegemony/post-hegemony, whilst Gilbert and Moufl'e can be considered to be 
hegemonists in broad normative agreement, dedicated to designing strategies which 
contest neo-liberal hegemony through some form of institutional engagement, Day is 
really much closer to Hardt and Negri's post-hegemonism, which seeks to create spaces 
of transcendent subjectivity external to statist formations and institutions, even if they do 
disagree about the subjects of transformational change. 
26 Whilst Day does build an entire book (provocatively entitled Gramsci is Deod - a provocation 
which Gilbert is perhaps guilty of CaJJing for) around these arguments, it should be pointed out that 
ultimately he does not uniformly dismiss the politics of statist and hegemonic interaction, when he argues 
that "I am citing what I see as the historicaJly established limited }X'ospects for these modes, and arguing 
that non-hegemonic strategies and tactics need to be explored more funy than has so far been the case" 
(2005: 215) 
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Referring to the thinkers considered in this chapter along the lines of hegemony/post-
hegemony then will assist in illustrating why it is that their approaches to alter-
globalisation networks remain overtly normative and thus unable to fully capture the full 
range of agencies, possibilities and enclosures inscribed in the practices of specific alter-
globalisation networks. This distinction does though remain slightly heuristic, and as will 
become evident there is not always a clear delineation between the two sets of thinkers. 
This is illustrated by the fact that unlike the Liberal cosmopolitans, who, Falk aside 
(1999; 2005), employed the same GCS language, the theorists I will consider in this 
section employ a range of interchangeable categorical language to describe alter 
globalisation networks, which cannot be simply ascribed to hegemonic or post-
hegemonic analytical approaches. Radical alter-globalisationists are only really united in 
their aversion to the descriptive use of GCS. Thus, in this chapter I will be discussing 
theorists who talk about 'Transnational Protest' (Bandy and Smith, 2(05), 'Global 
Activism' (Reitan, 2007), the 'Global Justice Movement' (Saunders and Rootes, 2006), 
the 'anti-Capitalist Movement' (Gilbert, 2008), the 'aiter-Giobalisation Movement' 
(SasseD, 2004), the 'Movement of Movements' (Della Porta, 2005), 'New Social 
Movements' (Melucci, 1996), 'Newest Social Movements' (Day, 2(05) and various other 
iterations of these terms. As will become evident, all of the authors listed above are 
inspired by radical and critical political imaginaries. They also use the terms listed above 
interchangeably. It is therefore clear that it would be impossible for me, in this section, to 
critique the relevance of a single categorical referent deployed by any group of theorists 
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inspired by radical political imaginaries in the way that I was able to critique the single 
categorical referent deployed by theorists inspired by Liberal political imaginaries. 
I will therefore distinguish the thinkers considered in this chapter along hegemonic/post 
hegemonic lines, clarifying when a particular theorist does not fall neatly into this 
distinction. Delineating these thinkers in this way will be an important exercise in 
generating an analytical framework in Chapter Three with which to interrogate the 
agencies, potentials and limitations of alter globalisation networks, and the case study 
considered in this thesis, GCAP. 
The chapter will therefore proceed by bringing hegemonic27 and post-hegemonic28 radical 
alter-globalisationists into conversation with each other via a number of concepts inspired 
by different and overlapping ideological traditions. The conversation will then continue 
as I proceed to critique the kinds of theoretical and practical binaries set up by these two 
sets of thinkers. These discussions will centre on approaches to the relationship which 
radical aher-globalisationists pose between alter-globalisation networks and statist and 
neo-liberal hegemonic formations, and then move on to discuss how, in light of what 
these networks are held to be opposed to, these thinkers conceptualise the need for and 
content of 'strategy' and the creation of universal transformative subjectivities. 
27 I.e. those who advocate engagement with hegemonic power and the construction ofcountCl'-
hegemonic blocs as necessary in achieving radical political change. 
21 I.e. those who regard engagement with hegemonic power as co-optive, and the construction of 
counter-hegemonic blocs as oppressive and hierarchical. 
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2.2 Radical Ideas for Radical Alter-globa!isationists 
Whilst I am not claiming a teleology of radical thought which underpins the radical alter-
globalisationists, any distinction which rests on, or departs frOID, the notion of hegemony 
must have clear roots in the thought of Antonio Gramsci (1971). Even post-hegemonists 
have marked their thought in clear reference to Gramsci (See Day's Gramsci is Dead 
(2005) for an example of this). 
In this section therefore I will consider some of the key features which distinguish radical 
aher-globalisationist thought, and which serve to underpin the distinction within that field 
of thought between hegemonists and post-hegemonists. This will highlight contradictions 
as well as areas of agreement between these two sets of thinkers. which will assist in 
assessing the applicability of their thought to the study ofalter-globalisation networks. 
The two key distinguishing features I will consider here then are oppositionality and 
strategy. Strategy flows from oppositionality in that one must identify what one is 
opposed to before one can decide how to overcome it. It is a further (and perhaps 
obvious) feature of radical alter-globalisationist thought that each of these features 
consist of a global dimension which distinguishes them from older debates on the 
90 
transformative relationship and potential between state and civil society (for example, 
Chandhoke, 1995)29. 
2.2.1 Opposilionality 
Oppositionality: a term which insinuates itself differently within radical alter-
globalisationist thought, of both hegemonic and post-hegemonic varieties. Related to 
discussions about strategy, which will be discussed in the next section (strategy is not 
constructed abstractly, but in relation to a whole field of identified oppositional forces), 
debates over the place of alter-globalisation networks in radical alter-globalisationist 
thought (i.e. their agency and potential for creating transcendenta~ radical and 
progressive change) clearly invokes other actors. Specifically, as "othering is always 
implied in making present" (Law, 2003: 7), the very act of naming a global justice, alter-
globalisation or anti-capitalist movement inevitably invokes an externality against which 
that movement operates. Understanding bow this externality is conceived ot: and how it 
interacts with alter-globalisation networks, is key to assessing the applicability of radical 
alter-globalisationist thought to the analysis of such networks. 
This section will investigate the 'what' question (the section on strategy will be more 
concerned with questions of 'bow') i.e. the ways in which radical alter-globalisationist 
theorists write about the nature of this externality - what it is. What is it that such 
29 These debates however will stiU be drawn upon in this discussioo wh«e relevant 
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networks are in opposition to? To what extent does or can a pure oppositionality exist 
between alter-globalisation networks and the forces of statist and neo-liberal hegemony? 
The liberal cosmopolitan John Keane accuses radical alter-globalisationists of a 
Gramscian bias which imagines "something like a world proletariat in civvies, the 
universal object-subject that can snap its chains ... draws a thick line between (bad) 
business backed by government and (good) voluntary associations" (2001: 28). 
Seemingly proving this characterisation, Chandhoke, whose work on state and civil 
society draws explicitly from the work ofGramsci, claims that whilst some hold out hope 
that institutions and practices can be transformed via a radical engagement with them, 
there are simply some institutions and structures which have persisted historically, and 
show no signs of being transformed (Chandhoke, 199.5: 232). This poses an absolute 
oppositionality between the forces of emancipation on the one hand (alter-globalisation 
networks) and the forces of oppression on the other (statist and neo-liberal hegemony). 
There are many examples of empirical claims made by contemporary radical alter-
globalisationists reinforcing the notion of this pure oppositional characteristic. Reitan 
appears to provide further evidence of Keane's claim when she asserts the purified nature 
of the ideal 'global activist' (Retain's term) "while others can and do play important 
facilitative and supponive roles, the onus is shifting to those whose identity as a member 
of a specific community in a physical place engaged in particular ways of living and 
working is felt to be under attack" (2007: 56). Similarly, Bandy and Smith posit an 
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unequal global system on the one hand, and movements and networks mobilised to 
international solidarity on the other (2005: 232), whilst Cohen and Rai assert that 'global 
social movements' (their term) offer an alternative vision and practice of globalisation in 
marked contrast to the representatives of global neo-liberalism - transnational 
corporations, the World Bank and the IMF (2000: 16). They further argue that 'global 
social movements' provide democratic alternatives to the increasingly authoritarian 
nation-state (iibid: 10). 
AU of these claims construct alter-gJobalisation networks and activists as pure, 
transcendent subjects, un-penetrated by logics of statist or neo-liberal hegemony. In fact, 
it is held that neo-liberalism itself provides the common symbolic field to contemporary 
alter-globalisation networks (Crossley, 2002: 676). Gilbert extends this assertion when he 
argues that any project which does not recognise the centrality of capital to the "reigning 
political projects of our age" cannot be called properly political (2008: 132). Whilst one 
may consider these thinkers as hegemonic radical aiter-globalisationists (in that they pose 
the centrality of a neo-liberal hegemonic power which must be engaged with and 
overcome by alter-globalisation networks), even Day, a post-hegemonist who might be 
expected to draw out or identify the fragmentation of social contexts, argues that " ... the 
actuality of globalizing capital. .. mean[s] that aU these struggles occur in an increasingly 
common context, even if they do not explicitly identify this context, or elements of it, as 
what they are struggling against" (2005: 6). Thus it appears that in studying alter-
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globalisation networks we should expect their politics to be explicitly dermed by an 
opposition to neo-liberal capitalist hegemony. 
This perspective does seem slightly reductive, and it is ironic that Keane makes this 
critique of the radical alter-globalisationists, for as we have seen in Chapter One, like 
other Liberal Cosmopolitans, he can be equally guilty of posing a 'pure' NGO-populated 
element of global civil society, set against the forces of private capital and abusive statist 
formations. However, this does not make Keane's argument in this regard any less 
relevant. 
On the one hand, it appears that radical alter-globalisationists are arguing that neo-liberal 
capitalism is everywhere, thus lending all our actions a symbolic political meaning. On 
the other hand it appears quite reductionist and in fact contradictory to suggest either that 
all of our actions are political by dint of this capitalist omnipresence, or that there are 
certain actions which are not political because they do not operate directly against it. In 
the study of alter-globalisation networks, this approach would appear to rule out the 
analysis of actions which are not explicitly reducible to neo-liberal capitalism. 
In response to those who have posed this alterity between the forces of 'good' and 'bad', 
De Certau argued that the inventiveness of the weak in their engagements with the 
powerful lends a political and potentially transfonnative potential to banal everyday 
practices. These inevitably intertwine the weak and powerful in an ever tighter clinch of 
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co-constitution and imbrication30 (1984: xvii). In fact, Cumbers, Native} and Routledge 
have argued that: 
"An overemphasis on resistance can ign<.Ie the lives of a variety of people with diverse 
relationships to globalisation, including lUlorganised workers, lUldocumented immigrants, 
and those not involved in political movements. Thus it is important to attend to a range of 
social locations and power relations (for example, gender, class, ethnicity, race, and 
sexuality), that refract globalization processes and the multiple ways that such processes are 
lived, created, accommodated and acted upon in different historical and geographic 
settings" (2007: 2590) 
Furthermore, Gibson suggests that the capitalist symbolic order identified by the radical 
alter-globalisationists discussed previously, and which is presumed to give consistency to 
the identifications of the movements and networks they describe, lacks this assumed 
rigidity and is itself lacking and inconsistent -
"This does not mean that structures do not exist, or that there is no such thing as 
neoliberalism, or transnational Capitalism. However, it does mean becoming conscious of 
the discontinuous and more contingent links between various forms of injustice and that 
different groups and individuals articulate injustice in means entirely beyond the 
ideological straitjacket of "one no"31.,, (2008: 271) 
30 I use this in the Deleuzian (1988) sense of the 'fold' which allows us to understand this 
weak/powerful engagement in terms which do not lead to the total consumption of one agent/structure by 
the other. Indeed, it collapses the 'one and other' binary. and allows us to think of this engagement as a 
fluid one where agents/structures occupy certain positions before moving on to occupy new ones in an 
unpredictable tilshion. Whilst some writers have taken this to imply a smooth space which equalises the 
weak-powerful disequilibrium (i.e. Castells. 1999b; Hardt and Negri. 2004). others have retained the notion 
of structured and lUlequal space without rejecting the notion that weaker actors can enter these spaces and 
still retain a contesting and transformational element oftheir own subjectivity (see Lac1au, 1996; Gilbert, 
2008). This will be explored in greater detail further on in this chapter. 
31 This 'one no' likely refers to a popular refrain of the World Social Forum. popularised in the Paul 
Kingsnorth book, One No, Many Yeses (2003) 
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How do we understand the agency of alter-globalisation networks in relation to statist and 
neo-liberal hegemonic formations in this highly uneven and contradictory field? Newman 
answers this by frrstly asserting that it is impossible to measure the power of modern 
statist formations as they flit between modernist (law and order) and post-modernist 
(discursive, co-optive) strategies in their attempts to order and construct the spaces of our 
existence. While this may lead one to the nihilism of Baudrillard, who asserts that we 
have little option but to give in to such overwhelming power (1988), Newman finds hope 
in the assertion that power is always lacking, and that radical movements may test the 
limits of statist power by devising a politics which simultaneously engages with and 
moves beyond these statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations (Newman, 2007: 58). It 
would appear though that for many aher-globalisationists such an approach to statist 
formations is ruled out by an over-reified conceptualisation of these formations and the 
movements who work against them, which sediments them as starkly oppositional forces. 
This seems to be a significant limitation of radical alter-globalisationist thought in the 
construction of a research framework for the study of alter-globalisation networks. 
Before pursuing this line of argument too much further it should be noted that it would be 
unfair to extend Keane's critique (2001: 28) to all radical alter-globalisationists. 
Chandhoke's conception of the state-civil society relationship, for example, is an 
intricately symbiotic one, where only some civil society practices reaffirm the state's 
hegemony. For Chandhoke (see also Mohan, 2002: 9; Mohan and Stokke, 2007: 558), 
civil society is not a 'good' in and of itself, as Keane might accuse radical alter-
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globalisationists of conceiving it to be, but a place where a radical politics might occur 
(Chandhoke,I99S: 178), Furthermore, as shall now become clear, not all radical alter-
globalisationists share Reitan's belief in the • pure , global activist (2007), in inherent 
opposition to the forces of global neo-liberal capitalism 
Whilst Gilbert does claim that the oppositional force facing contemporary alter-
globalisation networks is capitalism (2008: 81), he chaUenges any inherency to this 
assertion by framing the oppositionality of alter-globalisation networks as a strategic 
choice. So for Gilbert, there can only be a political element to alter-globalisation 
networks when they are capable of connecting a series of places or nodes together in 
opposition to forces which oppose or oppress them (iibid: 221). This allows for a more 
subtle reading of both those oppressive forces (which Gilbert summons as 'capitalism', 
but which he treats as a widely differentiated field) and the alter-gtobalisation networks 
themselves. In other words, statelhegemony and civil society/alter globalisation nodes do 
not pre-exist each other as discrete realms but are integrated (Mohan, 2002: 9), and only 
give the appearance of distinction through the strategic decision to draw lines of 
opposition. 
Colas similarly argues that aIter-globalisation networks do not represent a field beyond 
the relations of statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations, but are a result of 
antagonisms and contradictions affected by these forces. Although thrown up by these 
contradictions, alter-globalisation networks are still purposive agents seeking 
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transformational change (2002: 43). From both Gilbert and Colas then it is possible to 
understand alter-globalisation networks as occupying a field of great differentiation, 
where in certain circumstances they will be subjectified as agents of arch opposition to 
statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations (and according to Chandhoke this will most 
often occur in authoritarian societies where rulers seek to close down civil society - see 
Chandhoke, 1995: 9), but in most will operate within the subtle contradictions of 
capitalism, subtleties which will present alter-globalisation networks with strategic and 
tactical choices. 
Laclau, for example, argues that emancipation occurs within broader social processes, not 
as a distinct precondition or constitutive element of them (1996: 101). Emancipatory 
practices are thus always formed in the nexus of domination because it is in the 
universality of that dominating power that the particularity and distinctiveness of an 
oppressed identity references itself (iibid: 105). In other words, an emancipatory identity 
arises with direct reference to the domination which has produced it. It would be an 
entirely different identity without that experience of domination. As such, these radical 
alter-globalisationist theorists do not posit a strict oppositionality between alter-
globalisation networks, and statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations, but propose a 
much more complex and socially rich field of potentialities and constraints which appear 
more promising for understanding the agencies of alter-globalisation networks. 
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What is clear from this discussion is that whilst some radical alter-globalisationists posit a 
pure alterity between the 'good' of voluntary associations and the 'bad' of statist and neo-
liberal hegemonic formations, a closer examination of some of them reveals a far more 
complex reading of these fields which is productive for an analysis ofalter-globalisation 
networks. Rather than a single field in which the forces of 'good' line up against the 
forces of 'bad', we here have arrived at a radical alter-globalisationist conception of not 
one, but a series of overlapping and inter-locking fields which produce different 
opportunities and constraints for alter-globalisation networksJ2• This discussion has 
therefore revealed the complex nature of the social fields in which alter-globalisation 
networks operate, and warns against the judgement of the potentials and limitations of 
such networks based on a simplistic notion of bounded hegemonic and counter-
hegemonic entities. Indeed, given the complex nature of these fields, it is unsurprising 
that radical alter-globalisationists have proposed different approaches to how alter-
globalisation networks should relate to statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations in 
order to affect transformative socio-economic change. So whilst the hegemonic/post-
hegemonic distinction discussed at the beginning of this chapter is not so apparent in 
what these writers imagine aher-globalisation networks are opposed to, this distinction 
32 It is impatant at this juncture to distinguish this line of thought from the kind of 'political 
opportunity theory' (POn proposed by, amongst others, Tarrow (1996), or MacAdam, McCarthy and laId 
(1996). Where POT suggests a smooth field which actors approach and take choices based on their rational 
preferences, the radical alter-globalisationist approach delineated here suggests that actors (and their 
'preferences') are shaped by the structural contradictions of statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations, 
which sometimes subjectifies them, and sometimes allows them to take strategic, agentic decisions in the 
context of this structurally produced background. The main difference between these two approaches is the 
deployment of 'rationality' by POT theorists. For radical alter-globalisationists, 'rationality' is merely a 
socially constructed phenomenon. 
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becomes far more apparent when we consider how they prescribe such networks should 
relate to that externality (which, as has just been discussed, is not 'external' in any 
inherent sense). An exploration of these approaches however will reveal further which 
parts of this debate are useful for the empirical study ofalter-globalisation networks. 
2.2.2 Strategy 
Given the uneven and unfixed nature of neo-liberal and statist hegemony, how should 
alter-globalisation networks seek to subvert and transcend it? Discussions about strategy 
within radical alter-globalisationist thought focus on the relevance and necessity of 
strategy in and of itself. This segues into debates about what any strategic orientation 
should look like. In this section I will be drawing a distinction between hegemonic and 
post hegemonic thinkers regarding strategy. For hegemonic thinkers a strategic 
orientation is key; persuading others to join the counter-hegemonic project is essential to 
building the critical mass necessary to transcend statist and neo-liberal hegemonic power 
(see for example Gilbert, 2008: 221). Post-hegemonic thinkers on the other hand can be 
characterised as being anti-strategic, due to the potential for domination and hierarchy 
they see in actively building relations between people and groups (see for example, Day, 
2005: 219). I will argue that this distinction is revealing for the contributions and 
limitations it sets on radical alter-globalisationist thought regarding the study of alter-
globalisation networks. 
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The distinction between hegemonic and post-hegemonic thinkers seems clear. Whereas 
Bandy and Smith would claim that "Any effective challenge to the liberalizing forces of 
transnational capital nrust be global, broad based, cross-sectoral, and capable of collective 
action." (2005: 231), Day argues that we must "challenge the notion that the only way to 
achieve meaningful social change is by way of totalising effects across an entire 
'national' or 'international society'" (2005: 45). It is these ''totalising effects" which Day 
considers to embody the inherent hierarchicalisation of hegemonic relations and is thus 
destructive of any truly radical transcendent SUbjectivity. As the discussion progresses it 
will become clearer that there is a degree of characterisation implicit within each 
position's critique of each other, and that in fact there is some common ground where 
they both agree. For the moment though this discussion sheds important light on the ways 
in which alter-globalisation networks should or could be conceived of and measured with 
regard to their potentials and limitations i.e. by the degree to which they form trans-local 
ties and whether these are implicitly dominating or not. 
These debates draw directly back to an affirmation or rejection ofGramsci's fornrulation 
of the 'war of manoeuvre' and the 'war of position' (1971: 239), with different emphases 
placed by different theorists on these aspects ofGramsci's thought. For GramscL the 'war 
of manoeuvre' was never more than a temporary position taken by the revolutionary 
forces, allowing them to maintain spaces of oppositionality with regards to the state, 
draining the state's resources, ahhough never decisively, and protecting themselves from 
the state's full force. Manoeuvring from one such space to another, this only became a 
101 
'war of position' when these spaces lost their value and all that was left were spaces from 
which to launch decisive attacks against the state's hegemony, drawing in return the full 
force of the state (op cit). 
Gramsci's fornrulation was updated in the 1980's and 1990's by a range of theorists 
whose work further underpins hegemonic/strategic radical alter-globalisationists, and 
who remain important figures in radical alter-globalisation theory. Writers like 
Chandhoke (1995), and Laclau and Mouffe (in partnership: 1985; individually: Laclau, 
1996; Mouffe, 2005; 2009) have all made the case for the necessity of a strategic 
orientation to be taken up by opponents to neo-liberal capitalism (Chandhoke, 1995) and 
latterly neo-liberal globalisation (Mouffe, 2005; 2009). They argue that this is necessary 
to give what might otherwise be isolated actions a more socially resonant meaning. This 
appears to echo Gramsci's formulation of wars of manoeuvre and position - a 
formulation which always gives otherwise disparate and isolated actions a greater social 
purpose and resonance. 
Chandhoke argues that civil society represents a space from which the hegemonic power 
of the state (broadly conceived by her as always hegemonic, but which we should 
consider as relating to statist powers more broadly Speaking33), can be challenged and 
transformed. This is because both state and civil society are constitutive of each other. 
33 This is particularly the case if we consider weaker states who themselves might be considered 
worked through and penetrated by the hegemonic power of donors or transnatiooal capital. 
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The state must set boundaries around which it defines acceptable and legalistic norms and 
behaviour, but in doing so provides targets for civil society to discuss, critique and 
contest such boundaries (1995: 9). It is not enough though to site such struggles in 
localised settings, for " ... the fragmented arena resulting from these particularistic 
practices is peculiarly vulnerable to being occupied by the state and by the dominant 
classes" (ibid: 212). It is thus necessary to adopt a more universalistic political strategy 
with which to contest dominant practices, one which links struggles together. Without 
such a strategy disparate struggles have no need to come together, and will be dominated 
by the state (ibid: 223). This suggests we should relate the transformative potentials of 
alter-globalisation networks directly to the degree to which they manage to expand their 
demands to include previously non-aligned groups. 
Day, a post-hegemonist, and thus an anti-strategist (i.e. someone who does not believe in 
the necessity of enacting universal strategies), leads us to question the transformative 
potential we would otherwise assign to alter-globalisation networks which enact 
universalising strategic practices. He argues that the premise which necessitates 
universalising strategic orientations is based on a false assumption which he calls the 
"hegemony of hegemony", and which assumes that "effective social change can only be 
achieved simultaneously and en masse, across an entire national or supranational space." 
(2005: 8). In other words, Day criticises those who have been hegemonised by the belief 
that only a counter-hegemonic bloc can transcend neo-liberal and statist power. 
According to Day though, universal strategies can only result in the domination of other 
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less powerful groups, and history shows that re or counter-hegemonising the masses has 
only ever resulted in oppression (iibid: 214). He concludes: "Change can be achieved for 
more people by ridding ourselves of one of the final vestiges of the logic of 
hegemony ... the will to save everyone at once..... (ibid: 215). Instead of 
hegemony/solidarity, Day proposes a logic of affinity wherein " ... by providing 
ahernatives for those who can and will join the exodus from the neoliberal order, we open 
ourselves to sharing what we have built" (op cit). In this way then Day is arguing that the 
very act of linking struggles together involves creating hierarchical relations prone to 
various forms of domination As an ahernative he suggests a tactic of 'leading by 
example' • of creating alternative ways of living which might attract others to join in. 
Laclau provides an alternative approach to the issue of strategy and its desirability in 
transcending statist and neo-liberal hegemony. He asserts that it is one thing to argue that 
universalistic strategies are the preserve of dominant groups, and another to claim that the 
link between the two is innate and natural and therefore incontestable. Indeed, it is in the 
universal promises of the state that oppressed groups and identities can assert their own 
particular experiences as being universa~ valuable and thus deserving of recognition 
(1996: 106). Chandhoke provides an elaboration of this process, when she asserts that: 
"it allows the marginalized groups to fight for the benefits of the status and privileges of 
the citizen. Rights therefore become the object of struggles ... the enlargement of these 
spheres [political and civi/J permit ( ... J the marginalized to insert themselves into these 
realms" (1995: 190 - italics added) 
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Furthermore, Newman argues that the struggle for recognition by a radicalised and/or 
excluded subject affects a rupture in the established social order. By asserting a 
radical/excluded subjectivity strategically (I.e. in unison), the social order is forced to 
enact its promise of universality (i.e. universal rights) (2007: 89-90). When women 
marched for their right to wear the Islamic headscarf in France, Newman argues that they 
did so under French flags and the banner of Egalite. Liberte. and Fraternite. As such. the 
protestors revealed a constitutive contradiction within the state's practices, that whilst 
"they believe in the Republic ... the Republic does not believe in them" (ibid: 90). Thus, 
Newman argues that ''we all belong to the same 'community' of those who speak and 
think, and, yet, ... certain subjects are at the same time excluded from this community and 
so challenge their exclusion on the basis of the universality of this community" (ibid: 91). 
These claims, that universal strategies are not simply the property of the powerfuL are 
given a specific interpretation by Mouffe, who has said that" ... without a form of synergy 
between the alter-globalisation movement and those [established] institutions I don't 
think that important advances can be made" (Miessen and Mouffe, 2007). In other words, 
given the existence of opportunities to insert the experiences and demands of the 
marginalised into the strategies of the powerful and hegemonic, it is incumbent upon 
alter-globalisation networks to have a strategy which includes engaging the sites of statist 
and neo-liberal hegemonic power. This moves the debate on from a discussion regarding 
the desirability of building universal relations between aIter-globalisation nodes, to the 
necessity of these universalised networks to engage with statist and neo-Iiberal 
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hegemonic power. Hegemonic/strategic radical alter-globalisationists thus advocate a 
form of oppositionality with statist and neo-Iibeml hegemonic formations which makes 
explicit claims on those institutions to apply their forms of universal inclusion to all 
marginalised groups (articulated in unison. strategically), and to recognise these groups' 
particularistic demands as part of the state's universal promise of inclusion. If successful 
in their claims making, these marginalised groups will transform the socio-economic 
system, as the very act of extending inclusion and rights to them will explode the 
fundamental and constitutive inequalities of statist and neo-Iiberal hegellX>Dic formations. 
As Laclau argues, in this process ''universalism as a horizon is expanded at the same time 
as its necessary attachment to any particular content is broken." (1996: 1 06). This means 
that in addition to the degree to which alter-globalisation networks manage to expand 
their demands to include previously non-aligned groups, we should, according to 
hegemonic radical alter-globalisationists, also judge the agencies, potentials and 
limitations of these networks by the degree to which they force statist and neo-liberal 
hegemonic power to enact their promises of universal community and equality. 
So it is clear that for hegemonic/strategic radical alter-globalisationists, a universal 
strategy is therefore both necessary for socio-economic transformational change, and also 
continuously contestable by those who might be being dominated by such a strategic 
adoption. It seems then that in approaching the questions involved in explaining alter 
globalisation networks' agency, potentials and limitations, a universal strategic 
orientation (universal in representative terms, and in contesting a universal power) open 
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to internal contestation would be one marker by which to measure these actors. Indeed, 
Mouffe (2007) claims that this inherent contestation is a constitutive necessity of any 
radical democratic project and is what ensures the continuing democracy of any universal 
strategy (Miessen and Mouffe, 2007). 
As I have argued previously though, such a position is normative, and is based in large 
part on Gramsci's imperative to mount wars of manoeuvre and position (1979: 239). 
These would be impossible without a universalised strategic, or counter-hegemonic, 
orientation. Those who espouse post-hegemonic and anti-strategic positions though 
contest this assertion. As previously illustrated, Day has argued that universal, 
hegemonising strategies inevitably lead to the domination of subordinate groups (2005: 
214). Certainly, given the large swathes of oppressed people in the world today, one 
would have to question the generalisability of Newman's assertion that oppressed people 
can assert their radical subjectivity by simply resorting to the universal strategic promises 
which are generated by dominant groups of either statist or counter-hegemonic kinds 
(2007: 91). Indeed, Newman himself elsewhere asserts that it is often necessary to work 
around, rather than with or in, the institutions of the state and market (2007: 173)34. Day 
takes this assertion to its logical critical conclusion, when he argues that a politics of 
demand assumes that the state can act as a neutral arbiter dispensing rights and privileges 
like gifts (2005: 80). He compares the pursuit of such rights and privileges to the pursuit 
)4 Newman occupies a slightly ambiguous position in this hegemoniclpost-hegemonic binary. 
advocating on the one hand a miversal transformational subject (and thus cleaving to a narrative of 
begemooic strategising), and on the other hand a post-hegemonic politics of escape from the state. 
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of lUxury consumer goods, with which one is never completely satisfied once in 
possession of (ibid: 83). This creates an endless cycle of demand and partial response and 
thus new demand in a self-perpetuating cycle of capitalist growth and statist oppression 
(ibid: 89). Day argues that by engaging in a politics of demand, activists abdicate from 
the difficult tasks required to truly create transformative change. They are in it for the 
'buzz' of recognition, the thrill of getting somewhere close to transformation but never 
quite achieving it. This then is the basis of Day's criticism of hegemonic radical alter-
globalisationists as being "driven by a fantasy of emancipation" (ibid: 84). This would 
suggest that alter-globalisation networks should be judged by the degree to which they 
enact a politics of escape from statist and neo-liberal hegemony, rather than engagement 
with them Furthennore, the very filet of being networked omst be considered, according 
to this perspective, only legitimate if no attempt at persuasion or influencing bas been 
adopted to attract new nodes and members. 
Yet Gilbert dismisses the post-hegemonic position. He argues that "To advocate a wholly 
post-hegemonic or non-hegemonic conception of politics ... is to imply that reJations of 
influence never occur between different elements in a political process (nor that they 
should)" (2008: 220) and that what he calls the anti-capitalist movement would be 
nothing more than "a set of isoJated and mutually irrelevant struggles deploying wholly 
localised tactics" if it dispensed with strategic. or hegemonic thinking (ibid: 215). 
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We appear to have reached a binary in how to judge the agencies of alter-globalisation 
networks and their effectiveness at enacting a transformational subjectivity. Pickerill and 
Chatterton reinforce this when they rebut Gilbert's reasoning by arguing that it is 
misguided in looking for signs ofleadership, or a common programme when "the rules of 
engagement have changed" (2006: 739). For them, it is impossible to gauge the affects of 
autonomous spaces and movements on broader relations of power and culture. They 
argue that post-hegemonic activism is not a negative-sum reluctance to take power, but is 
"a commitment to freedom, non-hierarchy and connection and a desire to eliminate (or 
reduce) power relations" (op cit). Nonetheless, Gilbert argues that "advocates of such a 
'post-hegemonic' or non-hegemonic position can only logically do so on condition that 
they regard it as a matter of complete indifference whether anyone, anywhere, ever 
agrees with them or not ... This is nonsense" (2008: 220). It would appear then, regarding 
strategy, that there is little common ground upon which radical aIter-globalisationists of 
the hegemonic and post-hegemonic traditions can agree. They seem inherently opposed 
to each other with regard to how they conceive of strategy in relation to neo-liberal and 
statist hegemony. This creates problems for the analysis of aIter-globalisation networks. 
How should their potentials and limitations be judged? Should we dismiss them as 
apolitical iftbey do not engage with the institutions of statist and neo-liberal hegemonic 
formations (see Gilbert, 2008: 221), or as reinforcing oppressive statist practices iftbey 
do engage with these institutions (see Day, 2005: 89)? Should we automatically regard as 
oppressive any attempt by alter-globalisation networks to advance universally 
representative messages? Are these binaries apparent in the empirical practices of aIter-
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globalisation networks, or are they the result of the normative approaches adopted by the 
thinkers considered in this chapter? 
To an extent, this dilemma is not really a dilemma at all, for, like Mouffe's contestation-
based democracy (2005, 2007), it is within the spaces of such 'dilemmas' that the 
normative practices of aher-globalisation networks thetmelves may actually unfold, and 
which prevents any particular normative tradition from monopolising the explicatory 
ground on which the research of alter-globalisation networks might stand. In other words, 
it may be that aiter-globalisation networks practice acts of both hegemonic contestation 
and strategising, and post-hegemonic escape and plurality. 
To another extent though it is possible to find some common ground between these 
positions which provides similarly useful insights into the study of aker-globalisation 
networks. Both camps, probably most represented here by Day's Gramsclls Dead (2005) 
and Gilbert's Anticapitalism and Culture (2008), engage to some degree in some unfair 
characterising ofeach other. Day, for example, doesn't advocate the complete isolation of 
movements and activists, but proposes a politics of "groundless solidarity" which 
recognises that all struggles unfold in the same context i.e. neo-liberal capitalism (2005: 
202). Whilst he doesn't elaborate the implications of this for a strategic way of thought, it 
clearly does have such implications. Similarly, Gilbert, an avowed hegemonist (2008: 
215), does not advocate the reinforcement of statist and neo-liberal formations through 
counter-hegemonic strategising and universalising that Day accuses the neo-Gramscian 
110 
hegemonic project of proposing (2005: 213). Instead, Gilbert proposes a vision 
remarkably similar to the post-hegemonic visions of Day (2005) and Pickerill and 
Chatterton (2006) when he states that 
"It's in the facilitation of connectim and the creation of opportunities for common strategising 
between actors and thinkers ... that the possibility of democratic transformation must lie. To be 
clear then, this is not a matter of unification, homogenisatim or centralisation, but of the 
creation and intensification of relays, the actualisation of potential nodes and points of 
concentration, the active production of 'commons'" (Gilbert, 2008: 229) 
This provides a useful way in which a research approach to aher-globalisation networks 
can draw on both hegemonic and post-hegemonic thought. Gilbert's assertion that the 
very act ofstrategising involves a fundamental altering ofthe content of both 'leader' and 
'led' (ibid; 220) is reminiscent of Laclau's claim that a differential identity cannot be 
distinguished from the context in which it is produced. The act of distinction therefore 
also asserts the context at the same time. Similarly, a context cannot be destroyed without 
also destroying the identity of the destroyer. whose identity is predicated on the existence 
of the context (1996: 1(0). For both Laclau and Gilbert then, the point of universal ising, 
or hegemonising strategy, is that it is only through such a process of contestation that 
transformative subjects can be created, and objects/structures changed. In other words. 
struggles which isolate themselves, which reject broader strategic partnerships, end up 
sedimenting their subjectivities and re-asserting dominant relations of power. Day 
similarly makes the point that the aim of 'affmity' politics is to prove attractive to other 
people and build a critical (and plural) mass of adherents to usher in more equitable 
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social relations (2005: 202). It thus seems possible that there is some common ground 
between hegemonic and post-hegemonic radical aker-globalisationists after all, on the 
issue of the desirability of building a (contingent, always in-the-making) universal 
strategy at least. It is important though to bear in mind that the issue of engaging with 
statist and neo-liberal power remains a divisive issue, and one which generates a 
contradiction in the judgement of alter-globalisation networks i.e. whether such networks 
should or should not engage with statist and neo-liberal hegemonic power. 
This section has investigated the cleavages within radical alter-globalisationist thought 
over the necessity and potential to transform (or not), of universal strategy. I have argued 
that there is a distinction between Gramscian and neo-Gramscian hegemonists on the one 
hand, who believe in the fundamental centrality of universal strategy to any project of 
socio-economic transformation, and more Anarchist-influenced post-hegemonists on the 
other hand who believe that any such universal subject formation inevitably leads to 
domination and hierarchy. This debate has ramifications for how alter-globalisation 
networks are studied, calling for an interrogation into any claims of representation or 
legitimacy made by such networks and the actors and nodes which constitute them. 
Additionally, by illustrating the possibility of coll1IJX)n ground between hegemonic and 
post-hegemonic thought, I have attempted to lay the basis for a research approach to 
alter-globalisation networks which seeks to interrogate both the maintenance/contestation 
of their own dominated subjectivities, and the way they themselves may dominate other 
oppressed groups. 
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2.3 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter I have suggested that there is a diverse group of thinkers who write about 
and analyse alter-globalisation networks grounded in radical political and social theory. 
Unlike the Liberal cosmopolitans considered in Chapter One, these writers do not share a 
unique ideological background, but draw on hybridised radical traditions, including 
structural, post-structura~ Gramscian and Anarchist thought. Thus, what they share as a 
group is not so much an ideological affinity as a shared sensibility about the prospects 
and characteristics of contemporary alter-globalisation networks. As such, I have referred 
to this group of writers as radical alter-globalisationists. I have further argued that there 
are important points of divergence between these writers, particularly around the axis of 
hegemony/post-hegemony, which influences the more normative aspects of their thought. 
I have identified two key features which run through a great deal ofthis work, and around 
which hegemonic/post-hegemonic binaries appear to have concretised. For the first key 
feature, concerning oppositionality, I have argued that whilst some radical alter-
globalisationists posit a pure distinction between alter-globalisation networks and statist 
and neo-liberal formations, most recognise that both of these fields are complex, uneven 
and co-constitutive. I argued that it is this recognition that lays the ground for the 
diversity of opinions which exist regarding how and where statist and neo-liberal power 
should be contested. 
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For the second key and related feature, concerning the necessity of a strategic response to 
that which alter-globalisation networks are opposed to, I have argued that there is a 
binary between those radical alter-globalisationists who advocate the necessity of a 
strategic orientation as an essential pathway to the creation of a universal 
transformational subject, and those who believe that such a subject would be inherently 
and necessarily exclusionary and dominating. Despite this binary, I have also argued that 
some common ground exists between the two sets of thinkers, which allows us to 
approach the study of alter-globalisation networks by looking for both the structural 
domination of their own subjectivities, and simultaneously the ways in which such 
networks dominate or exclude other forms of political subjectivity. I also argued though 
that a much less bridgeable binary existed between hegemonic and post-hegemonic 
thinkers. This binary exists between those who see the possibility of socio-economic 
transformation in some form of relationship (albeit a contesting one) with statist and neo-
liberal hegemonic formations, and those who reject this position and view any such 
relationship with these formations as being inherently structured and dominated by them. 
This binary creates a dilemma for the study of alter-globalisation networks i.e. whether to 
judge them by the degree to which they engage with/transform statist and noo-liberal 
hegemonic formations, or the degree to which they evade/escape these formations, 
discursively and materially. 
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In key areas of radical alter-globalisatiorust thought then there appear to be binaries 
between hegemonic and post-hegemonic positions, with some aspects of these positions 
being bridgeable, others not. I have argued that this derives from particular normative 
positions, and would further argue that such binaries only have limited use for the study 
of alter-globalisation networks. This is because presented as such, radical alter-
globalisationist approaches only allow us to view one or other of its binaries as being 
authentically radical and transcendental of statist and neo-liberal hegemony. This is 
particularly the case with regards to the normative positions adopted by thinkers 
considered in this chapter for the relationship between aher-globalisation networks and 
their oppositional powers and externalities (i.e. statist and neo-liberal hegemonic 
formations). It means that, for example, we cannot theorise aker-globalisation networks 
within a radical alter-globalisationist paradigm as operating both within and without 
statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations. 
In the next chapter I will explore some of the issues raised in this and the preceding 
chapter in more detail, adopting a 'grounded-normative' approach which I intend to allow 
for a more nuanced account of aker-globalisation networks and which will provide the 
basis for my methodological framework presented in Chapter Four. In doing so I will 
draw on some of the same thinkers I have considered in this chapter, but will seek to re-
contextualise their approaches in order to arrive at a suitable theoretical framework for 
the study of alter-globalisation networks. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Grounded and Normative: An 
Epistemologv of Alter-Globalisation 
Networbs 
3, 1 Introduction 
The previous two chapters have sought to critique a great deal of the theorising about 
alter-globalisation networks carried out since the end of the Cold War, I have argued that 
whilst these approaches do generate some useful perspectives for the empirical study of 
alter-globalisation networks, taken on their own they are too reductive, attempting to 
identify ideal-types of activist and civil society groups, dismissing at various points those 
who do not meet these standards as being 'uncivil' (Falk, 2005: 75) or irredeemably 
unrealistic and utopian (Gilbert, 2008: 220), 
Whilst many of the writers considered do nothing more than set out a normative project 
for organising for socio-ecooomic transformation, in ruling out certain ways of 
understanding the agency of alter-globalisation networks, to study these networks from 
any of their perspectives alone would be to privilege certain epistemologies of these 
networks and relegate the complex agencies which they embody, For example, how do 
we understand the different perspectives of certain civil society groups towards violent 
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resistance if we immediately brand any supporters of such resistance as 'uncivil'? How 
do we understand the complex relationships that civil society groups have with statist and 
neo-liberal hegemonic formations if we immediately brand any relationship with these 
formations in a pejorative fashion? How do we understand the attempts by some civil 
society groups to pursue non-hegemonising actions if we simply dismiss them as utopian 
fancies? 
By constructing these enclosures many of the writers considered in the previous two 
chapters deflect the focus on alter-globalisation networks from their internal constitution 
to their external relationships. In this chapter then I will argue that such distinctions need 
to be collapsed if we are to understand the agencies of contemporary aher-globalisation 
networks. I will seek to develop a theoretical framework which can adequately 
encompass these complex agencies. Furthermore I will be arguing that in collapsing these 
distinctions we inevitably end up viewing the agency of aher-globalisation networks 
through a prism of power and space - which power relations construct these networks, 
and which power relations are alter-globalisation networks productive of! How do these 
power relations become embodied, what kind of spaces do they produce (exclusive? 
inclusive?) and with what effects? Perhaps put more simply, how does the power in alter-
globalisation networks, explain the power a/them? 
At this stage I will not go further in developing these questions and the definitions of 
power and space which I think will be useful to this study. These questions and 
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definitions will be developed in the next chapter, 'Methodology and Research Design'. 
For now, the imperative to study power and relationality within and around alter-
globalisation networks does require a brief analysis of the implications of such an 
approach for how we incorporate a critical yet supportive normativity into the study of 
them 
3.1.1 Grounded Normativity 
Normativity is important to this discussion for the following reason: many of the writers 
considered in the previous two chapters are, to various degrees, guilty of an uncritical 
and/or prescriptive normativity in relation to the actors in which they invest their hopes 
for socio-ecooomic transformative change. This poses a problem I, like the writers I have 
discussed, believe in the necessity of a fundamental re-ordering of global socio-ecooomic 
relations to redistribute resources and weahh away from the ever-shrinking few to the 
ever-growing majority who suffer from various forms of economic, social, cultural and 
environmental deprivation and violence. It is not my wish, therefore, to attack the 
movements and actors which are seeking to make the changes necessary for a more 
equitable world. Rather, I am motivated by my desire to understand the potentials and 
limitations of such actors in order to better map out the terrain upon which such struggles 
need to be fought. 
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So I seek to strike a middle ground between the uncritical and prescriptive normativity 
which one fmds especially, ahhough not uniquely, amongst the Liberal cosmopolitans on 
the one hand, and the over-bearing rejection of such movements and campaigns which 
one finds in the writings of, for example, Chandler, who accuses globally-focussed 
campaigns of a narcissism born from the failure to ''win the argument" at home (2004: 
331) or Zizek (2007), who sees in these global campaigns an atTumation of existing 
socio-economic structures. In this sense, I find the work of Kurasawa useful. Kurasawa 
encourages the adoption of a 'critical nonnativity' which attempts to constructively 
engage with alter-globalisation networks in order to "bolster empirical understanding of 
socio-political situations or structural forces by helping to identify and assess their 
emancipatory potentialities and perils" (2007: 10). I would argue that this represents an 
empirically grounded approach to the study of aher-globalisation networks. In asserting 
this Kurasawa argues that we can move beyond the reification of alter-globalisation 
networks as an amalgamation of 'good' progressive actors (Beck, 1997; Kaldor, 2003), or 
on the other hand, wasteful nihilists (Chandler, 2004) "and turn our attention to the 
arduous and contingent fonns of struggle that compose [them]" (Kurasawa, 2007: 8). 
This means that the prescriptive aspect of an analysis of alter-globalisation networks must 
be cognisant of and grounded in the relations which construct them, and the 
''potentialities and perils" (iibid: 10) of the structural and spatial contexts in which they 
emerge. 
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Of course, it is highly likely that many of the writers I have discussed in Chapters One 
and Two would consider themselves as being 'critical' or at least 'constructive' in their 
approach to alter-globalisation networks. and I certainly do not wish to create a hierarchy 
of who is more or less 'critical' in this regard. Nonetheless, Kurasawa's enjoinder to 
focus on the struggles and the tensions which produce aIter-globalisation networks seems 
to me to carry the potential of a more grounded approach which could be especially 
useful in the analysis of actors invested with such hope by so many. 
The rest of this chapter will therefore explore the ways in which a more grounded-
normative approach could shed light on the study of alter-globalisation networks, and the 
kinds of research questions this approach can bring to the fore for the study of these 
networks. I will break down this approach into three areas of analysis which have arisen 
from discussions in previous chapters: 
i) Statist and Neo-Liberal Hegemonic Power 
ii) Cosmopolitanism 
iii) Locating Alter-Globalisation Networks 
It is not my intention to 'develop theory' here, but rather to interrogate what a grounded-
normative approach could bring to these thematic areas and how they relate to our 
understanding of alter-globalisation networks. In the following sections I will address 
each of these thematic areas in turn through the prism of writers whom I consider to offer 
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the potential for a grounded-normative approach to understanding these areas in relation 
to alter-globalisation networks. 
3.2 Statist and Neo-Liberal Hegemony Revisited 
In Chapter One I discussed the manner in which NGOs have been invested by Liberal 
cosmopolitans with a monitory agency vis-A-vis statist and neo-liberal hegemonic 
formations (Keane, 2009). I counter-posed the supposed monitory and transformational 
power ofNGOs with the work of, amongst others, Kamat (2002, 2004), who has argued 
that NGOs represent nothing more than the neo-liberalisation of the public sphere and 
civil society, and thus perpetuate the dominance of neo-liberal hegemony. This set of 
claims and counter-claims is a useful representation of the uncritical/rejectionist binary 
that I identified in the introduction to this chapter, and is one which this section will seek 
to problematise through utilising the work of writers who provide the framework for what 
I have dermed as a grounded-normative approach to the study of alter-globalisation 
networks and the actors which constitute them. This section will therefore begin with an 
expansion of some of the theoretical arguments framing NGOs in Chapter One, using this 
as a spring-board to take a more grounded-normative, yet simultaneously theoretical 
approach to these issues. 
Heins assens that the explosion of International NGOs and International Governmental 
Organisations represents a deep and potentially problematic affinity between civil society 
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and statist and neo-liberal formations (2005a: 193). He further argues that NGOs and 
such formations are locked in a relationship where both sides seek to influence the 
behaviour of the other. For example, whereas agencies like the Red Cross used to 
accompany their governments into war in order to alleviate the consequences of such 
actions, Heins argues that they are now more likely to try and change the outlook of 
governments to war before it has even begun. However, it has also been the case that 
several NGOs in recent years have proposed anned 'humanitarian intervention' as a 
viable policy option in certain instances (Heins, 2005b; 366). This suggests an ambiguous 
relationship between statist formations and NGOs, where hegemonic contestation does 
not necessarily involve being co-opted by a bounded, impenetrable project which takes 
all before it. 
Nonetheless, as Eschle and Stammers point out, many of what they call Transnational 
Social Movement Organisations (TSMOs) (eliding between this term and NGOs, which 
perhaps reveals the synonymy they feel these two types of actors have) are entirely 
unconnected to social IIlOvements, and are often technocratic in character, thus sharing 
more in common with the large bureaucracies they may seek to change than the social 
movements they claim to represent (2005: 53). This mirrors the argument made by 
Mawdsley, Townsend and Porter that international and development NGOS represent a 
diffusion of imperialism and the reproduction of the managerialistic bureaucracy of statist 
and neo-liberal hegemonic formations, which can be seen in "an over-bureaucratised 
'report culture'; the priority placed on tracking rather than achieving change; the 
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exclusions of language and communication technologies (ICTs); and the dominance of a 
minority of southern NGOs. All these help to promote 'information loops'-privileged 
circuits of information and knowledge" (2002: 833). This has helped to produce a mainly 
English-speaking elite of transnational development workers, disconnected from the 
communities they are supposed to be working with (ibid: 830). This suggests that we 
should treat the involvement ofNGOs in alter-globalisation networks with suspicion, and 
that those networks, like my case study in this thesis - the Global Call to Action against 
Poverty - in whom NGOs playa dominant role, might be severely limited in their 
abilities to challenge statist and neo-liberal hegemony. 
Even those campaigns which seem to challenge the hegemonic logics of neo-liberalism 
can be questioned. Harrison argues that the United Nations' adoption of the Millennium 
Development Goals in 2000 (which were the result in part of significant civil society 
lobbying through a series of international summits in the 1990s (see Hulme, 2007» does 
not represent a shift in the logic of growth which underpinned their heavily criticised 
(especially by civil society) structural adjustment programmes of the ]980s and 1990s 
(Harrison, 2004: 11). Indeed. Harrison asserts that the Bank's post-structural adjustment 
approach in general simply solidifies the role of the market in alleviating poverty. So 
whereas in earlier structural adjustment programmes the state was positioned as rent-
seeking and parasitical, a block to market expansion, more recent programmes of 'good 
governance' merely reposition the state as the guarantor of similar market expansion 
(iibid, 18). 
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Governments dependent on overseas aid are thus subjectified by donors who proactively 
pursue a project to shape the methods by which government policies are formulated and 
executed. They fund new techniques of administration, and "aggressively shape the 
discursive limits of the 'politics of the possible', [locking] governance states into a 
powerful 'transparency' by imposing matrices and 'logfi"ames' of policy reform" (ibid, 
129). A particular form of civil society in these states has emerged, working around 
issues of 'anti-corruption', 'budget monitoring', 'human rights' and 'poverty-alleviation'. 
Such issues mirror the neo-liberal discourse of what the post-conditionality state should 
be concerned with, and fits neatly with a logic which requires reasonably well-off and 
content consumers with whom markets can be expanded (iibid, 131). These debates have 
particular resonance in relation to the issues which the Global Call to Action against 
Poverty (GCAP) campaigns on i.e. poverty and socio-economic injustice, and 
problematises the credibility and legitimacy of alter-globalisation networks like GCAP 
who seek to work with 'grassroots' civil society actors in structurally disadvantaged 
areas. An analysis of such claims requires an investigation of how neo-liberal managerial 
and social discourses limit the potentials of alter-globalisation networks to exert 
transcendent and emancipatory modes of power. 
One might conclude that the previous discussions mirror the rejectionist tone to civil 
society of that taken by Kamat (2002, 2004). NGOs, whether of the explicitly 
'development' kind or not, help to constitute alter-globalisation networks which are 
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subject to discursive regimes of neo-liberal govemmentality from which there is no 
escape. Statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations, and the agencies of neo-liberal 
market capitalism, constitute what is and what is not possible for the networks and 
campaigns discussed here. 
In a 'grounded-normative' move though, many of these authors also illustrate the various 
ways in which alter-globalisation networks and the actors which constitute them such as 
NGOs find various and sometimes unintentional ways of escaping the seemingly 
dominant hegemonic power. This is the sense in which these actors, as subjects, are 
productive, not just of the dominant systems and codes from which they are constituted, 
but of other unpredictable and often unstable modes of becoming. This speaks to the 
unpredictable and uneven nature of hegemonic power discussed in the previous chapter 
(see for example Laclau and Mouffe, 1985: 180; Mohan and Stokke, 2007: 558; Gilbert, 
2008: 137). So, Mawdsley, Townsend and Porter assert that Development NGOs have 
been "simultaneously approved by the World Bank for their supporting role in 
strengthening a neoliberal civil society, and endorsed by certain radical activists and 
revolutionary theorists" (2004: 872). This contradiction, they suggest, speaks to the fact 
that different NGOs operate under different principles of compliance and resistance, and 
that these work along a spectrum rather than in any dichotomous either/or sense. NGOs 
are subjects of rather than subjugated by neo-liberal discourse, and thus their relationship 
with statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations is "a complex mixture of acquiescence, 
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strategic subversion and resistance to achieve, in part, their goals and desires" (op cit). 
This results in an often uneven and contradictory agency, whereby 
"not every alternative NGO takes what we would see as the opportunities, while clients and 
staff of some traditional, patriarchal NGOs make Wlexpected spaces. It is vital not to 
exaggerate this use of NGOs ... the use is piecemeal, inchoate, generating few specific 
social movements able to bring sustained pressure on the state. The alternatives are local, 
fragmentary, insecure. These are nevertheless courageous, creative endeavours, sometimes 
successful, which deserve recognition" (ibid: 885) 
Similarly, Lipschutz identifies the potential involved in being subjectified to not just 
reassert but also to challenge the "contradictions inherent in the increasingly dense web 
of global governmentality" (2005: 767). Alter-globalisation networks therefore may 
create spaces which might be thought of as ''ruptures or discontinuities" (op cit). Due to 
their unstable and sometimes unintentional and authorless nature (Ferguson, 2000: 40 1 )35 
these spaces mayor may not overcome neo-liberal governmentality or statist oppression 
(op cit). For a researcher, such a possibility makes the case for a grounded approach to 
the relationships between the actors which constitute alter-globaJisation networks, statist, 
and neo-liberal hegemonic formations and agents. This recognises the contradictory and 
unpredictable outcomes produced by the interplay of these various actors, of essentially 
structure and agency. 
U Ferguson uses the term 'authorless' to describe effects which are unintended, unplanned and 
unpredicted, but which nonetheless result from the exertion of power. This will be more fuJly explored in 
the following chapter. 
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This discussion speaks more broadly to the debate which was explored in Chapter Two 
between hegemonic and post-hegemonic approaches to the 'how' of oppositionality, i.e. 
how seemingly oppositional forces should be engaged and dealt with. At the end of that 
chapter, I concluded that the binary set up by these thinkers in terms of engaging with or 
not engaging with the institutions and agencies of power left a problem for the research 
of alter-globalisation networks~ namely that following either one of these approaches 
would result in too easily dismissing the complex and contradictory characteristics of 
alter-globalisation networks. It would be to ignore the unpredictable and inconsistent 
manner in which alter-globalisation networks and their nodes might both engage with, 
and seek to exclude, statist and noo-liberal hegemonic forces in their activities. For in 
practice, it is unlikely that alter-globalisation networks cleave tightly to one or the other 
of these positions. It is therefore important not to reify this binary, and investigate 
theoretically how we might move around or through it in order to fully understand the 
potentials and limitations of these networks. 
Laclau (1996) suggests that in the act of periphery groups making claims on the legalistic 
framework of statist formations, they simultaneously transform the content, depth and 
meanings of that legalistic framework, as well as their own identities, which will no 
longer be constituted by periphery experiences. Clearly, it is possible to see in this Day's 
(2005) critique that this would merely reinforce dominant practices as one group moves 
into the centre whilst others remain on the periphery. However, I would suggest that it is 
possible to see in this transformation the possibility of not only transforming the content 
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of statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations, but also their form. In doing so, 
periphery groups might not necessarily move to dominant centre positions, as the very 
existence of these centre-periphery positions would be transformed and made redundant. 
This relates directly to the work oflate 19th/early 20th century anarcho-socialist, Gustav 
Landauer, who would sit squarely within post-hegemonic radical thOUght. Landauer 
argued that the state was not an ontological fact, but a series of relationships (191111978: 
132-138). In this way one might say that the individual self-subjectifies by summoning 
up the existence of a fIXed ontological state where in fact there is nothing but sets of 
relationships. Landauer therefore advocated first individuals, and then communities, to 
simply change their relationships and practices in ways that would negate the 'state' -
"New institutions must be created almost out of nothing, amid chaos; that is alongside 
rather than inside existing social institutions ... let us destroy ... by the gentle ... and 
binding reality that we build" (ibid: 135). 
Again, it is clear that such a position completely rejects working through statist 
formations, as it negates the existence of the state as an ontological fact. If we return to 
Laclau's transformational claims-making (1995), though, where both the periphery and 
centre are transformed by virtue of their being brought into relation with each other, we 
can see how Landauer allows us to imagine the creation of alternatives whose very 
existence transforms the nature ofthe identities of those involved, as well as the nature of 
statist formations - whether these formations are taken to be sets of relations or fixed 
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entities. Changing the relationship, asserting alternative practices which stretch, move 
through and around statist formations, allows us to overcome the binary between 
hegemonic and post-hegemonic radical alter-globalisationists where they advocate an 
oppositional statist-engagement on the one hand, or reject it on the other. Oppositionality, 
on this rendering, is not so much about alter-globalisation networks establishing a 
separation between themselves on one side, and statist and noo-liberal hegemonic 
formations on the other, before then deciding whether to cross the divide and engage, or 
stay on their own side and escape. Rather, oppositionality here is about affecting a 
transformational relationality which engages (transforms) statist and neo-liberal 
hegemonic formations by its very existence. 
In relating this back to the previous discussion on NGOs and alter-globalisation 
networks, and their relationship to statist and noo-liberal hegemonic powers, it becomes 
clear that it is unnecessary to adopt a dichotomous approach to the study of these 
networks, where their potentials and limitations are judged by either how much or how 
little they engage with (materially or discursively) what they are ostensibly held to be 
opposed to. This approach also leads us to be unsurprised when apparently subjectified or 
dominated actors exhibit practices of re-subjectification or resistance. This is a 
'productive' approach to hegemonic power which shares much with the work of the 
anthropologist of development James Ferguson. In his seminal work on development 
projects in rural Lesotho, Ferguson took the effects of 'development' as his point of 
departure, suggesting that whilst the agents of noo-liberal hegemonic power may display 
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intentionality and construct forms of knowledge, the practices of the subjects they 
construct represent at least in part the working outlre-working of such complex structures 
of knowledge (Ferguson, 2000: 400). This means that a point of departure for judging the 
limitations and potentialities of alter-globalisation networks cannot be with an ontological 
statist formation, but with the practices and subjectivities ofthe networks in question. 
In this section I have argued that hegemony itself is relational, and thus questioned the 
utility of a perspective which judges engagements with statist or neo-liberal hegemonic 
formations in any either/or sense. Rather, the affrrmation and embodiment of ahernatives 
in and of themselves challenge and transform hegemonic power. In a way, this is a re-
worked version of the liberal cosmopolitan approach to monitory power (Keane, 2009), 
although in this case relying on an epistemology of aher-globalisation networks and 
statistlneo-liberal hegemony as co-constitutive. Monitory power then becomes a two way 
process, with both limiting and emancipatory possibilities for aher-globalisation 
networks. This is very different to Keane's epistemology of monitory power, which 
posited alter-globalisation networks as occupying a distinct and autonomous social field 
from where they could hold statist and neo-liberal hegemony to account. A grounded-
normative approach to the relationship between alter-globalisation networks, statist and 
neo-liberal hegemonic powers can therefore make space for the fully contradictory nature 
of such networks, and reveal both their limitations and potentials (Where and how do 
they enact oppositionality? What practices and discourses are involved in this 
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oppositionality? Which relations constitute this oppositionality?), whilst retaining a 
broadly constructive and supportive normativity for their aims and agendas. 
The next section will utilise the same approach to tackle the ways in which alter-
globalisation networks navigate the spatial and moral distances between their various 
nodes and hubs, as well as the people on whose behalf they often claim to speak. In short, 
this will be a discussion about the (apparently) universally transcendent pretensions of 
cosmopolitanism, and the (apparently) rooted myopic interests of particularism which the 
cosmopolitan project has traditionally sought to overcome (Kant, 1795/2006; Singer, 
1999; 2004; Fine, 2003a). This will provide the basis for an exploration of how alter-
globalisation networks may be productive of both emancipatory and dominating powers. 
3.3 Cosmopolitanism 
In Chapter One, I argued that the implication of the Liberal cosmopolitan position for 
enacting relations of solidarity across geographical, social, economic and cultural 
distance was a cosmopolitanism almost inevitably bound by its own particular imperial 
and colonial historical development, and that further, this form of cosmopolitanism was 
prevalent amongst many of the campaigns of contemporary alter-globalisation networks. 
I further argued that this historical form of contemporary practice of cosmopolitanism 
always carries the potential to be a destructive force, as it requires the discursive andlor 
physical destruction of the suffering other in whose name it mobilises itself. 
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I then argued that this context gave contemporary cosmopolitanism two distinct features 
which mitigated against the ability of cosmopolitan campaigns and networks (of which 
many progressive alter-globalisation networks are undoubtedly examples) to allow the 
particularistic demands and ways of being of those suffering from structural violence to 
'speak back'. To recap, these two features were: 
i) A degree of authoritarianism which seeks to 'overcome' difference, but which 
in reality serves only to silence the weak (Mouffe, 2(05). 
ii) A degree of ahistoricism, which ignores the history of cosmopolitan ethics as 
a key aspect of the historical imperial project (Van de Veer, 2(02). 
In this section, I seek to further problematise notions of cosmopolitanism by 'critiquing 
the critique'. Most pertinently, do the critiques I just summarised require the rejection of 
cosmopolitanism, of a transcendental universality between different people, per se? In 
this section I will be arguing for a more grounded normative approach to 
cosmopolitanism, which, by investigating alternative forms of cosmopolitan agency seeks 
to develop other ways of thinking about the meanings of such a project. This is relevant 
because if the accusation levelled at cosmopolitanism is that it does not recognise the 
particularistic demands of 'others', then it would be wrong to close off possibilities for 
such 'others' to speak back with their own cosmopolitanism in researching alter-
globalisation networks, networks which clearly operate with some kind of inherent 
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cosmopolitanism (i.e. an ethic of transcendental care and emancipation across distance36). 
For example, the cosmopolitanism of the Liberal cosmopolitans can be rightly critiqued 
as constructing relations of neo-imperialism and top-down domination. However, does 
the immanence of this imperial domination, the manner in which it is always being 
created and is never complete as a project, create the conditions for other forms of 
cosmopolitanism to challenge its verticality? Does this open up the possibility of 
identifying emancipatory potentials and powers within alter-globalisation networks, 
rather than dismissing them uniformly as constructs of Western imperialism? I am 
therefore seeking here to develop the theoretical basis for articulating not just one, but 
several forms of cosmopolitanism which may circulate in alter-globalisation networks, 
some of which may engender more horizontal and emancipatory relations of solidarity. 
The kind of cosmopolitanism which Mouffe (2005), for example, criticises is what could 
be called distinctly 'Western' in character, and thus by equating this kind of 
cosmopolitanism with cosmopolitanism per se I would be closing off the possibilities for 
other forms of cosmopolitanisms to articulate themselves. In talking about a 'Western' 
cosmopolitanism, I do not mean a geographical region, but a project with a particular 
history and sensibility. This is exactly what Van de Veer is referring to when he claims 
that cosmopolitan is colonial (2002). However, to reject all forms of cosmopolitanism 
because of this would be as blind to difference as Mouffe accuses the Liberal version of 
36 As should be becoming clear, 'distance' will be defined in terms beyond the geographical, but 
also as a social, economic and cultural phenomenoo. This will be explored more fully in Chapter Six. 
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cosmopolitanism of being. Indeed, I would argue that such a perspective is trapped in 
what de Sousa Santos (2008) has called 'Northern Epistemologies', in this case of an 
explicitly historically Liberal nature, unable to comprehend that non-Western forms of 
cosmopolitanism may engender more horizontal and emancipatory relations of solidarity. 
It could be argued that identifying the colonial and subject-reinforcing effects of Liberal 
cosmopolitanism works to reinforce the way that "Third World societies have been 
colonized by a Western imagination that frames and represents their meaning as part of a 
project of rule" (Slater, 2004: 9). In other words, the critique of cosmopolitanism as 
inherently colonial could merely serve to reinforce the notion that the post-colonial world 
is uniformly subject to relations of neo-imperialism. Heins similarly argues that this 
critique of Liberal cosmopolitanism in fact reifies the 'otherness' which it seeks to make 
room for. Making his case in the Indian context, he notes how in historical colonial 
discourse the city was represented as "suspicious and sly", whereas the countryside was 
imagined as being populated by "sinless little hill girls" (2000: 42). Such a discourse is 
now transposed by those who wish to 'emancipate' this fetishised other - ''Thus, we are 
confronted with the notion of the 'feminine', always ambiguous and nature-loving Orient 
represented by poor female subsistence farmers as opposed to the 'masculine', 
monocultural and logical West embodied by rich corporate managers". Indian NGOs who 
adopt this 'feminine' discourse therefore profit from Western cultural codes, " ... whereas 
the neo-modern groups in India have to pay a price for their lack of imagined Otherness. 
On average, they are attracting less attention and sympathy" (op cit). In a discussion 
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about the implications of the cosmopolitanism of aher-globalisation networks, this means 
that we must be wary of treating network nodes in structurally disadvantaged and post-
colonial contexts as a romanticised other, seeking to escape from, rather than to be 
included in, the bonds of a universally transcendent cosmopolitan project. To ignore this 
possibility would be to ignore forms of alter-globalisation network agency which reveal 
something about their potentials and limitations. 
So we are therefore left with a cosmopolitanism that is colonial and a critique which 
feeds off and reinforces this colonialism. What is necessary, then, is an epistemology of 
cosmopolitanism that allows an identification of colonial and authoritarian tendencies, 
but that understands that epistemology as one of potentially many unfixed possibilities. 
Before continuing it is important to reassert the importance of this exploration: the liberal 
cosmopolitans of Chapter One praised the cosmopolitanism of contemporary &her-
globalisation networks, my response to which was particularly critical. As my critique 
was based on the idea that liberal cosmopolitanism is a particularly Western, historical 
form, any study concerned with the potentials of alter-globalisation networks which sees 
cosmopolitanism as only Liberal and Western would be unnecessarily and damagingly 
reductive. If aher-globalisation networks are articulating alternative cosmopolitanisms37, 
then a theoretical framework is required which is divorced from the critique of 
37 It is important to note however that it should not necessarily be assumed that other 
cosmopolitanisms would be any more horizmtal, democratic or inclusive than the Western form critiqued 
in Chapter One. 
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cosmopolitanism as colonial and destructive per se. The quest for such a framework will 
be the subject of the rest of this section. 
How else then might we understand cosmopolitanism in such ways as to allow different 
actors to express their different articulations of it? In other words, is it possible to 
understand cosmopolitanism in terms which do not reinforce the binary between colonial 
and post colonia~ universalistic transcendentalism and particularistic myopia? 
Laclau's attempt to collapse the universaVparticular binary, briefly alluded to earlier in 
this chapter and in the previous chapter, is useful here. Laclau identifies the process by 
which " ... the particular realizes in itself the universal - that is, it eliminates itself as a 
particular and transforms itself in a transparent medium through which universality 
operates; or it negates the universal by asserting its particularism" (1995: 95). In the 
previous chapter I related Newman's account of French Muslim women asserting their 
right to wear the headscarf in the context of the apparently universal French belief in 
Liberte, Ega/ile, and Fralemile (2007: 89-90). This illustrated both the possibility of the 
particular to assert itself in the promise of the universa~ but also the particular exclusivity 
of the universal which excludes certain groups (in this case Muslim women). By 
therefore understanding some of the most aggressive universalisms in modern history 
(i.e. Western Imperialism) as in fact the universalisation of a powerful particularism 
(1996: 24), Laclau claims we are faced with problematic paradox, for if we posit that the 
(marginalised) particular is something that needs to be defended against the (particular) 
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universalism of Empire (of either the straightforward imperial kind or Hardt and Negri's 
(2000) post-modern version of non-centred globalised control) then we end up having to 
defend all kinds of anti-social and reactionary groups (Laclau, 1995: 99), including those 
who we might previously have understood as representative of a 'universal' neo-liberal 
project (persecuted City bankers for example). 
Laclau overcomes this paradox by collapsing the binary between the universal and the 
particular that would have us defend one or the other. He argues that by asserting a 
particularistic identity one is at the same time distinguishing, and thus reaffirming, that 
from which it is different (the universal). The same is also true of any particularism 
which seeks to destroy the universalism which oppresses it. That universal context cannot 
be destroyed without " ... destroying at the same time the identity of the particular subject 
who carries out the destruction" (iibid: 100). This is because if the particular is in part 
constituted by the universal it seeks to destroy, then destroying the universal will also 
destroy that of the particular which it constitutes. Thus "a particularism really committed 
to change can only do so by rejecting both what denies its own identity and this identity 
itself' (iibid: 102). This therefore means that change which seeks to overcome some form 
or relation of oppression needs to move beyond both its poles, rejecting a simple politics 
of the preservation of identity (iibid: 103). This is what Fraser has called the 
'transformation-recognition' axis of change, whereby not only is the universal system in 
question challenged to broaden the meaning it gives to concepts of citizenship, but the 
very group making the demand is also transformed as it seeks to de or re-subjectivise 
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itself and de-stabilise group differentiation (2008: 34). Similarly, Massumi bas argued 
that 
"having pity for someone who occupies a category that is not socially valorised, or 
expressing moral outrage on their behalf, is not necessarily helpful in the long run, because 
it maintains the category and simply inverts its value sign, from negative to positive .. .It 
doesn't challenge identity-based divisions .. .if any group, disadvantaged or otherwise, 
identifies itself completely with its self-intecests it's living the fiction that it is a separate 
autonomy" (2002: www.brianmassumi.com) 
From this perspective, a more transcendent cosmopolitanism (and aker-globalisation 
network) would refrain from fixing any particularistic identity, either tbat of the 
oppressed or the oppressor. To iJ]ustrate this Laclau distinguishes between two forms of 
post-colonial struggle. In one, the oppressive colonial power is merely rejected, and 
'othered'. Its constitutive role in the post-colonial movement is unrecognised, and thus 
the content of power is reversed (with the post-colonial 'particular' taking the place of the 
colonial 'universal') but thefonn of oppression remains. The new, post-colonial universal 
is therefore only transcendent in that it is the most oppressively powerful particularity. In 
the second distinction, the inter-constitutivity of the universal and particular is 
recognised, and their positions as either universal or particular are dissolved. Thus both 
the contents and forms of oppression are transformed and transcended. In this case it is 
not just the particular oppressive relation between universal and particular which is 
inverted, but the particular universal system itself is dismantled and transformed (1996: 
31). Applying this discussion to the potentials and limitations of aker-globalisation 
networks would see us recognise any cosmopolitan ethic which transcends and dissolves 
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the universal/particular binary of the network in question as a genuinely emancipatory 
one, and vice versa. In other words, when assessing how the powers of these networks 
explain the powers of them, the following question could be posed: how do the power 
relations between their (alter-globalisation networks) always unstable and inter-
constitutive poles of universality and particularity inform their ability to enact an 
emancipatory and socio-economically transcendent political subjectivity? This question 
will be refined further in the following chapter. 
Another useful dimension to consider here is provided by Massey. Where Laclau 
problematises the universal/particular binary, Massey problematises the local/global one, 
arguing that traditionally the local has been treated as the victim of the globaL and thus 
distinct from it. Her argument, outlined in Chapter One, that everywhere is 'local', but 
that some localities are more powerful than others and are therefore productive of what 
appear to be 'global' phenomena, problematises fixed distinctions between the local and 
the global as autonomous geographical fields (something I will return to in the following 
section). Thus the global may exist may exist in relations of domination with certain 
locales, as well as constitute the character of certain powerful places, but is always 
socially produced. In this case the global is itself constituted by the ability or 
susceptibility of all these locales to either dominate or be dominated. This leads Massey 
to conclude that just as there is a responsibility on global institutions to ensure 
particularistic socio-economic equality (i.e. in particular localities which suffer the most 
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from the structural violence ofneo-liberalism), there is also a responsibility of particular 
local places for the ways they produce what is taken to be 'the global' (2005: 102) 38. 
I would argue that the 'responsibility' which Massey argues for implies also an agency on 
behalf of what we might call the (relational) local. Furthermore, it is illogical to confine 
such an agency simply to locales which we would define as powerful. and so it must also 
be extended to locales which appear to be dominated by relationally constructed 'global' 
processes. Taken together with Laclau's approach to the universaJ/panicular binary, I 
would argue that this would involve an approach to the study of alter-globalisation 
networks sensitive not just to the ways that material domination and resistance are 
produced in and by them, but also epistemological domination and resistance. If diverse 
cosmopolitan projects and ethics are being enacted by alter-globalisation networks, and if 
they are constituted by the agency of traditionally defined powerless groups and places 
(Reitan, 2007), and thus represent non-Western modes of cosmopolitanism, then it is 
important to ask to what degree they reaffirm or transcend existing subjectifications. Do 
they, as Heins (2000) asserted, merely reinforce the epistemological colonial imaginary, 
or represent new transformational configurations of power relations? Furthermore, even 
if founded on de Sousa Santos' 'epistemologies of the South' (2008), do the agencies of 
the traditionally weak/oppressed 'particular' (Laclau, 1995) or 'local' (Massey, 2(05) 
38 Massey cites the specific example of London, which is celebrated for its availability and diversity 
of cultural experiences. However, the wealth which makes the consumption of this culture possible is 
predicated on Loodon existing in relations of domination with other distant locatioos, from where comes, 
for example, the cheap migrant labour which provides the armies of low-paid cleaners, cooks, and night-
shift security personnel which in part underpins the success of London's financial services, or culinary 
industries (2005: 101). 
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simply invert the context of previous colonial and imperial power relations (and thus 
carry with them the destructive content of Western forms of cosmopolitanism), or 
transform the whole structure and content of them? 
Several writers in post-colonial and broader literatures have sought to provide some 
answers to these questions. Bhambra warns against being over-zealous in celebrating 
what may initially appear to be non-Western forms of cosmopolitanism, for in doing so 
we may simply be reaffrrming Europe as the fIXed centre of the modem period (2007: 62-
64). Mignolo asserts that in doing so we risk being blind to the "darker side of 
modernity", i.e. colonialism. What is necessary then is a way of re-conceiving 
cosmopolitanism from the post-colonial perspective in ways which do not re-affirm 
Western epistemologies, what Mignolo calls "critical cosmopolitanism" (2000: 723). 
Mignolo suggests we do this by deploying "border thinking" - distinguishing this from a 
mode of thought which sees the 'marginalised' as separate from the 'centre', "border 
thinking" involves centring what has been thought of as the periphery, which in doing so 
is reformative, and potentially transformative of what the 'border' is brought into, or 
what is brought to it (ibid: 736) (this is reminiscent ofLaclau's (1995; 1996) dissolution 
ofthe universal-particular relationship discussed previously). Mignolo deploys the use of 
'connectors' to explore the inter-discursivity of periphery-centre relations, in order to 
illustrate the manner in which an analysis of cosmopolitan solidarity can be re-centred 
without solidifying the West as the originator of modernity and social relations. 
Connectors are shared terms which encapsulate different definitions brought into contact 
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with each other in a process of negotiated understanding. Mignolo cites the example of 
the Zapatistas, who have enacted a particularistic, 'border' notion of democracy: 
''Democracy for the Zapatistas is not conceptualized in terms of European political 
philosophy but in terms of Maya social organization based on reciprocity, communal 
(instead of individual) values, the value of wisdom ... The Mexican government doesn't 
possess the correct interpretation of democracy, under which the Other will be included. 
But, for that matter, neither do the Zapatistas have the right interpretation. However, the 
Zapatistas have no choice but to use the word that political hegemony imposed, although 
using the word doesn't mean bending to its mono-logic interpretation. Once democracy is 
singled out by the Zapatistas, it becomes a connector through which liberal concepts of 
democracy and indigenous concepts of reciprocity and community social organization for 
the common good must come to terms." (2000: 742) 
Thus discourse itself becomes the process through which cosmopolitanism is enacted. 
Mignolo argues for a cosmopolitanism based on "diversality", whereby instead of 
connections emanating from a centre to leave those on its periphery re-imagined in a 
mode of cosmopolitan imperialism, the experiences of the border are brought in to the 
'centre' and understood as "new forms of projecting and imagining, ethically and 
politically, from subaltern perspectives" (ibid: 745). This assertion mirrors Pollock, 
Bhabha and Breckenridges's call to be "archivaUy cosmopolitan", when they urge us to 
"simply look at the world across time and space and see how people have thought and 
acted beyond the local" (2000: 586). 
So for a study of the potentials and limitations ofalter-globalisation networks, this means 
not reducing alternative cosmopolitan visions to being simply non-Western. or as being 
defined purely by an opposition to 'Northern epistemologies' (de Sousa Santos, 2(08), as 
this would be to ignore the fuller potentiality of such alternative cosmopolitanisms. It 
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would be to fix these visions at the border/periphery, rather than to treat them as 
ahernative and plural centres. Whilst even in these ways cosmopolitan relations could 
still emerge from a Western epistemology, by keeping in mind Mignolo's "border 
thinking" we can begin to develop a focus which simultaneously transcends any notion of 
the West as being the unique originator of all cosmopolitan relations. This calls for an 
approach which is attentive to ahernative epistemologies of cosmopolitanism and 
solidarity, and is another example of the potential of more grounded and normative 
approaches for the understanding of the powers and agencies of aher-globalisation 
networks. 
I want to draw attention here to an underlying theme which seems to underpin this 
literature on cosmopolitanism from the post-colonial studies canon, and which I believe 
is helpful in thinking about and analysing the kind of cosmopolitanisms we might 
encounter in aher-globalisation networks, and that is the distinction Hannah Arendt made 
between 'making' and 'action'. For Arendt, 'action' corresponds to the plurality of 
humanity, or, as Arendt puts it, that there are " ... men, rather than man" (1958/1998: 7). 
Plurality is the constitutive element of politics, for politics would be unnecessary if all 
people were the same and reproduced themselves ad infmitum (op cit). In other words, 
'action' is Arendt's way of theorising the plurality of individual expression and 
creativity39. 
39 It is important to note here that Arendt was no borderless cosmopolitan, and that my use of her 
political theory is abstracted to a degree from her broader canm on the role of the state. Arendt's work has 
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In political terms, Arendt distinguishes 'action' from the mode of politics as 'making', 
which she sees in the majority of historical political practice. 'Making' as politics almost 
always involves the abolition of plurality, of 'action'. This is a result of people seeking 
shelter from the unpredictability of plurality/action, and sees a retreat into 'making' as 
politics - i.e. the centralisation of political action in monarch, dictator, party or 
parliament (iibid: 220). This making/action distinction speaks directly to Mignolo's 
'diversality' (2000: 745), and his normative desire to see a cosmopolitanism which 
emanates not from the centre, in a form of "global design" (iibid: 722), but from the 
borders, in plurality. I would argue that Arendt's distinction helps us to understand just 
quite how risky and uncertain a 'border' or post-colonial cosmopolitanism could be. 
Never existing in isolation, and linked by 'connectors' (iibid: 742) to much more 
powerful hegemonic powers, 'action', seems always vulnerable to projects of 'making'. 
As such, this provides an important caveat to the research of alter-globalisation networks, 
and the kinds of cosmopolitanisms which might be encountered within them, namely, that 
aU the forms of cosmopolitan practice and understanding which aIter-globalisation 
networks, may, at various nodal points, incubate, will always be vulnerable to a co-optive 
project of 'making', of de-plural ising. This is a reason then to be cautious abut the extent 
been appropriated by international relatioos realists, post-structuralists, feminists, critical theorists and 
cosmopolitans (Owens, 2009: 31). Arendt however believed that rights and freedoms could only be 
guaranteed by the territorial state, probably due to her aversion to grand supra-state political and military 
projects produced by the historical period in which she was writing and living (ibid: 39). 
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to which we celebrate alternative cosmopolitan visions and practices in alter-globalisation 
networks. 
In this section I have attempted to problematise the central radical critique of 
cosmopolitan theory which I first introduced in Chapter One. Whilst retaining the belief 
that this is a relevant critique, I have argued that as a critique it falls into the same trap 
that it accuses cosmopolitanism of falling into - that of being Euro-centric and blind to 
post-colonial productivity. In problematising this critique I have further sought to disturb 
the notion that the only cosmopolitanism possible is one framed in the development of 
the Western historical colonial project. Post-colonial, or border cosmopolitan projects are 
inherently risky and uncertain, and thus provide useful insights into the relationships 
which operate to constitute aher-globalisation networks and their potentials. In the next 
and fmal section of this chapter, I will explore literature which helps to explain how we 
understand the spatial location of alter-globalisation networks, and what implications this 
has for the legitimacy and authenticity of such networks. This will provide further 
insights into how a grounded normative approach to such networks could proceed. 
3.4 Locating aher-globalisation networks 
In the previous section on cosmopolitanism, I drew on the work of Massey (2005) to 
argue that the local and the global are not distinct from each other, instead co-constituting 
each other so that both are in fact 'local' in the sense that both emerge from particular 
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places or combinations of places. In this section I will be investigating this claim in more 
detail. This is because part of the challenge in researching alter-globalisation networks is 
locating the geographical frame in which to study them This issue is considered here 
because in many respects, where one chooses to study alter-globalisation networks 
depends on the approach one takes to their relationships with statist and neo-liberal 
hegemonic powers (and how one defmes those powers), and the degree to which one 
deems their cosmopolitanism to be emanating from a single source. In this section, then, I 
will attempt to develop a framework by which alter-globalisation networks can be 
'located' which allows as full an understanding as possible of their muhiple agencies and 
practices. 
3.4.1 'Transnational' vs. 'Global' 
Whilst seemingly innocuous, the labels by which alter-globalisation networks are referred 
to carry a great deal of significance for the kinds of research questions posed when 
studying them It will be necessary therefore to develop as much clarity as possible in the 
terminology I will employ for the study ofGCAP, for as I will illustrate, different labels 
imply different lines of investigation. 
Before plunging into this discussion however, I want to make clear one important caveat: 
Any discussion around what is the context in which alter-globalisation networks are 
constituted is inherently risky. Any conclusions reached here will be eminently 
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contestable, not just in the realm of academic debate, but more importantly in the 
unpredictable process of doing research. Indeed, just because something may appear to be 
one thing, doesn't mean that those involved in making that process won't understand it as 
something else. This is exactly what Heins argues in relation to global civil society - just 
because some academics (including me) may not recognise the validity of the claims 
made by global civil society theorists and Liberal cosmopolitans, does not mean that it is 
not " ... an idea that many people live by" (2005b: 195). Nonetheless, as I have argued, the 
act of labelling opens up and shuts down different ways of thinking and understanding 
alter-globalisation networks, and so it seems to me to be an important exercise to engage 
with these debates in order to make some (or my) kind of sense out ofthem 
Lipschutz argues that the majority of social movements and networks are transnational, 
because to 'go global' implies being subsumed by homogeneity " ... and to lose both 
distinctiveness and discursive power" (2006: 18). It is because of this threat that many of 
the actors who constitute such movements and networks remain wedded to some degree 
of place-specific identity and culture, be that nations, states or ethnic groups (op cit). One 
immediate issue which arises from Lipschutz's conceptualisation of these movements and 
networks as transnational is that the places he assigns the national to are not, in fact, 
necessarily national Ethnic groups, even nations, are not necessarily found, and do not 
necessarily place themselves within the confines of a territorial nation-state. I will return 
to this shortly. 
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Sikkink's work on Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs), first with Keck (1998) 
and later with Khagram and Riker (2002) makes the empirical case for Lipschutz's 
conceptualisation. According to Keck and these writers, a TANis based on actors spread 
across different countries acting to regulate international norms and international 
governmental organisations such as the Bretton Woods institutions (Khagram, Riker and 
Sikkink, 2002: 7). This is clearly a conceptual language framed by the pre-eminence of 
the territorial nation-state, and the institutions created by different territorial nation-states 
agreeing with each other. 
Not only does such language place the territorial nation-state as central to how we 
conceive of alter-globalisation networks (thus being open to criticisms of 
'methodological nationalism' (Beck, 1997: 87», but it is also reminiscent of those who 
argue for a scalar approach to the way that alter-globalisation networks, and globalisation 
more broadly, is thought about (Johnston, 2003; Gane, 2004; Sassen, 2007a). Sassen for 
example, asserts that the territorial nation-state has become "unbundled", and been 
transcended (thus being 'trans' national~ by other spatial scales, such as the regional and 
the global (in Ganes, 2004: 126). It is not that Sassen, and those others who share this 
approach, seek to reify such scales. Indeed, Johnston is critical of " ... the tendency to 
reduce complex phenomena to a singular level of geographic scale, to see struggles as 
either [local or global] ... [scales are] frequently treated as static ontological entities, 
obscuring their fluid construction" (2003: 92). However, one has to question whether it is 
40 My conclusion, not Sassen's 
J 
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in deploying the language of scales that such reifications are made more possible (for 
example, describing an aker-globalisation network as campaigning on a 'national' 
scale41). If, like SasseD, one views functions as shifting from one scale to another, then it 
is fairly likely that one will seek to find evidence of such functions operating in relatively 
bounded processes of 'global', 'national', 'sub-national' etc. 
This latter point is extremely important. Even though Johnston claims that scales are 
produced by fluid processes, by invoking the existence of scales he is inevitably invoking 
something which is fIXed, even if it is temporary. According to Pile, privileging particular 
scales in this manner masks the modalities of domination and resistance which are always 
ongoing in giving scales the appearance of fixity (1997: 13). In other words, spatial fixity 
is socially produced, and thus involves some degree of othering and exclusion. So 
Chandler's wholesale rejection of activism which locates itself outside of national 
borders (2004) may have something to do with the fact that he privileges formal local and 
national political institutions as the sites where transformational socio-economic change 
should occur (2007). In doing so he rules out the validity of almost any activism not 
directed at these national institutions, and reifies the pre-eminence of the 'national' scale 
as a fixed and bounded entity. This is not a particularly useful paradigm in which to 
investigate how alter-globalisation networks operate in space, and where they emerge 
from. This is because Chandler explicitly relegates the efficacy of any political action 
with the appearance of non-national features, and assumes that scales exist independently 
41 The implications of this kind oflabelling in GCAP is discussed in Chapter Seven 
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of each other, easily transcended by alter-globalisation networks and activists. If that 
were the case though then we could surely expect to find something called the Global 
Call to Action against Poverty in a place characterised by 'the global', retreating, as 
Chandler would argue, from somewhere else characterised by 'the national'. I am 
extremely sceptical as to the degree to which we can characterise space in these fixed and 
bounded ways. Where exactly, might 'the global' be found? Similarly, whilst one might 
point to a map to locate a national space, how characteristically national are many of 
these spaces when we consider the reformation and reworking of the state and 
sovereignty under conditions of globalisation in so many parts of the world? These 
questions are important with regard to the study of alter-globalisation networks for how 
particular understandings of space allow us to explore their claims of legitimacy, 
representation and authenticity. In other words, what do claims of being global allow 
such networks to say and do, and what does an exploration of where they are actually 
located, discursively as well as materially, reveal about the authenticity of these claims? 
Thus far this discussion bas centred on the resonance of the 'transnational' and the 
'scalar' to the study and location of aher-globalisation networks. Of course, GCAP, the 
case study in this research, is the Global Call to Action against Poverty, and I am now 
going to argue tbat deploying the 'global', rather than the 'transnational' has different, 
and, arguably, more useful connotations in helping to approach the questions posed 
above. It is important to note that I am going to be developing a particular understanding 
of the 'global' here which divorces it from a scalar or spatially autonomous imaginary. 
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When the Liberal cosmopolitans talk about 'global' civil society, this global element is 
deemed to be something qualitatively new in world history (Beck, 1997; Kaldor, 1999; 
Scholte, 2005). Where Beck in particular accuses those who continue to focus on the 
territorial nation-state as the preeminent sociological frame of 'methodological 
nationalism' (2007), I would argue that Beck, and others who claim a distinct global 
sociological frame, are guilty of a kind of methodological globalism which has the same 
effect. Furthermore, a narrative which presents the global as something new simply 
solidifies the historical dominance of the modernist territorial nation-state narrative. As 
Fine argues: 
''the shaky premise oftbe new cosmopolitanism is that no ftmdamental change has occurred 
until recent times. Events as momentous as the political revolutions of the late 18th century 
and the rise of the modern nation state, the growth of imperialism, colonization and 
scientific racism in the late 19th century, the collapse of the mainland European empires in 
the First World War and the formation of a raft of newly independent nation states out of 
their fragments, the rise of totalitarian regimes with global, anti-natiooal ambitioos in the 
int«-war period, the collapse of overseas empires after the Second World War and the 
formation of a new raft of post-colonial nation states - all these events are presented as 
mere punctuation marks in a continuous Westphalian or modernist narrative." (2003b: 457) 
Such a perspective therefore separates the national and the global into distinct analytical 
processes, asserting the territorial nation-state as the autonomous originator of modernity, 
with the global posited as the post-modem condition. I want to argue however, drawing 
again on Laclau (1995, 1996) and Massey (2005), that the global (locally originated and 
universally dominant), is both historical, and relational. Historically, global processes 
were at the centre of the birth of modernity; for example, the cotton mills of the early 
151 
Industrial Revolution were reliant on the cotton and weaving technologies which were 
imported from India, with the cotton itself picked by slaves (Bhambra, 2(07). 
Relationally, the global can be understood as something which both has producing effects 
on localised daily lives and institutions, and is constituted by those same lives and 
institutions. Like Laclau's discussion on the universal and the particular (1996), the local 
cannot exist without the globaL and vice versa. If there was no globaL then how would 
we distinguish the local from anything else? And if everything was global, how would we 
distinguish what was local? In this vein, Stammers and Eschle warn against treating 
globalisation as a homogenising (and thus distinct) force which creates shared 
experiences. Instead, they argue that globalisation is multi-causal and inter-sectional 
(2005: 57). This means that there is still room for locaL nationaL ethnic and cultural 
differences. So we know what the global is not. It is not (as Lipschutz (2006) argues) a 
homogenising, distinct force. What then, is it? 
I would argue that the global is a relational dimension. Scholte (2009) has asserted that 
there is very little that is not global in some sense. The national may retain relevance in 
battling the ill effects of neo-liberal globalisation (Halperin, 2003, Ugarteche, 2(07), but 
if the very actions of national governments are responding to global processes, then those 
actions have been constituted by a relation to those processes which gives those actions a 
global dimension (even though the global itself will be produced by single, or more often 
multiple localities). This does not mean that these national actions are entirely globaL 
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merely that they are part-constituted by something which has emerged locally to take on 
global significance. 
For example, the United States is popularly held to be a global superpower. In this way it 
is productive of certain global relations of domination between itself and other actors. 
Just as much as the US presence in Iraq is produced by certain national militaristic and 
imperialistic trends in US foreign policy, thus emanating from a national space, it could 
also be argued that this very national space is in its turn partly constituted by global 
processes of migration, oil production and climate change, themselves emerging from 
particular places to have global effects. In this sense the 'national' is not a bounded space 
or scale, but something relationally constructed and which contains many different 
dimensions. The same can be said for what we call the 'global'. 
So instead of looking for pre-existing or entirely constituted global, national or local 
scales or spaces in which alter-globalisation networks might operate, we are left with one 
space of many dimensional distinctions, productive of diverse experiences and agencies. 
In political terms this kind of approach underpins Fraser's 'all affected' principle (2007), 
whereby rights and compensation claims are no longer based on territorial affiliation - to 
specific places, nations or scales - but are extended to all those who might be affected by 
the actions of governments or groups in any part of the world. The very fact that they 
may be affected at great geographical distance from where the action was operationalised 
speaks to the inter-dimensionality of places and what is experienced in them, and the 
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manner in which what appears to be singularly global is produced by a range oflocal and 
national dimensions. 
In the context of alter-globalisation networks, therefore, I find it useful to consider what 
Routledge has called 'convergence spaces' (2oo3a: 345-346). Even though Routledge 
persists with the deployment of a scalar imaginary, I believe that the concept of 
convergence spaces can be read as something which transcends scale and becomes 
specific to the actors and relations which constitute such spaces. So, for example, 
Routledge describes a convergence space as "a heterogeneous atrmity - 'a world made of 
many worlds' (Marcos 2001, 10) - between various social formations" (2003a: 345). 
Thus, rather than distinct scales being traversed by instrumental social formations such as 
social movements, a convergence space allows us to think of a site where scales are 
intermingled (and, I would argue, dissolved), and ''where such scales become mutually 
constitutive ... grassroots globalization networks prosecute globalized local actions ... and 
localized global actions" (ibid: 346). Such actions therefore take on various dimensions 
of the locaL national, or global, never being entirely one or the other (and thus never 
entirely occupying one scale of action, and collapsing the very deployment of this kind of 
imaginary). Where Kohn argues that ''The 'global' makes no sense except as the 
convergence of different localities" (2003: 163), we might also understand any social site 
of apparent fixity being the representation ofa convergence of particularities or localities 
(Hetherington, 1997). 
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Viewing space in this way can also lead us to wonder about which 
particularities/localities are absent from a specific convergence space, and why. It is the 
manner in which such convergence(s) may be produced by consensual or conflictual 
relations that gives this process its productive yet temporary and contingent (upon 
consensus andlor conflict) feature (pile, 1997: 13; Butler, 2008: 47). So in the context of 
alter-globalisation networks, we would need to ask how the spaces they occupy are 
produced (particularly when claims of horizontality or accessibility are made about these 
spaces by alter-globalisation networks) and who or what are excluded from these spaces. 
This would also help to explain how their potentiaL their power to, and their convergence 
with other social relations and actors, is immanent in/produced by this process. 
In this sub-section I have argued against common conceptions of alter-globalisation 
networks which see them either as 'transnational' thus privileging the territorial nation-
state as the main source of contemporary political action, and notions of the global as a 
distinct and homogeneous space or 'scale'. Instead I have argued for a conception of the 
global which views it as a dimension, something which is never whole, and entirely 
contingent on relations and actors who are to greater and lesser extents dimensionally 
local or national. These actors in turn are also never whole, and also reliant on productive 
relations and actors which are to greater or lesser extents dimensionally global Such a 
conception of space and the features it takes are thus dependent on the agency of the 
relations and actors who constitute it. The next sub-section therefore will address this 
agency in more detail. Following this I will conclude this chapter with a rumination on 
155 
what the implications of these discussions are for the study of alter-globalisation 
networks. 
3.4.2 Agency 
As I argued in the previous discussion, the global is not new, distinct, homogenising or 
even singular. It is instead a locally-produced and productive dimension which lends the 
convergence spaces which might in part be constituted by the global a distinctly 
heterogeneous character. Given this, it is relevant to include here a discussion of the 
various and conflicting agencies which might be found in convergence spaces. It is 
important to take a grounded normative approach to this issue because some writers who 
address the spaces of alter-globalisation networks (for example: Taylor, 2004; Della 
Porta, 2005: Saunders and Rootes, 2007) do so in such a way as to uncritically celebrate 
and fetishise the activists and organisations found therein. One example of this was 
explored in Chapter One, where Liberal cosmopolitans were found to reify NGOs and 
social movements as inherently progressive, and somehow bounded off from 'uncivil' 
society (Falk, 2005: 75). In developing a research framework for the study of alter-
globalisation networks and convergence spaces, it is thus important to investigate some 
of the ways in which globa~ national and local dimensions combine with the agency of 
the actors who constitute such spaces to produce dominating and resisting effects. This 
has clear implications for the normative potential of alter-globalisation networks, and will 
illustrate the necessity of taking a grounded nonnative approach to the research of them, 
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which takes due notice of the conflicting agencies involved in producing the convergence 
spaces which constitute these networks. 
Describing convergence spaces, Routledge asserts that they are comprised of contested 
social relations, conflicting goals, ideologies and strategies. Whilst this at times can be 
productive of a transcendental universal agency, more often than not these divisions are 
ongoing - ''problematic issues will continue to arise within convergence spaces 
concerning unequal discursive and material power relations that result from the 
differential control of resources" (2003a: 346). 
Such an understanding of an always ongoing contestation within groups and movements 
brings to mind Melucci's work on collective identity formation (1996), which he argues 
is always the result of contestation around what that collective identity should look like, 
and is therefore never ftxed or static. Drawing on this Meluccian understanding on social 
movement formation, Eschle argues that the divergence characteristic of what some 
people call the global justice or aher-globalisation movement (see Chapter Two for more 
examples of these terms) is in fact what constitutes it as a movement (2005: 20) -
"movements are ongoing processes in which diverse actors construct a common frame of 
reference ... the formation of a collective identity through which participants establish 
relationships to each other" (p cit). However, such a presupposition assumes a certain 
degree of equality between the actors involved to have their voices heard and to 
contribute to the formation or dissolution/reformation of collective identities. 
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Building on this, Pile argues that one will never really fmd a singular 'movement', with 
an origin and a destination Rather, one will encounter a number of at times contesting, at 
times coherent pathways, which means there is no single reason why people and 
organisations are mobilised, ''no one single aim, no single demand, no one path of 
struggle" (1997: 29). Pile argues that far from disabling them, this is what makes 
movements strategic, tactical and resourceful (op cit). This would seem to only be the 
case when such disparate pathways are able to align themselves, for when they do not, 
not only would a movement be dysfunctional, but it is unlikely there would be anything 
resembling a movement to observe. This means that in assessing the potentials and 
limitations of alter-globalisation networks we must be attentive to how the appearance of 
coherence and authenticity is maintained. 
Cumbers, Nativel and Routledge reveal the constitutive element of exclusivity which 
produces and maintains coherence in the convergence spaces of aher-globalisation 
networks. They illustrate the very central role that what they call 'imagineers' play in 
maintaining network or movement coherence in their study of an alter-globalisation 
network called Peoples' Global Action South Asia, which has implications for how we 
understand such coherence as an equally negotiated process or occurrence. Despite the 
horizontal manner in which PGA South Asia is constituted (2007: 2579), much of the 
organisational work, including partiCipation in meetings, planning of events, and 
facilitation of communication flows between network nodes is carried out by what they 
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call " ... free radical activists and key movement contacts" (ibid: 2576). They possess key 
English-language skills and are computer literate. They therefore are positioned to 
literally 'imagine' the network into being, grounding it in terms of what it is and how it 
works within the grassroots communities who make up the membership of the other 
participants in the network (op cit). 
Other key nodes in the network who accrue power by virtue of their positionality are the 
translators who translate the English in which PGA South Asia's main conferences are 
held into the languages of the constituent grassroots members (ibid: 2583). Such 
imagineers compromise PGA South Asia's "supposed horizontality, generating unequal 
power relations within the network" (iibid: 2580). 
Network imagineers are internationally mobile, perform much of the work that is 
required to sustain the network and often possess the cultural capital of higher standards 
of formal education, and the social capital which comes with their travels around the 
world attending various get-togethers of activists and social movement organisations. 
They therefore not only route most of the information through their networks, but very 
often decide the content of it too. Cumbers, Nativel and Routledge point out that such 
positionality is very often not instrumentaL and that ''power defaults to them through the 
characteristics noted above; personal qualities like energy, commitment. and charisma, 
and the ability to synthesise politically important social moments into identifIable ideas 
and forms" (iibid: 2584). Furthermore, grassroots members often defauh to this informal 
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elite of imagineers to just get on with the organisation of PGA South Asia (op cit), 
despite having grievances over the direction and content of the network. For example, the 
authors found that many of the grassroots members of PGA South Asia were distinctly 
uncomfortable with the network's focus on performative events such as protests and 
caravans, rather than strategic interventions at the points where the structural violence of 
neo-liberalism was being felt most forcefully (iibid: 2890). This study by Cumbers, 
Nativel and Routledge illustrates the manner in which convergence spaces are non-static 
and non-uniform Just because they are produced spaces, does not guarantee or even 
make likely any kind of homogeneity within them. This is because they are immanent, in 
constant processes of being re-made and fe-interpreted. 
This sub-section has contributed to the wider discussion on how aIter-globalisation 
networks can be located. I have argued that alter-globalisation networks cannot be judged 
by their immediate appearances, but that rather any appearance of fixity they have is 
likely to be unstable and temporary, produced by the agencies of the actors and structures 
which constitute them, and the often unequal power relations between them Furthermore, 
I have argued that these inequalities are linked to the positionality of such actors and 
structures, both to each other, but also within fields and spaces which are produced by 
different dimensions oflocal, national and global processes. It is therefore not necessarily 
the case that the most powerful actors within a network are 'global', with the weakest 
being 'local', but rather that the most powerful actors are constituted by different degrees 
ofthese dimensions. So for example, an actor which is deeply constituted by its relations 
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to a powerful national space, such as the USA, may be far more powerful in a network 
than an actor which travels a great deal and is constituted to a great extent by its global 
relations, none of which however are particularly productively powerful. This is again 
important to bear in mind when studying the agencies of alter-globalisation networks, for 
it prevents us from being automatically celebratory at the appearance of diversity within 
an alter-globalisation network. 
3.S Chapter Conclusion - A Grounded NOrmative Framework 
I began this chapter by arguing that in order to avoid some of the binaries identified in 
Chapter Two, and the uncritical celebration of alter-globalisation networks identified in 
Chapter One, it would be necessary to adopt something which I called a grounded 
normative approach, which investigates the relations which constitute alter-globalisation 
networks in order to understand their limitations and potentials. I then adopted this 
approach to the discussion of three themes which had been present throughout the 
explorations of Chapters One and Two, namely: Statist and Neo-Liberal Hegemonic 
Power; Cosmopolitanism; and Locating A1ter-Globalisation Networks. 
In exploring the relationship between alter-globalisation networks and statist and neo-
liberal hegemonic powers, I argued that a grounded normative approach allows us to 
move beyond the hegemonic/post-hegemonic binary which arose out of the radical alter-
globalisationist approach discussed in Chapter Two. I proposed that we should 
161 
understand neither alter-globalisation networks, nor statist and neo-liberal hegemonic 
formations, as fIXed entities, but instead as sets of relations which can both afftrm, negate 
and transform the contents of each other. I argued that this approach takes into account 
the complex ways in which alter-globalisation networks may re-subjectivise themselves 
and contingently and perhaps temporarily transform the seemingly dominant powers of 
statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations. 
With regards to the ways in which alter-globalisation networks manage the tension 
between the universalism they attempt to embody and the particularisms which constitute 
them, I argued that where the Liberal cosmopolitans of Chapter One over-celebrated the 
cosmopolitan, de-particularising potential of such networks, which often masked Euro-
centric and imperial epistemologies and ontologies, the critics of that position have 
similarly rendered cosmopolitanism as a uniquely western (historica~ imperial) concept. I 
argued however that it was necessary to collapse the universaVparticular binary, in order 
to make it possible to theorise cosmopolitanism from alternative centres of knowledge, 
using the writings of post-colonial theorists to illustrate this. This discussion pointed 
again to the importance of paying attention to the relations which constitute alter-
globalisation networks in order to assess the degree to which such non-western or 
alternative cosmopolitanisms are possible, and whether if they are, to what degree they 
represent more horizontal or equitable modes of encountering distant others. 
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Finally, I turned my attention to the location of alter-globalisation networks, exploring 
ways in which a grounded and normative approach can transcend global-national or 
global-local binaries in the study ofalter-globalisation networks, and what this means for 
understanding their agency. I argued that the various approaches to alter-globalisation 
networks which cite them as trans-nationa~ global, nationally bound, or multi-scalar, all 
in their own ways fIx these networks at one particular site of existence. Adopting a 
dimensional approach, I argued that seeing alter-gtobalisation networks as 
heterogeneously constituted by and productive of convergent dimensions of glob~ 
national and local allowed an understanding to be developed of these networks as 
existing beyond immediate spatial fixity. This means that the research of alter-
globalisation networks needs to take account of the instability ofthe different spaces they 
help to produce and how these may often be contradictory and/or exclusive. 
If in this chapter I appear to be drawing some methodological conclusions then this is not 
accidental. What I have attempted to do here is provide the beginnings of a framework in 
which we can understand the potentials and limitations of alter-globalisation networks 
without being over-celebratory or over-critical in our analysis of them, and without 
setting up binaries about what they should be doing based on particular normative 
positions. In the next chapter I will be setting out my methodology in greater detai~ 
building on the framework developed in this chapter and defIning key concepts intrinsic 
to the study ofrelationality. I will also be outlining the more instrumental aspects of my 
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research design, and reflecting on some of the issues and opportunities I encountered 
when doing this research. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
Methodolog, and Research Design 
4,1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will be seeking to outline a number ofrelated processes and subjects: the 
rationale for this research and the research questions which follow from this; a research 
approach, including defming the key methodological concepts which pertain to it; the 
case study for this research, the Global Can to Action against Poverty (GCAP) - some 
background information, and how I chose to study it; the main research methods I chose 
to use for this research, the justifications for my choice of them, and their limitations, as 
well as how 'doing' the research simultaneously influenced my methods; the ethical 
implications of the research project; and lastly my approach to the issues of 
generalisability and truth claims, 
4,2 Rationale 
In the flTst three chapters of this thesis, I have attempted to illustrate that whilst various 
scholars have centred on how aher-globalisation networks supposedly speak to power 
(see Chapter one) or seek to transcend it (see Chapter Two) many of them (particularly in 
Chapter One) have failed to focus on how the coalitions, movements and campaigns that 
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constitute these networks are themselves constituted by power, including the power they 
wish to speak to/transcend. I have further argued that this has implications for how 
seriously we can take the socio-economic transformation promised by many of these 
networks. Lastly, I have argued that a great deal of this work has relied on uncritically 
normative prescriptions for change, rather than a more grounded approach which would 
seek to investigate the implications of how and by what/whom these networks are 
constituted. In Chapter Three I sought to develop a theoretical framework in which such 
an analysis could take place. 
This lack of a more grounded emphasis has been identified by several authors. Diani 
identifies the lack of attention paid to power generally and leadership specifically in 
social movements (2003: lOSt2. Eschle takes a broader structural approach when she 
argues that there have been many cases of women's minority groups being marginalised 
in the agendas and mobilisations of social movements and civil society. Movements are 
42 It is interesting that Diani should make this claim. As perhaps the leading practitioner and 
exponent of social network analysis (see, Diani, 1992; 1995; 2002; 2003), it is Diani who has done most to 
illustrate the potential of this method in revealing the dynamics of social movement centralisation and 
participation (Diani, 2003: 9). As Anheier and Katz point out though, social network analysis has 
traditionally paid moce attention to the existence of ties and relations, rather than their cultural and social 
meanings and how they are interpreted (2005: 206). Anheier and Katz do however highlight the 
contributions a social network analYSis approach can make to the study of power in alter-globalisation 
networks (or in their words, 'global civil society'), including the diffusion of ideas; patterns of inclusion 
and exclusion; and the relatim ofstructural positions within a network (ibid: 221). However, as 
Yanacopulos notes, network memberships change over time, and thus render quantitative analyses of them 
inflexible (Yanacopulos, 2009). This is reinforced by the impression that a social network analysis assumes 
a relatively static set of social relations existing autonomously from the researcher, and further sets 
boundaries around what actually constitutes the network (i.e. material organisatimal forms, rather than, for 
example, discursive formations). tntimately, whilst social network analysis does provide useful insights for 
the study of power in alter-globalisation networks (as well as the Diani's various contributions, and 
Anheier and Katz, 2003, see also Saunders and Rootes, 2006), I do not believe it provides the right kind of 
insights, nor methodological flexibility for the particular epistemology of power I will be developing 
further m in this chapter. 
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seen as somehow "outside or below power: as intrinsically counter-hegemonic or 
emancipatory ... " (2005: 23). Together with Stammers, Eschle goes on to argue that the 
network form so closely associated with both contemporary capitalism (Hardt and Negri, 
2(00) and the contemporary global civil society and social movements which seek to 
fight it (Hardt and Negr~ 2004), is not necessarily anti-hierarchical and democratic 
(Stammers and Eschle, 2005: 62-63). They thus argue that "the character and dynamics 
of network relationships within social movements may be crucial for considering the 
potential of movements to contribute to a shift towards a more democratic world order" 
(ibid: 63). 
Taking into account both the gaps in the literature on alter-globalisation networks that I 
identified above, and the framework for analysis which I developed in Chapter Three, 
this research will seek to address the following questions: 
Central Research Question 
• What do the powers in alter-globalisation networks reveal about the powers of 
them? 
Sub-research Questions 
• In which ways can alter-globalisation networks be understood as oppositional? 
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• Which processes of exclusion and inclusion constitute alter-globalisation 
networks? 
• Where are alter-globalisation networks? 
4.2.1 Contribution to Knowledge 
It has been argued that there is a tendency in studies of alter-globalisation networks to 
focus research on actors in structurally privileged contexts (Henry, Mohan and 
Yanacopulos, 2004), which this project aims to redress. Furthermore, as several authors 
have attested to (Diani, 2003; Henry, Mohan and Yanacopulos, 2004; Amoore and 
Langley, 2004; Eschle, 2005; Eschle and Stammers, 2005), the study of alter-
globalisation networks has often overlooked power within in favour of power to. 
Nonetheless there are still very few empirical studies of the fonner. It is the contention 
here that one cannot understand the potential of such networks to challenge seemingly 
dominant hegemonic forces without first analysing the degree to which they are 
themselves constituted by relations to these same powers, and what implications this has 
for how they can be understood as oppositionaL inclusive, and locatable. 
4.3 Research ApJ:!roach 
Throughout this thesis so far I have made repeated references to power, and this certainly 
comes to the fore in the mtionale for the research presented at the beginning of this 
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chapter. Whether it has been to critique the Liberal Cosmopolitans for not considering the 
exclusions of 'global civil society' enough, or to illustrate the tensions inherent to the 
relationship between the cosmopolitan and the particular, or the state and civil society, 
power has been writ large thus far. 
Up to this point I have been engaging power as a tool of critique, and have avoided 
explicitly illustrating exactly what kind of power I would deploy in my own analysis. 
Moving forward though, I intend to deploy 'power' analytically. Given this, it is 
important that I offer a discussion which reflects how I intend to use power as an 
interrogative concept. 
4.3.1 Power and Relalionality 
In this section I will develop an epistemology of power which will inform my study of 
GCAP. Steven Lukes' 'radical view' (1974) opened up a discussion on power which 
sought to look past the observed actions or 'non-actions' (Bacharach and Baratz, 1962) of 
human actors, and to locate power either in structure, as Lukes attempted to do, or, as 
others have tried to do, in agency, more specifically in shifting and productive 
relationships. Whereas Lukes claimed that power was hegemonic, dominant and 
exercised, several writers, first as a response to this claim and then later as an extension 
of these counter arguments, came to see power in far more diffuse and non-centralised 
terms. 
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When Foucault famously argued that "We need to cut off the King's head" (Foucault, 
2000: 122), he was referring to the trend within political theory to view power as 
centralised, to reify it as sovereign. Power flows down, dominating its subjects as a King 
does. According to Clegg, ''the formal theoretical concern with what was taken to be 
power had been fixed by Hobbes in a preoccupation with questions of causality, 
sovereignty and order" (Clegg, 1989: 37). Clegg argued that this concern could still be 
found in Lukes' radical view over four hundred years later (op cit). 
Clegg, amongst a range of other writers (see for example Knights and Willmott, 1982; 
Wickham, 1986; Hardy and O'Sullivan, 1998; Sharp, Routledge, Philo and Paddison, 
2000; Allen, 2004), proposed more diffuse notions of power, more in line with the late 
post-structuralism of Foucault. Rejecting the notion that power is something that can be 
held, exercised, that it has property, Clegg argued that it is the image of it as such - its 
reification - which is power's greatest achievement. "When power is regarded as thing 
like, as something solid, real and material, as something an agent has, then this represents 
power in its most pervasive and concrete mode. It is securely fixed in its representations." 
(1989: 207) These representations are rarely as fixed as they might seem, and it is in 
recognition of its actually contestable nature that politics becomes possible. Power is thus 
relational: "it is not a thing nor is it something that people have in a proprietorial sense. 
They 'possess' power only in so far as they are relationally constituted as doing so" (op 
cit). In other words power is only something that is 'held' for as long as the holder of that 
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power is allowed to do so by the complex sets of relationships with people and 
institutions which he or she fmds themselves in. 
It is important to note here that this significantly opens up Foucault's notion of dispersed 
power. Whereas classical Foucauldian power is for the most part uncontestable, because 
it is everywhere and thus has no obvious point of contestation, relational power emerges 
from somewhere, just not where it is often purported to be. This has implications for both 
those who claim to exert power, and those who are subjectified by it. This is because, 
understood as such, it is possible to imagine contesting power by altering a single link in 
the scaffolding of relationships which enables the exertion of power as we experience it. 
Break a link and the structure might dissolve, or at least be required to reconfigure itself 
and provide further opportunities for contestation. This is made all the more possible by 
the fact that often those held to be powerful are not necessarily so in every sense. 
According to Ferguson, 
"planned interventions may produce Wlintended outcomes that end up, all the same, 
incorporated into anonymous constellations of control - authorless "strategies". in 
Foucault's sense - that tum out in the end to have a kind of political intelligibility ... the most 
important political effects of a planned interventim may occur Wlconsciously, behind the 
backs or against the wills of "planners" who may seem to be nmning the show" (2000: 401) 
The idea that the effects of power might in fact be unpredictable, and intelligible only in 
as nmch as they are internalised by consenting subjects, reveals how powerful the 
appearance of power can be, but also how malleable it might be. Allen argues that, 
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because it is relational, power is contestable 'en route'. By this he means that rather than 
viewing power as something which effects us from 'over there', it is something which 
controls us 'over here' (2004; 30), in place. Like Clegg then, Allen views power as 
something which is not held by the powerful, but as a relationship. Indeed, for Allen 
power cannot be held at all, and therefore does not 'flow' from one point to another as 
such, but is merely in constant stages of refraction and flux, never emerging from a 
centre. This does not mean, though, that power is not experienced and intended, just that 
as the relationship itself is malleable, power as experienced and intended may rarely be 
the same thing.43 This dissonance also means that it is possible to understand resistance 
as sometimes, and contingently, being able to 'escape' dominant power. This is because 
"power relations are incomplete, fluid, liable to rupture, inconsistent, awkward and 
ambiguous. Now, spaces of resistance can be seen as not only partially connected to, but 
also partially dislocated from, spaces of domination" (Pile, 1997: 14). It is in this partial 
separation that the possibility for resistance exists - the ability to speak back, around or 
away from power. 
43 In a criticism of Allen, Sayer argues that whilst power does travel and is malleable, it is also held, 
and therefore centres of power can be attacked (2004: 264). Despite this distinction, Sayer does not arrive 
at particularly different conclusions about how power operationalises. What seems to matter therefore is 
how power becomes embodied, and therefore brought into being in the ways in which we observe it. To 
return to Foucault, his argument was not necessarily that power is never centred, but rather that it cannot 
escape its centre without being refracted through a myriad of social relationships. Therefore power is never 
exerted or held in an ontological sense, as this can never be observed, because the very act of observing 
alters the constellation of relations which in tum re-fix power in place (or give powa' its fixed appearance 
at a centre) (Foucault, 198211994: 225). 
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Allen's argument that different forms of power 'travel' differently (i.e. coercion may be 
very effective at short distances but becomes harder to maintain over larger geographies 
due to the increasing number of diversions, obstacles and oppositions coercive power 
would face) (2004: 24) opens up the potential for different strategies at different places in 
the 'map' of power relations. This is an argument made by Massey (2005), who argues 
that different power relationships construct spaces and that these subsequent spatial 
formations construct, constrain, empower and disable different agents. This resonates 
with the notion of space being the site of convergence discussed in Chapter Three 
(Hetherington, 1997; Kohn, 2003; Routledge, 2003a). If dominating forms of power 
cannot dominate a site in its entirety, then that site must be one of converging resisting 
and consenting relations of power. As I argued in the previous chapter, this also means 
that it is difficult to talk about bounded sites such as the 'local' or the 'global' - rather, 
these are relationally constructed sites with few if any specific properties in and of 
themselves. 
This all has implications for how aker-globalisation networks have been viewed with 
regard to debates around structure and agency, with some concluding that they embody 
both (Crossley, 2(02). Imagining networks as fixed actors with singular agency is to reify 
the notion of the network. Networks are structures, but this does not mean that they 
uniformly structure their contents (or 'nodes'). They cannot therefore be assumed to be 
intrinsically one thing or another, and certainly not intrinsically democratic as some argue 
(Dryzek,2000: 134-135). The way they are structured may occur as a result of particular 
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spatial arrangements ofpower, but as Clegg (1989) has shown, any organisational form is 
inherently and continuously contingent, and thus cannot be assumed to simply draw in 
and conduct the behavior of its members. Rather, it is the relational interplay of structure 
and agency which provides insight into the appearance of network fixity, and which 
sheds light on the power relations that construct them, and which are then reproduced 
through them at given moments (Crossley, 2(02). 
I am therefore arguing for a particular epistemology of power which creates an approach 
to alter-globalisation networks which is relational. Whilst this approach takes structure 
seriously, it seeks to look through structure and adopt a post-governmentality position 
which allows resistance to have its own partial and contingent agency. This therefore is 
how I intend to deploy power as an analytical tool in this study. I will now discuss the 
implications of this for a research approach to alter-globalisation networks. 
4.3.2 Researching Relationality 
Lukes' 'radical view' suggested that an agent's interests could be deduced from (and thus 
an analysis of power should rest upon) the degree to which an agent is conscious of those 
interests and then able to pursue them In other words, by deducing what an agent would 
otherwise do, what Lukes called the "counterfilctual" (1974: 39-41). Clegg though argues 
that if we accept that subjects are reiationally constituted, then it makes no sense to try to 
understand what they would do under different conditions, for under those different 
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conditions they would be different subjects with different agencies, thinking and 
choosing differently (1989: 96-97). Whilst Lukes' position is a structuralist one (for it is 
hegemonic control that produces a false consciousness of 'non-real' interests), Clegg in 
fact accuses his methodology of being too agency-centric, for it implies a certain "moral 
relativism" i.e. the injection of the researcher's own values into the definition of what 
'real' interests are (ibid: 100). 
The methodology for this project therefore falls into a tradition which draws on both 
structuralist and post-structuralist epistemologies of power and space, but which 
questions some of the key structuralist tenets regarding agency found in Lukes' work. I 
attempt to arrive at a post-governmentality framework which rejects notions of a 
'sovereign' power (Wickham, 1986; Foucault, 2000), instead choosing to view power as 
having no pre-conceived form. That being so, " ... the only problem is to provide oneself 
with a grid of analysis which makes possible an analytic of relations of power" (Foucault, 
in Gordon, 1980: 199). This by necessity therefore rejects neither structure nor agency. 
As I have argued, because power is embodied, and thus malleable and unpredictable 
(Allen, 2004), opportunities for resistance always exist - whilst structures may form and 
be productive, they themselves can be subject to productive relations of contestation and 
change. 
Methodologically, this epistemology is brought together in the notion of 'translation' put 
forward by Michel Calion and other figures significant in the development of Actor 
175 
Network Theory (ANT) (Calion and Latour 1981; CalIon, 1986; Law, 1992; Latour, 
2005). The notion of translation seeks to determine how some actors in a network 
manage to 'enrol' and 'mobilise' other (human and non-human) actors to a particular 
vision, a 'problernatisation' (Calion, 1986) or 'imagining' (Cumbers, Nativel and 
Routledge, 2007) of what that network looks like, what its aims should be, and how 
actors should behave within it. Such problernatisations assemble actors in its vision, 
emolling them to particular functions, and mobilising them in certain ways which serve 
the initial problernatisation or vision (Calion, 1986). Whilst ANT's focus on the agency 
ofrnaterial things has been controversial (see Vandenberghe, 2002; Whittle, 2008), this is 
not a debate which has much relevance to this study. It is rather my intention to take 
advantage of ANT's focus on the political and the epistemic (Law, 2007), and how this 
allows us to understand structure as having an agency of its own to an extent, which, like 
all agentic processes can be itself structured or mobilised. This calls us to take notice of 
the ways in which different agents are enrolled and subjectified, and re-translatelre-
subjectify themselves within the flexible and porous epistemic boundaries in which they 
fmd themselves. For a study of alter-globalisation networks, this means researching them 
as part of broader epistemic networks constituted by discursive and material relations to 
statist and neo-liberal hegemonic powers as well as more radical and transformative 
discourses. It is therefore the degree to which alter globalisation networks are produced 
by these different discourses/agencies which is of interest here. 
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In the preceding two sub-sections I have set out my approach to the methodological 
concepts which I deployed throughout the design of this research project and in the 
analysis of the data considered in this thesis. The chapter will now continue by 
introducing in more detail the alter-globalisation network around which this research was 
conducted, the Global Call to Action against Poverty. 
4.4 An aher-globalisation Case study - The Global Call to Action against Poverty 
(GCAP) 
In June 2008 my partner and I took a flight to Lilongwe, capital of Malawl where we 
based ourselves for the following month into late July. My plan was to speak to members 
of organisations that participated in the Global Call to Action against Poverty (GCAP), a 
large ('global') multi-sited network of anti-poverty and social justice NGOs, social 
movements, trade unions, faith groups and other civil society actors. Many of the 
organisations I planned to visit in Malawi were based in the capitaL ahhough some were 
in Blantyre to the south, and others were in Mzuzu to the north. At the end of July we 
flew on to Delhi, where we spent another month whilst I interviewed members of 
organisations based there that also participated in GCAP. We then spent another month in 
India moving around as I visited GCAP-participating organisations in Lucknow, Shimla, 
Koikata, Mumbai, Pune and Hyderabad. In both Malawi and India a lot of time was spent 
waiting for people to get back to me to confirm interview dates and times. 
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This rather neat little tale summarises what might be called my 'field'-work during this 
study. However, as will become clear, the 'field' ofthis study preceded this trip, and in 
fact partly constituted and structured my 'choice' of GCAP as a case study. This field 
also extended well beyond Heathrow Terminal 4 upon my 'return' from India. In this 
section therefore, I will detail the processes of decision making and serendipity which 
resulted in first the choice ofGCAP as a case study, my subsequent choice of Malawi and 
India as sub-case studies, and then the expansion of my 'field' beyond my visits to these 
countries. 
There are clearly a great number of alter-globalisation networks, working across a wide 
number of policy and activist areas which I could have chosen to form the basis of this 
study. Had it been a straightforward 'choice', then it would undoubtedly have taken a lot 
longer to finally settle on GCAP, although if I had conducted a preliminary and 
systematic analysis of a range of alter-globalisation networks GCAP would almost 
certainly have stood out as a principal network. For instance, GeAP is very large. It is 
constituted by lIS national-level coalitions of International NGOs (where they have a 
base in a particular country), country-specific NGOs, faith-based organisations, social 
movements, trade unions and parliamentarians. These national coalitions are supported 
and coordinated to varying degrees by regional secretariats. The secretariats and 
coalitions work under broad programmatic agendas agreed to at a bi-annual global 
assembly, attended by members of national coalitions. In between global assemblies, an 
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elected Global Council (supported by a global secretariat) takes decisions on issues as 
they arise. 
GCAP's main aim is to hold national governments and international agencies to account 
over their commitments under the Millennium Development Goals, as well as a range of 
agendas including climate and trade justice (GCAP, 2007a). To this end GCAP organises, 
via its national coalitions, mobilisations around major international summits, as well as 
the Stand Up against Poverty events which take place on the International Day for the 
Eradication of World Poverty in October every year. In 2008, GCAP claims that over 116 
million people 'stood up' against poverty around the world (GCAP, 2008a). 
On a more pragmatic leve~ GCAP is also a very easy network to study and is open to a 
range of research methods. For instance, GCAP is incredibly transparent, posting a great 
number of internal discussion and policy documents on its core website 
(www.whiteband.org). Because GCAP operates in so many spaces and organisational 
contexts, GCAP also provides many opportunities for a researcher to engage with it. 
My decision to research GCAP came at the end of a journey which goes back to my 
Masters, which I studied for between 2003 and 2005. It was not so much the content of 
my Masters which shaped my eventual interest in GCAP (although my interest in the 
study of alter-globalisation activism did begin here too), but the events which bookended 
that period of time - the 2003 anti-war marches in London and the 2005 Make Poverty 
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History campaign. Both seemed at the time to be epochal moments of public activism, 
but neither protest/campaign appeared to succeed in building sustained public 
constituencies for the kind of change necessary to achieve their aims (and this is to put 
aside the debates over the success/failure of them in achieving their immediate priorities). 
So much energy had been expended, and for what? As I turned my thoughts towards 
studying for a PhD, this was the question which initially motivated me - how do 
campaigns like we had seen in 2003 and 2005 build the necessary constituencies to 
achieve the kind of socio-economic transformational change that their aims require? 
Of the two campaigns, it was Make Poverty History that appeared more interesting, with 
its wider aims and potentially broader constituencies. It became clear, however, that 
when it came to focussing on how I would research this question, two problems posed 
themselves. One was with the question itself: which I soon realised was a more 
complicated way of asking 'How do we change the World?' The three years I had for my 
PhD did not seem enough to answer a question of this magnitude (!). The other problem I 
had was with Make Poverty History itself, which by this time had ceased to function as 
anything much more than a registered trademark, having been officially disbanded as an 
active coalition shortly after the 2005 mobilisations. It was also incredibly difficult to pin 
down what exactly Make Poverty History was, and who and what I would speak to and 
analyse ifI wanted to study it. 
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It was at this point, about half way through my first year of doctoral study, that I 
stumbled across GCAP. GCAP is not a name that appears much in the literature produced 
by the Make Poverty History campaign, but it transpired that GCAP was the network 
which acted as an umbrella for Make Poverty History, which was, de jure if not de facto, 
the UK national coalition of GCAP. Whilst Make Poverty History had been a very 
autonomous campaign in the UK (because of the richness of resources enjoyed by 
campaigning organisations in the UK, and the political and popular support it received), 
and thus required little support from GCAP, in other countries GCAP played a very large 
role in facilitating the 2005 campaigns. GCAP was big, it was transparent, and at first 
glance it had a straightforwardly researchable hierarchical structure. I had my alter-
globalisation network. 
4.4.1 Getting into GCAP - a/oeus on national coalitions 
Having 'found' GCAP, my next challenge was to decide how to study it. In taking a 
relational approach to GCAP, I had to take my own presence in the research seriously. I 
was under no illusion that I could somehow capture all of GCAP's relationality and 
agencies, firstly because of my own situatedness as a seemingly and relatively white, 
economically privileged male44, and secondly, because of the unpredictable agency of 
44 I was mainly reminded of this at times when I became too critical ofGeAP. It was very easy for 
me, as someone who does not need GeAP campaigning for me, to dismiss those aspects ofGCAP which 
served to benefit particular marginalised or oppressed groups. This was especially reinforced to me during 
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what I was pJanning to study. I therefore did not plan this research with a view to 
overcoming Haraway's 'god trick' (1997: 283-295)4S in mind - quite the opposite, in 
fact. 
This understanding of what was achievable had a significant impact on how, or where, I 
decided to study GCAP. Rather than make an attempt to 'capture' a 'full' picture of 
GCAP's relationality, which would be necessarily lacking in any case, I decided to 
follow the advice of Latour (2005), who has argued that it is necessary to follow the 
actors which constitute a network when deciding who and what to research in it, rather 
than to define it in the initial stages of the research as the person researching it. In this 
vein, then, I decided to focus in on the actors which many ofGCAP's documents claim 
constitute it, and are the base for its action and cooperation; the national coalitions 
(GCAP, 2005: 3. GCAP, 2006: 5. GCAP, 2007b: 8). I decided that once I was involved in 
the national coalitions, I would look out from that perspective to where else I should go 
in seeking an understanding of GCAP's relationality - a fuller account of that process 
will take place later in this chapter. 
my time in India, speaking with and attending meetings of Dalit and Adivasi campaign organisations, who, 
as I write about in subsequent chapters of this thesis, have made important gains by being a part of GeAP. 
4' In 'The Persistence of Vision ' Haraway argues that the 'god trick' .... .is an illusion that creates 
the belief in infinite vision and thus a detached observer perspective from which "objective" scientific 
theory is formulated" (Conroy, 2007: Paragraph 2). In this way, the subjects of all kinds of research have 
historically been objectified as un-mediated, with theory being seen as the place of the all seeing observer, 
free from implicit assumptions. 
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Another reason to start 'at the bottom' with the national coalitions was the sheer 
unfIxability of who constituted GCAP in any of its global configurations. Despite 
GCAP's hierarchy of national, regional and global bodies, in reality these bodies are not 
constituted by easily recognisable national, regional or global agents. So for example, 
most members of the Global Council, GCAP's main decision making body, in fact also 
belong to or work for organisations involved in national coalitions. Furthermore, there are 
a large number of sub-groups with a global remit constituted in the same way, such as the 
GCAP Feminist Taskforce. So, for example, in the period up to 2007, there were roughly 
260 people who participated in the GCAP International Facilitation Team (the precursor 
to the Global Council) and its various sub bodies and working groups (GCAP, 2007b). 
Again, judging from their contact details and GCAP's modus operandi of working from 
national coalitions up, most of these people were situated in organisations participating in 
national coalitions, as well as other regional arrangements. The degree, therefore, to 
which I could address my research to GCAP at a 'global' level was questionable. I should 
point out that this does not mean I advocate a kind of methodological nationalism (as 
should be clear from Chapter Three). Rather it is the case that by not attempting to 
research GeAP's relationality where it might perhaps seem obvious to do so i.e. at the 
'global', I am retaining here the sense in which neither the 'global', nor the 'regional' or 
'national' are autonomous entities. To study GeAP in the places where it is constituted is 
to precisely not prioritise one distinct 'scale' over another, but is simply the result of my 
intention to allow GCAP its say in where it should be studied. 
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The focus on the national coalitions again posed questions for this research. There are 
115 national coalitions, and either researching all of them, or just a small number of 
them, would have ramifications for this project. Anything which would involve 
researching all of the national coalitions would have proved unmanageable and 
unproductive of the kind of research story I wanted to tell. Clearly I could not visit 115 
countries to interview every member of every national coalition Whilst the Sri Lankan 
coalition is a one-organisation 'network', in India there are 3,000 members. If! tried to 
do a survey of the coalitions, then apart from issues of language, and the difficulty of 
getting an adequate response rate, it would also produce exactly the kind of quantitative, 
representative-'full picture' sample that I didn't believe was plausible and was trying to 
avoid making a claim of providing through my research. 
I therefore decided to focus on only a very small number of national coalitions, and to 
'follow GCAP outwards' from there. I made this decision in order to provide me with a 
deeper perspective on what was happening in some parts of GCAP, some of the time. So 
in other words I went for depth, rather than breadth. Given the kinds of claims made 
about alter-globalisation networks discussed in Chapters One and Two, I believed (and 
still do) that such a perspective would speak to these universalising claims in a more 
meaningful and problematising way perhaps, than a piece of research which itself made 
universalising claims about GCAP's agency. 
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This is then where a mixture of 'grand-theory' and the everyday came into play, resulting 
in me settling on two national coalitions to study - in India and Malawi. More 
prosaically, this was dictated by available research budgets, the amount of data I could 
process in a time-limited research project, my poor non-English language skills, as well 
as the availability of my partner, who was able to take no more than three months offher 
full-time job in order to accompany me. More importantly, both India and Malawi 
provided interesting sub-case studies, as I will now illustrate. 
4.4.2 GCAP in India and Malawi - Contrasts and Comparability 
The first point to make here is that despite the title of this subsection this is not a 
comparative study. Rather, comparisons or contrasts were only drawn in such a way as 
they shed light on the kinds of relations which constituted GCAP, rather than because 
they might be of interest as comparisons in their own right, i.e. in order to say that 
'Malawian civil society is better at this' or 'Indian civil society is better at that'. Such an 
analysis would not only be relatively useless for this study, but would also be unfilir 
given the large discrepancies between the histories and agencies of civil societies in India 
and Malawi. In the interest of providing some insight into why I chose these two 
countries then. what follows is a brief introduction to GCAP in India and Malawi, and a 
reflection on some of the literature on civil societies in those countries. 
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According to a senior GCAP organiser based in the UK. the Indian coalition (named 
'Wada Na Todo Abhiyan' (WNTA) - Hindi for the 'Keep Your Promises Campaign') has 
achieved remarkable results (Interview 12). It was one of the earliest affiliate coalitions to 
have been established (actually pre-<iating OCAP's formal induction in 2(05) and 
individual members of it play active roles in OCAP's governance structures (such as the 
Global Council). In 2007, during a debate on whether the OCAP Global Secretariat 
should be moved from its then current location in South Africa, WNT A was the only 
non-European coalition to have bid to host it. 
Historically, India has a very well developed NGO and civil society sector, although this 
has not led to an unproblematic contemporary civil society terrain. A commitment to 
Gandhian 'voluntarism' has resulted in many NGOs being established by charismatic 
figureheads with paternalistic ideas about how the victims of socio-economic injustice 
should be represented and their lives improved (Kamat, 2002; Baviskar, 2(05). 
Furthermore, government licensing ofNGOs receiving overseas donations has meant that 
NGOs who contlict with the government have had to tread a careful line if they do not 
want their license to receive such funds revoked on a pretext (Baviskar, 2005). Lastly, as 
the urban centres where most major Indian civil society actors are based have become 
unrecognisably wealthier in recent years, urban-rural political and cultural boundaries 
have become more pronounced (Heins, 2000: 42). 
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The GeAP coalition in. Malawi on the other hand (named the National Civil Society 
Taskforce for the MOOs - NCSTM) operates in a very different context. The civil society 
sector in Malawi is relatively young. only really growing in the post-dictatorship era of 
multiparty democracy since 1994. Coinciding at a time of mass donor involvement and 
attention to civil society. the government views many NGOS as service providers and is 
unreceptive to criticism and advocacy (Tembo. 2003). Furthermore, because NGO and 
CSO networks are so young and their members so under-resourced, a situation has arisen 
where funds for such networks are appropriated by newly formed secretariats who carry 
out the work of the network but simultaneously create a gulf between themselves and the 
network membership (James and Malunga. 2006). Despite these dynamics. the NCSTM 
has organised the largest mobilisations in Africa for the past two Stand Up against 
Poverty annual mobilisations. 
Clearly. then., both national coalitions and contexts were going to provide interesting 
opportunities for focussing this research in ways which would speak to the kinds of 
relations which constitute GeAP and of which GeAP is productive. The coalitions 
provided interesting contrasts in terms of their relationships with GeAP (with far more 
members of the WNT A being engaged with GeAP processes than in the NCSTM). yet 
both coalitions were based in contexts on whose behalf GeAP claims to speak, thus 
suggesting a sense in which GCAP might have been experienced similarly in both 
coalitions. These then were some of the thoughts I had when I began contacting coalition 
members in both countries. I shall now move on to the implications of my 
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methodological framework for the research methods I eventually chose to use in my 
study of these two GCAP national coalitions, and in anticipation ofGCAP more broadly. 
4.5 Research Methods 
The methodological approach outlined previously allowed me to collect data in such a 
way that recognised the particularities of the spaces in which they were collected, and the 
interplay of power between those spaces. It also alJowed me to look beyond traditional 
notions of North-South domination and dependency theory (Kamat, 2004), or resource-
mobilisation (Zald and McCarthy, 1979) (although to still identify them where they 
existed), towards possibly unexpected or non-formulaic examples of emancipation and 
empowerment. It was also a reflexive approach. which acknowledged my own influence 
over the construction, for example, of interview situations and transcripts (Taylor, 2003: 
27_31)46, as well as the identification of actors within the network (Melucc~ 1996: 21). 
Latour (2005) claims that it is only when an actor leaves a 'trace' that it can be said to 
exist within the network. Ultimately such traces will be identified and often constructed 
by the research participants (including the researcher)47. My methodological and 
46 The co-producedness of interview situatims became evident when I introduced information 
sheets to the research participants, an issue I cover in more detail furthec on in this chapter, in section 4.5.5. 
I was also aware of the fact that in several interviews, research participants were keen to get information 
about the Open University (OU) from me, and how they could receive grants to take OU courses. I was not 
sure to what degree my role as a specifically OU researchec had m these overall interview situations, but I 
cannot discount the possibility that some research participants may have been more compliant or eager to 
flease than they othecwise might have been. 
7 This was wuJoubtedly the case with what a very significant output of this research became, and 
which forms the content of future research I plan to carry out, around the discursive and material effects of 
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epistemological approach allowed me to adapt questions and methods in a contingent 
manner, in order to allow such traces to 'speak back', recognising therefore the co-
constitutive nature of researcher and researched. This acknowledgment of my own role 
within the production of the research data required the provision of opportunities for the 
research participants to 'answer back' in the translation of their inputs into the fmal thesis 
(which has the further benefit of retaining the contingency of the data) (Whatmore, 2003: 
98)48. In this way I attempted to overcome the binary between 'the real' and 'the 
constructed', instead recognising them as " ... synonymous aspects of fabrication" 
(Whatmore, 2003: 9St9• 
As a result of this, I never believed that it would be possible to simply 'capture' a vision 
of GCAP - that it was simply 'out there' awaiting discovery. I did not therefore seek to 
assemble this research around a static or graphical representation of GCAP. Instead I had 
the expectation that GCAP and its terrain would be continuously produced and 
rearranged by the actors which constituted its network (including me in the moments in 
which I interacted with it/them). It was therefore not the purpose of this research to 'map' 
the Millenniwn Development Goals on civil society organisations (see Chapters Five and Eight). I had no 
inclination of the significance of the MOOs to GCAP before I began speaking to GCAP participants in 
Malawi. In this way 'traces' of the MOOs were constructed by/working through the research participants. 
48 It is for this reason that research participants were sent full transcripts of our discussions for 
comment and analysis. The process of 'answering back' also occurred when I confronted research 
participants with textual data which I had collected in advance about their campaigns. Some responses to 
these situations challenged my own interpretations of these texts and served to contextualise the way I 
wrote about them in this thesis. 
49 This is most evident in the degree to which I try to avoid, in my concluding chapter, making truth-
claims based on this research. GCAP as presented in this thesis is my interpretation of it. Whilst this 
interpretatioo is based on the interactions I had with actors which constitute it and are constituted by it, 
GCAP is always evolving and mutating, and bas already evolved beyond the picture of it I present through 
this research. 
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this terrain at any given (and thus highly reductionist) time, but rather to tease out the (at 
times contradictory) complexities in GCAP's constitution. Whilst a network is relational, 
these relations make the network form immanent, and are ever shifting and coalescing to 
construct and reproduce the network differently in different spaces. A static 
representation of it (for example a social network analysis (see Diani, 2002 - see also 
footnote 32 on p.148» - which necessarily involves several degrees of separation from 
the data as produced - may therefore only have a very limited representational use 
(Latour 200S). 
In using a case study approach I therefore aimed to produce a 'thick' and 'rich' analysis 
of the processes under study (Snow and Trom, 2002). By this I intended to produce an 
explicatory understanding of GCAP in particular expressions of its being, which, in 
shedding light on how we might understand GCAP's agencies, might also provide an 
illustration of how we go about understanding the agencies of aher-globalisation 
networks more broadly. Furthermore, a case study approach allowed me the degree of 
flexibility my methodological understandings called for - it allowed me to consider 
unexpected factors as they appeared rather then going into the field with a set of static 
and reified notions. so 
In employing a case study approach I am cognisant of its shortcomings, the major one 
being of poor genemlisability (Snow and Trom, 2002), which is always contingent on the 
The next sub-section will address this in a little more detail 
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cases being used and the claims being made. This research makes no claim for the 
universal applicability of its narratives, rather that they may contribute to the as yet small 
canon of literature analysing the constitutive power relations of alter-globalisation 
networks. 
Based on this methodological perspective, this study utilised a range of research methods. 
All of them to greater and lesser degrees involved a discourse analytic approach. This 
was because of the penetrating and intensive focus on patterns and relations of ideas 
which qualitative discourse analysis offers (Johnston, 2002: 69). As such I will delineate 
this approach in a bit more detaiL before continuing to highlight which methods were 
deployed in the process of this research, and how they were influenced, and in some 
cases re-constituted, via my interaction with the other research participants. 
4.5.1 Discourse Analysis - a brie/summary 
Discourse analysis is ''the close study of language in use" (Taylor, 2001: S) and is thus 
concerned with the way in which meanings are produced. It regards text and talk as social 
practice rather than a medium through which to discover an absolute truth and assumes 
that language is not neutraL that it constructs rather than reflects reality (GilL 1996: 246). 
Discourse analysis looks at how people use language to construct the(ir) world(s) and 
how language gives meaning (Tonkiss, 2004: 2S9). Furthermore, according to Gill 
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(1996), discourse analysts ''produce readings of talks, texts and contexts. We do not 
claim to 'discover' the 'truth' or even produce a 'definitive' reading ... " (147). 
Discourses therefore comprise words and language which construct identities, relations 
and spaces. Discourse analysts are not primarily interested in distinguishing fact from 
fiction in discourse; rather they are interested in the work that discourses do (Bhasin, 
2010). Whilst Marxist or critical discourse analysts maintain a distinction between the 
material and the culturaL and try to find the material basis of cultural understandings and 
meaning making (Wetherell, 2001: 384), the approach I adopt in this research is more 
influenced by Foucauldian and critical psychological understandings of discourse, which 
collapse this distinction and understand the material as only possible through cultural 
meaning-making (ibid: 391). Discourses are therefore not understood to be always and 
necessarily animated by 'secret' or 'hidden' material or cultural drivers, although this is 
not to dismiss them entirely, but to problematise the tranquility in which they are 
assumed to pre-exist discourse (Foucault, 1969/2002: 28. Edley, 2001). 
Foucault recommends treating discourses on their own terms, but only in order to be able 
to identify their articulated co-existences, which go beyond the mere intentionality of the 
speaker or author. Thus ''to reveal in all its purity the space in which discursive events are 
deployed is not to undertake to re-establish it in an isolation that nothing could overcome; 
it is not to close on upon itself; it is to leave oneself free to describe the interplay of 
relations within it and outside it" (Foucault, 1969/2002: 32). It is not therefore the 
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analysis of the language itself that reveals its 'facts', but ''the analysis of their 
coexistence, their succession, their mutual functioning, their reciprocal determination, 
and their independent or correlative transformation" (op cit). This is clearly then a 
relational approach to discourse, which shares many features with the approach to power 
which I laid out earlier, in as much as it allows for an analysis which takes the role of 
structure in shaping discourse seriously, but only to the extent that it is featured by the 
discourse, and only to the extent that it too is susceptible to translation and mediation by 
other actors in relation to it. 
This also shares a great deal with another tradition which I wish to deploy in this 
research, critical discursive psychology (COP). Whereas Foucauldian analyses have been 
used to explain the construction of seeming monoliths (the clinic, the prison, etc), the 
focus of COP on 'interpretative repertoires' places more emphasis on human agency in 
the construction of language and allows for the fact that many different repertoires may 
be expressed by the same person in the course of one piece of talk (Ed ley, 200 I). 
Interpretative repertoires are thus fragmented, and give rise to 'ideological dilemmas' 
(Billig et ai, 1988). According to Billig et al (ibid), ideological dilemmas in people's talk 
arise from the contradictions inherent to 'everyday common sense'. Far from being 
meaningless, this gives people a rich tapestry of discursive resources to draw upon in 
making sense of their everyday lives. However, identifYing these dilemmas and 
associated interpretative repertoires can still reveal a great deal about their broader 
ideological context and the subject positions these produce. The key, though, is to 
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understand that different subjecthoods might be taken on in one piece oftalk. In this way 
therefore "Speakers both exploit and are exploited by existing discursive formations" 
(Edley, 2001: 223) 
In the above manner therefore it is possible to understand discourses and interpretative 
repertoires as being unstable, contradictory and productive, rather than monolithic 
constructs conditioned by material practices and macro-ideologies. By collapsing the 
discursive and the material we also allow for the consideration of discourse as being 
embodied, and practiced rather than distinctly and purely epistemic - it is in this way that 
Law (2003) suggests that the work of Foucault and Actor Network Theory are connected, 
a relationship I intend to deploy in this research by focussing at times on the material 
implications of discursive constructs. I also intend to draw on this relationship by 
interpreting what counts as discursive data in a broader sense, to include not simply talk, 
but also texts and observations. 
I want to conclude this section with a caveat. I am not a Critical Discursive Psychologist. 
Nor am I a Foucauldian Discourse Analyst. This is not an archaeological or historical 
study. It is simply that I believe both these traditions provide useful tools for the analysis 
of research data, at given moments in the research process. It is for this reason that I have 
not deployed these traditions uniformly and universally in the presentation ofthe research 
data over the coming chapters. Rather, I have deployed them selectively when it has 
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seemed most appropriate and interesting to do so. I will now introduce the data which 
formed the basis of my study, followed by the methods I deployed to analyse it. 
4.5.2 Research data 
I examined the productive effects of discourses mediated through the following two 
processes: 
i) The talk of GCAP coalition participants in Malawi and India, as well as with 
members of the GCAP Global Council, GCAP Global Secretariat and GCAP 
Learning and Accountability Group (of which I was a participant-observer). 
ii) The documents of GCAP's "machinery of representation" (Wetherell, Taylor 
and Yates, 2001: 4) i.e. the written texts produced by GCAP and the national 
coalitions via official publications, website articles and news releases and 
strategy and discussion documents (see separate bibliography for coq>lete 
list) 
Both of these types of discursive mediators lend themselves to the production of 
researchable texts, which were augmented by observations and informal conversations 
which will be further detailed in the list of methods I deployed in this research (or were 
deployed for me in some cases) in the next sub-section. Before that, though. I want to 
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take a 'reflexive moment'. In analysing both the talk and the documents ofGCAP I have 
been very conscious of my own role in constructing the themes and conclusions which 
you will find in the data chapters which follow. Even if I was an 'objective' researcher 
(which I am not), then the very act of presenting this research in a written document with 
a logical progression of thematic chapters inevitably involves the production ofa unique 
research narrative rather than a definitive set of research 'findings'. Understood in this 
way, the term 'research participant' has to be broadened out from my self, and the 
members of particular GCAP bodies, but has to also include the Open University'S PhD 
dissertation guidelines and my Western academic research training, both of which are 
also mediating actors in the GCAP network under analysis (Latour, 2(05). Me, the other 
human research participants, and these other non-human research participants, all played 
important roles in mediating the data which I present in the following chapters. 
This is something which is particularly important to keep in mind in a study which 
employs fieldwork. Very often the 'field' is thought ofas being in another place, separate 
from where the research is prepared and written up. It is the place where the researcher 
'goes to' and 'comes back' from However, as Massey explains 
"At each stage [of the research] ... something is lost (locality, particularity, materiality, 
mUltiplicity, continuity) and other things are gained (compatibility, standardisation, text, 
calculation, circulation, relative universality) ... there is both 'reductioo' and 
amplification· ... 'The field', then, begins to seem less like a space which one goes to and 
subsequently leaves. Rather. it is a much more complex structure which one transforms; it 
is still present, in transformed form, in your written report ... and the processes of 
transforming it are present too, in every operatioo 'within' the field ... there is not a huge 
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uncrossable gap between you at your desk reading the 'literature' and a field 'out there'" 
(2003: 82-83) 
Whilst I see no need to endlessly repeat my own role in (re) constructing'l this data 
narrative, if only because I believe it is fairly obvious and furthermore sheds little light on 
my core research questions, I nonetheless feel this is an important assertion to make here, 
as it is something which influenced my choice of methods (i.e. qualitative over 
quantitative), and my aversion to making truth claims with the data gathered in this 
research. 
4.5.3 Choosing and applying research methods 
Having discussed the analytical approach adopted to the data under study in this research, 
I will now outline in more detail the data analysed, and the four methods deployed in 
gathering and analysing it - semi-structured interviewing; ethnographic interviewing; 
participant observation; and documentary analysis. Two of these methods lend 
themselves to the production of texts for discourse analysis - transcripts in the case of 
semi-structured interviews. and the collection of written documents in the case of 
documentary analysis, whilst the other two methods augment these texts by producing 
observation and conversation-based field notes. This was an important aspect in the 
selection of these methods (even though some of them were adopted/adapted whilst I was 
~I This is a re-constructive mOOlent because it involves my interpretation of the constructions of tile 
other research participants involved in this project. 
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'in the field') as they provided data which could be analysed using similar analytical 
tools. I will now introduce each method, why they were deemed appropriate and how I 
used them to produce data for this research. 
Semi-structured interviewing: Semi-structured interviewing was preferred to structured 
interviewing because it is more useful in answering 'how' and 'why' questions, and 
allows for participants to expand their responses (Woodehouse, 1998), thus providing the 
possibility for 'rich' forms of data (Snow and Trom, 2(02). I wanted to use interviewing 
as a method as it would help me to build a picture of how participants in GCAP 
understand their involvement with it, in reference not just to GCAP but in the other 
contexts through which they live their lives. Through 31 interviews with members of 
WNT A, the NCSTM and the GCAP Global Secretariat I sought to elicit details of the 
inter-relationships between the participants and other actors as they came to light over 
issues such as strategy, tactics and public mobilisation. This helped to understand key 
moments of 'translation', 'enrolment' and 'mobilisation' (CalIon and Latour 1981. 
CalIon, 1986) through the GCAP network. The interviews were also used to help identify 
and differentiate between what Latour (2005) calls 'mediators' (those who problematise 
and enrol the network) and 'intermediaries' (those who merely reproduce those 
problematisations). 
After transcribing the interviews myself: I shared the transcripts and preliminary analysis 
I made of the interviews with the research participants in order to re-affirm the 'co-
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produced-ness', contingent and sometimes contrariness of the data (Whatmore, 2(03). 
Such data was then used in conjunction with data elicited from my subsequent methods. 
The interviews were conducted face-to-face, mostly in the offices of the research 
participants (although on a few occasions in 'neutral' venues such as coffee shops). Lists 
of national coalition members were available on the web sites associated with each 
coaiitionS2 and were contacted differently in each country. In Malaw~ the NCSTM 
secretariat provided me with the contact details of all coalition members, who I emailed 
in advance with details of the proposed research and their involvement in it (see 
Appendix One). Emails were followed up with phone calls where numbers had been 
provided. In India however, the WNT A secretariat decided that my request would be 
more likely responded to if they established contact and set up the interviews on my 
behalf. Thus, when I arrived in Delhi to conduct the initial interviews, unbeknownst to 
me, the WNT A secretariat had organised a schedule of interviews for me with Delhi-
based coalition members. This had two ramifications, one potentia~ and one very 
productive. The first ramification was that this would potentially lead to the interview-
based research being controlled and directed by the WNT A secretariat. I was concerned 
that they would be 'leaning over my shoulder' through the research. It transpired that this 
concern was also one shared by the coalition secretariat, or that at least they were 
concerned that there would be a perception amongst coalition members that the research 
In India www.wadanatodo.net. and in Malawi 
http://www.sdnp.org.mw/-edsaidi/coogoma3/index.htm 
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was being carried out directly under the auspices of the secretariat, and that this would 
therefore jeopardise or shape the responses in a certain way. We decided together 
therefore, that after the first set of interviews which they had already set up for me, I 
would arrange all subsequent interviews directly. The second ramification of this initial 
arrangement was fur more productive, and created the conditions for the adoption of a 
second interviewing method which I took the decision to utilise whilst in India. 
Ethnographic Interviewing: Ethnographic interviewing is a process in which the 
selfi'other dichotomy inherently performed in a more formal structured or semi-structured 
interview setting is collapsed (Thrift, 2(03). According to Sherman: 
"Ethnographic interviewing ... include[ s] those projects in which researchers have 
established respectful, on-going relationships with their interviewees. including c.'Dough 
rapport for there to be a genuine exchange of views and enough time and openness in the 
interviews for the interviewees to explore purposefully with the researcher the meanings 
they place on events in the world ... empowering interviewees to shape. according to their 
world views. the questions being asked and possibly even the focus of the research study" 
(2007: 370) 
Thus ethnographic interviewing is a method which involves questions produced by the 
evolving context and mood of the interaction It is interviewing as 'travelling', rather than 
'gold-mining' (ibid: 371). During my time in India it quickly became clear to me that the 
amount of time I was spending in and around the WNT A secretariat, in particular two of 
its members, was providing me with the opportunity to develop not only more 
contextualised understandings of the relationships which constructed GeAP in India, and 
India in GeAP, but also a more contextualised basis for my research project as a whole. 
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Spending time with, and becoming friends with these individuals left my own position as 
a researcher far more porous to their opinions and understandings of GCAP and my 
research more broadly. As such, my representation of the productive effects of the 
WNTA's discursive practices became very attuned to the inclusionary and emancipatory 
possibilities contained within that coalition, as understood by the people involved in it. It 
is a limitation of this research that I was unable to build similar relationships with some 
of the research participants in MalawL and is one possible reason for the more 
conditioned and dominated context I felt I had encountered theres3• 
Participant Observation: This is another method which I adopted once I had begun to 
conduct the research, and occurred in two instances, the second of which further 
collapses the university/field distinction, as it is a process which is still ongoing and may 
well continue beyond the end of my time as a PhD student. Firstly, in Malawi I was 
invited to participate in a NCSTM coalition meeting held at the offices of the United 
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in Malawi. This provided me with a one-off 
opportunity to witness the action of the coalition as it unfolded in everyday life, an 
advantage of participant observation (Lichterman, 2(02). 
53 I f th· . should stress that this is one reason amongst many, and that both 0 ese lDlpresslOns were 
corroborated by more formally conducted intlniews and textual analysis. For example, I also believe that 
there are historical and material reasons for the different situations I encountered which have already been 
explored earlier on in this chapter, and which will become clearer in the data chapters. 
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The second instance of participant observation I conducted was far more iterative and 
consuming. As this research became more known within GCAP's various fora, and as a 
result of some 'snowballing' (Yanacopulos, 2007), I came into contact with one of the 
co-chairs ofGCAP. The co-chairs ofGCAP head the GCAP Global CounciL and provide 
public leadership of the network where relevant and asked to do S034. The co-chair 
invited me to participate in a small Learning and Accountability group (LAG) which had 
been mandated by the Global Council to address GCAP's organisational structures and 
operating procedures. This was planned with a view to promoting horizontal leadership 
of GCAP and the accountability of all parts of the network to all other parts, without 
sacrificing the non-hierarchical and non-binding nature of its original mandates (GCAP, 
2008b). The LAG occupied three main 'fields' - conference calls, group email exchanges 
and one face to face meeting in Utrecht, in April 2009. The LAG also produced its own 
collection of documentation mainly in the form of discussion reports and strategic 
analyses and evaluations ofGCAP. I was given access, and was expected to contribute to, 
all of these fields and outputs. I adopted a slightly adapted form of theory-driven 
participant observation (Lichterman, 2(02) in my engagement with the LAG. Rather than 
taking it as read that I would be "seeing structure happen" (ibid: 118) I was also open to 
'seeing structure created', or rather, to analysing both the conditioning and productive 
relationships which would interact within the LAG's multiple fields. 
On the whole GCAP tries to ensure tbat no one is tasked with 'leading' the network. and attempts 
to spread responsibility through the network. However, in reality the co-chairs are often asked by media 
outlets and other organisations for public comment on various issues. 
202 
In both cases, participant observation allowed me to see (albeit particular instances of) 
GeAP unfold in front of me, with me, at times, doing some of the unfolding. This helped 
to augment the meanings which individual participants gave to GCAP through the semi 
structured and ethnographic interviews, by translating some of these meanings into 
observable interactive practices. 
Documentary analysis: In this section I will address the manner in which I encountered 
and selected the documents which I analysed in this research. The GeAP website 
(www.whiteband.org) is used by GCAP to communicate not only with the public at large, 
but also with its constituent network members. As such it is a highly transparent medium 
where many documents which might normally be considered 'internal' or 'sensitive' are 
posted. It should be noted though for all the ease with which I was able to access such 
documentation it has nonetheless been the case that as such this area of the research has 
been mediated to a great degree by GeAP and the individuals within GCAP who decide 
what does and what does not appear on the website. Whilst I have no reason to believe 
that this is done with any other intention than to be open and transparent, even the simple 
fact of posting final drafts of documents without their predecessors can create the 
impression of wide agreement when this may be the outcome of intense negotiation. 
In addition to the documents available on the GeAP website. I was also able to analyse 
texts specific to the two coalitions I was studying in greater depth. The NCTSM had not 
produced very many public documents, although I was given access to coalition meeting 
203 
minutes. I was also in email contact with many of the NCSTM coalition members, and 
these in themselves constituted interesting research material. 
WNT A on the other hand provided me with over 70 non-publicly accessible documents 
pertaining to their coalition. This included strategy documents, meeting reports, 
questionnaire responses and internal email exchanges. The email exchanges were 
particularly interesting, in that they all related to specific instances of controversy and/or 
disagreement. That these were sent intentionally was of little doubt to me, and made me 
question the degree to which I was being diverted into certain areas which some members 
of WNT A wanted me to focus on (for example, the relationships between the 
International NGOs and the Indian NGOs on the coalition). Whilst accepting this might 
be happening, the content of the emails were nonetheless of immense interest, and did 
inform some of my investigations and conversations with the coalition members. The 
research process in this respect was therefore circular; my initial questioning and contact 
with the research participants and their 'machinery ofrepresentation' (Wetherell, Taylor 
and Yates, 2001: 4) was driven by my original research questions. These were then re-
constituted through my encounter with the mediating practices of the research 
participants and their conditioned and conditioning discourses. This fed back into, but did 
not entirely displace, my original research questions and approach. 
4.5.4 Analysing the data 
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The data I collected was categorised and analysed using NVIVO 8 software. This 
software has the advantage of not doing too much to the data as inputted. It is not a 
programme that can carry out much analysis by itself. Instead, it encourages the user to 
methodically analyse the data and arrive at his or her conclusions regarding it, leaving a 
'paper trail' throughout the entire process for ease of referring back to re-analyse and re-
evaluate. To the degree that any piece of software inevitably mediates the data inputted 
into it, and thus the narratives arising out of it, NVIVO 8 cannot escape this fact. It is 
though, comparatively, a piece of software that keeps its opinions mainly to itself. 
I transcribed the semi-structured interviews over a period of three months, and these, 
together with the documentary data, provided the main data groups which I uploaded into 
NVIVO 8. These were supplemented by my field notes from the participant observation 
and ethnographic interviewing. The data was evaluated and grouped into themes (known 
in NVIVO 8 as 'nodes') and sub-themes (known as 'tree nodes'). Evaluation took place 
as an iterative process under many guises; of formulating and revisiting the nodes I had 
created, submitting various iterations of the research at various stages to peer review 
(including journal submissions and conference presentations); and lastly in consultation 
with the participants in the research - formally in emailing the interviewee participants 
the transcripts of their interviews and asking for comments, and informally in 
conversation with co-contributors to the events I was a participant-observer in. 
4.5.5 Ethics 
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In many ways this research did not present any ethical dilemmas. For example, the 
(human) research participants all worked for large and publicly active NGOs, some of 
them internationally renowned. All of them regularly made public statements in 
newspapers, online or at public meetings. Whilst the information sheets and consent 
forms they were asked to sign'S (see Appendix Three) offered anonymity, many 
participants signalled that they were happy for their responses not to be anonymised. 
Nonetheless, I did not feel that naming the participants would add a great deal to the 
research, particularly as some participants switched in the course of a conversation from 
wishing their names to be made public to wishing to be made anonymous. I did therefore 
anonymise the data, although this was only possible to a certain extent. For example, 
where comments related to a particular country or other context it was obviously not 
possible to hide the filet that such comments were being made by actors situated in those 
countries or contexts. Furthermore, and with respect to the wishes of some of the research 
participants, I have prepared a full list of human participants (see Annex One) where 
further relevant details about them and their organisations can be found, where a desire 
was expressed that this should be the case. 
The information and consent sheets provided information about the research project, 
outlining the theoretical questions I was seeking to address and the practical elements of 
LAG members were emailed this information but were not asked to sign. Consent was given by 
admitting me to the group as a participant observer. 
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carrying out the research. The sheets made clear that in the case of face-to-face 
interviews I would be recording and transcribing the conversations. This was amended 
slightly for the LAG, as most of my interaction with them was either online, or in a two 
day group meeting which I did not seek to record. 
One issue which arose from this procedure and which in future research projects I intend 
to think through in greater detail is the manner in which these ethics and information 
sheets themselves 'act' in the research process. On several occasions during the semi-
structured interviews I got the impression that research participants were talking to the 
themes in the information sheets and using language or concepts that they might not 
otherwise have done. Whilst this was not necessarily problematic, nor universal it 
challenged any remaining notion I had that the answers to my questions would be 
divorced from those questions, or the themes I brought myself to the interview situations. 
4.6 CIw>ter Conclusion: Generalisabie Truth-Claims 
In this chapter I have sought to provide the rationale and contribution ofthis research, the 
main research questions it will address, discussions around the methodological and 
analytical concepts that have been deployed in it and the framework and methods that 
were employed to research the subject matter, GCAP. Whilst a critique of the way power 
has been understood by scholars of alter-globalisation networks has been an implicit 
theme throughout the first three chapters of this thesis, in this chapter I have argued for a 
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particular approach to power as an analytical concept which is relational and post-
governmental. This has led to a particular epistemological understanding of data and 
discourse, and the methods which are best suited to the analysis of data and discourse. 
As I have already stated, the methodological approach I adopted for this research was not 
intended to produce concrete truth claims or universally generalisable results. Rather, it 
was intended to produce a narrative of GCAP, which, through being brought into 
existence via a number of co-produced steps, would problematise some of the 
assumptions made about the inclusionary or exclusionary nature of alter-globalisation 
networks, and would address gaps in the literature on these networks. More specifically, 
the narrative of this research is intended to address the manner in which whether or not 
such networks are thought to speak to or transcend power, they are also constituted by 
different relations of power, and the implications of this for how we think of their 
potentials and limitations. 
Through analysing these different power relations, the research makes certain contingent 
claims relating to specific manifestations and locations of power, which serve to 
relationally constitute alter-globalisation networks. These manifestations and locations 
were proposed in detail in Chapter Three, and form the thematic ordering of the 
following data chapters, as they help to understand the agencies of GCAP, and possibly 
of alter-globalisation networks more broadly. These three main thematic areas (and 
chapter headings) are: 
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i) Statist power, neo-liberal hegemony and oppositionality 
ii) Competing cosmopolitanisms 
iii) Finding GCAP 
The chapters that follow will now focus on each one of these thematic areas in tum, 
before turning to a final discussion and conclusion to this thesis. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Statist Power, Nao-Llberal Hegemonv 
and Opposltlonalltv 
5.1 Introduction 
In this chapter I will be addressing one of my core research questions, namely: 
In which ways can alter-globalisation networks be understood as oppositional? 
It will be argued in this chapter that GCAP's oppositionality is differentiated, reciprocal 
and unstable, problematising notions of GCAP being understood as embodying or 
enacting a pure oppositionality. It will be argued that this is largely because of the 
monitory (Keane, 2(09) rmdaIity of oppositionality which GCAP embodies, although I 
deploy this tem in a different sense to Keane, who as I argued in Chapter One, deploys 
this term with minimal regard to constitutive and/or governmental power. It will be 
helpful to interrogate here how being monitory relates to, and is distinguished from 
oppositionality. Whilst something oppositional might seek escape from the actions of that 
which it opposes, being monitory implies a relationship between monitory and monitored 
i.e. that when an agent monitors another agent, it positions that other agent as its point of 
reference, to the exclusion of broader fields of oppositionality. This is therefore a 
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relationship of at least partial co-legitimation, as both agents are now open to being 
affirmed and ordered by the other. The monitoring agent can still oppose, but it is already 
engaged in a different relationship from that of pure oppositionality which now leaves it 
open to being co-opted, either as part of a broader hegemonic project, or diffuse and 
unintentional modes of governmentality. This speaks to the notions of mutual and 
constitutive hegemonic contestation and transformation, productive of unstable 
subjectivities, that I discussed in Chapter Three, drawing in particular on Laclau (1995) 
and Landauer (191111978). 
In this chapter I will seek to explore the complex interactions between GCAP and various 
statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations. I will be doing this in an effort to 
understand the ways in which GCAP can be thought of as an oppositional network, acting 
either (counter) hegemonically or post-hegemonically. It could be argued tbat it is 
slightly misleading to speak of 'interactions', as this assumes two stable and autonomous 
entities (GCAP and, for example, a territorial state) which act in relation to each other. As 
I will now illustrate, both GCAP and the entities it positions itself in relation to are in fact 
uneven and disparate, and constitute each other in different ways, discursively and 
materially. 
The chapter will begin with an account of how GCAP, in certain articulations, constructs 
its own meaning as one of what I will call 'monitory oppositionality·. an ambiguous 
condition which is at once both opposed to, but also implicitly supportive of statist and 
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various hegemonic formations. This is because in monitoring these formations it is a form 
of oppositionaIity which simultaneously afftrms them I will then illustrate this ambiguity 
through several steps. Firstly, I will detail GCAP's relationship with the United Nations, 
and the internal contestation this has provoked in some parts of GCAP. I will then 
explore the discursive nature of this relationship with regard to how GCAP frames 
hegemonic and counter-hegemonic understandings of development more broadly, in part 
with reference to the United Nations Millennium Development Goals. 
I will be narrating the forms and contents of monitory oppositionaIity which emerged 
during my engagement with and observation of GCAP in the various contexts and fields 
where this research took place. The point here is that in offering different and at times 
contradictory accounts ofGCAP's monitory oppositionality, I am suggesting that there is 
no singular entity called GCAP, but rather a variety of sites where the constituent and at 
times ambivalently related nodes of the GCAP network embark on everyday 
engagements with (as subjects or conditioning factors of) various statist and hegemonic 
configurations~6 . 
S.2 Monitory Ojlpositionality 
56 This being said, at times I will refer to GCAP as a singular entity. This reOeets the way GCAP 
presents itself in certain contexts, i.e. on its website, and provides a useful way of interrogating how this 
projected Singularity is successful in mobilising the rest of the GCAP network in a particular vision of it. 
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On its website, it is claimed that GCAP "is calling for action from the world's leaders to 
meet their promises to end poverty and inequality" (GCAPa). GCAP is a call against 
poverty, "demanding solutions" (op cit) from world leaders. Already here we can see a 
slight ambiguity about how GCAP might be understood. On the one hand it could be 
argued that GCAP appears to be oppositional. It is against poverty, and demands action 
on issues where not enough action has taken place. GCAP recognises that such action has 
not taken place for political reasons and out of the self interest of powerful actors. For 
example, on trade injustice, the GCAP website has the following to say: 
"trade rules and policies, and the imposition of harmful economic policy conditions, have 
become the vehicle for the indiscriminate liberalization of developing country economies 
undermining sustainable development, increasing poverty and inequality." (GCAPb) 
This suggests an understanding that in making demands on political leaders they are 
making demands of individual and institutional actors who have been, and in some cases 
still are, opposed to GCAP's own analysis of political economy. However, engaging in 
what is an accountability exercise suggests that GCAP is not simply opposed to political 
leaders and institutions, but also seeks to lobby, advocate and work with such actors, 
evidenced by current discussions taking place amongst the GCAP Learning and 
Accountability Group regarding corporate and governmental 'partnerships' (LAG 
Fieldnotes). This narrows GCAP's field of oppositionality by framing it as a monitory 
relationship, tied to the actions ofparticular actors deemed as central to the eradication of 
poverty. One example of this is GCAP's cooperative relationship with the Club of 
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Madrid, the organisation ofpro-democracy ex-heads ofstate (www.clubofinadrid.org).In 
maintaining relationships like these GCAP may not merely monitor and influence but 
also be IOOnitored and influenced back. The degrees to which these two contradictory yet 
intrinsically related processes work through GCAP is the subject of this chapter. 
Of course, the statements made on the GCAP website are merely one thin layer of 
GCAP's dynamics in this regard. As I will iIlustrate, this ambiguity runs through GCAP's 
constituent nodes, and is the result of historical and ongoing contestation around these 
issues. 
I will therefore begin with an account of the ways in which some ofGCAP's constituent 
nodes envisage themselves as monitoring and conditioning governmental and elite 
political behaviour. I will also offer an account of how these monitory narratives create 
practices which serve to condition the behaviour of governments and political elites, 
redefining and expanding issues such as social inclusion and rights in the process. 
In many of the sites where this research took place, GCAP is understood, both in the 
abstract, and as something which is participated in, as a monitory and at times 
oppositional entity. Various GCAP statement positions, negotiated at and distributed after 
every meeting of the GCAP Global Assembly and considered to be guiding documents of 
the network (LAG Fieldnotes), all make claims to an understanding of GCAP as holding 
wayward and irresponsible political elites to account. In this way they therefore create 
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two sets of subjects - political elites and national governments on the one hand, and those 
to whom they bear a responsibility on the other. A sequence of GCAP statements 
performs this function: 
"Governments too often fail to address the needs of their citizens ... Rich countries have yet 
to act on their repeated pledges to tackle unfair trade rules and practices" (GCAP, 2004a: 3. 
Italics added) 
'The action is meant to put pressure on national leaders and decision-makers to act 
responsibly and be accountable for their decisions to the people. It is meant to put pressure 
on government leaders to work in favor of the poor, and to fulfil their promises and 
commitments to fight against poverty" (GeAP, 2005: 4. Italics added) 
"Governments too often fail to meet the needs of the pea pie wilhin their territory ... We call 
on governments to act against poverty immediately and decisively" (GCAP, 2006: 2. Italics 
added) 
"All governments must fulfil their commitments. They must be fully accountable to their 
peoples" (GCAP, 2oo7a: 5. Italics added) 
Such statements do not position these subjects as unrelated, for to do so would be to 
create two opposing camps, for example, 'rich' and 'poor', where the 'rich' owed the 
'poor' nothing. and the 'poor' had no automatic claim on the 'rich'. This kind ofanalysis 
would possibly underpin a more violent or revolutionary oppositional subjectivity. By 
talking of 'governments' and 'citizens', 'national leaders' and 'the people', these 
statements create a relationship of responsibility and accountability which gives GCAP 
its function of monitory oppositionality - the guardian and overseer of governments' 
promises to their peoples. In this way GCAP invokes itself as the enforcer of national and 
international promises to world citizenry. 
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This is an invocation shared by many of the national coalition members I spoke to. 
Research participants summoned several subjects which can be taken to represent the 
state as a diffuse and elite network responsible for alleviating poverty, as well as subjects 
which represent those to whom these statist networks should be held to account. 
Participants across both national coalitions subjectified "government" (Interviews 2, 3, 8, 
15, 20, 22) and "parliament" (Interview 3); the "important people" (Interview 6), 
"bosses" (Interview 3) and "leaders" (Interview 3) as those with the responsibility to 
alleviate poverty (although in Section 5.4.2 I will illustrate how even this is sometimes 
ambiguous). The function of the GeAP coalitions in these countries was to hold these 
state subjects to "account" (Interviews 1,3,4,6,9,10), to "monitor" them (Interviews S, 
8, 22, 30) and to provide "checks and balances" to them (Interviews 15, 18). These 
functions were performed on behalf of "civil society" (Interviews 3, 4, IS, 20); ''the 
masses" (Interview 3) and "the people" (Interviews 2, 3, 8); "ground" or "grassroots 
voices" (Interviews 4, 6, 8); and ''the marginalised" (Interview 9) 
The following interview excerpts represent the context in which the majority of the 
research participants related these subjects and modalities to each other: 
"Its main objective was to make uh, our system accountable to people, because in, 
especially I can talk about South Asia, for a long time, our governments are not at aJl 
accountable." (Interview 2) 
"I think governance accountability in the sense of governance accountability to people, 
democracy ... how do you make democracy deeper, relevant to marginalised groups ... ?" 
(Interview 9) 
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..... the new government which bad come, promised to the people of the country, so we 
[WNTA] had to put pressure on the government to at least adhere to the promises they had 
made" (Interview 8) 
" ... at times government would like to make things look very rosy, when they are not rosy. 
So the civil society act more or less as balances, checks and balances in terms of really what 
is really on the ground" (Interview 18) 
" ... the GCAP coalition can play and does try to play that role, to really bring that 
awareness that these commitments, that our government together with other governments 
have made to end poverty by making sure that they give attention to these areas. And J 
think to that purpose, to try and mobilise people to keep on reminding the government, and 
also like the donor countries who have committed resources to help in the mn urn .. .in 
achieving those uh ... goals you know? But I think the thing for me is to monitor ok? To 
monitor with the purpose ofah ... maybe contributing to the achievement of these goals, so 
to, to track and say, is government doing enough OK?" (Interview 21) 
The excerpts reveal the manner in which these research participants networked the 
subjects and modalities they invoked into relationships with each other. Statist networks 
and actors need to be held to account, not just to abstractly defined notions of right or 
justice, but also to the '''promises'' or "commitments" they have made, in both national 
and international polices and agreements. The GCAP coalitions were necessary, as one 
participant in India told me, to " ... bridge the gap between the dialogue gap that existed 
before the Wada Na Todo Abhiyan, [WNTA] between the government and civil society" 
(Interview 3). Thus it is that the national coalitions employ the modalities of 
"accountability", "monitoring", and of providing "checks and balances", in order to make 
governments and other statist actors more responsive and dutiful to their '''people'', 
"masses" or "grassroots". What is immediately obvious is that these statements negate 
the possibility ofGCAP enacting any kind of post-hegemonic agency (Day. 2005). This 
kind of monitory relationship with statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations makes 
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any (productive and creative) escape from them impossible. Whether GCAP expands the 
supposed universality of statist and neo-liberal hegemony by engaging with it 
transformatively will be explored subsequently. 
These statements also reflect an interpretative repertoire which draws on a common 
understanding of the statist and governmental networks as the arbiters of social change 
and care. There is though a simultaneous ideological dilemma here; for example, 
governments do not tell the truth (Interview 21: ", .. at times government would like to 
make things look very rosy, when they are not rosy") and they are historically 
unaccountable (Interview 2: " ... for a long time, our governments are not accountable"). 
This dilemma may represent the everyday contradictions with which social change 
activists and organisations around the world wrestle. It certainly underpinned the 
arguments between hegemonic and post-hegemonic radical alter-globalisationists 
discussed in Chapter Two as to the degree with which progressive movements and 
activists should engage with statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations. 
Nonetheless, in my engagements with GCAP participants I did not once encounter 
statements recommending a disengagement from statist or governmental processes, 
despite the mistrust with which such institutions and processes might be held. Indeed, the 
epistemological networks created through GCAP's statements and coalitions have had 
material ramifications on statist, governmental and political elites and processes. For 
example, the GCAP-affiliated NCSTM coalition in Malawi lobbied for and contributed to 
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the drafting of a domestic violence law, which had never existed before in Malawi 
(Interview 20). They have similarly contributed to government food policy, resulting in a 
food surplus in the country, some of which is being exponed to other African countries. It 
is not the claim here that these achievements can be solely or directly attributed to a form 
of monitory oppositionality, and the degree to which this monitory oppositionality is 
autonomous will be explored in subsequent sections of this chapter. It is the WNTA 
coalition in India, however. where such a claim has greater vemcity. and where indeed, 
the coalition appears to move beyond pure monitory modalities, and into areas of forging 
new ground in which they bring statist discourses and practices with them. Minutes from 
the WNT A central coordinating group make this explicit: 
"WNT A should go beyond mmitoring promises, to also critique the inadequacy or 
inaccuracy of policy promises. Therefore, the task of the Aliliyan is also to point out the 
flawed policies and promises, or areas where there needs to be further policy attention and 
investment." (WNTA CCG 2006a) 
Similarly. at an earlier meeting, "Several members shared the need to 'change realities' 
rather than merely monitoring realities" (WNT A CCO 2006b). The manner in which the 
WNT A campaign operationalises this approach is reminiscent of Laclau's (1996) 
description of rights claims as being an operation which can transform the (hegemonic. 
particularistic) universal through its inclusion of the excluded panicular. Participants 
invoked the Indian constitution, above and beyond any temporary government policy. as 
being the core guarantor of universal rights and the document to which the government 
and statist agencies should be held to account above all else. The rights of marginalised 
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and excluded groups were therefore asserted in relation to the Indian constitution, not 
particular and contestable government policies (Interviews 8, 11). This bas resulted in 
lobbying for, and confirmation ot: extra resources for scheduled castes, Adivasis, and 
other minority groups under the latest Indian government Five Year Plan, in direct 
reference to commitments made in the Indian constitution regarding the distribution of 
weahh and resources (Interviews 3, 10). In this way the content and form of hegemonic 
power is transformed, with periphery groups staking their claims within the universalistic 
promises of hegemonic power, not displacing those who currently occupy powerful 
positions, but expanding and occupying with them the ground upon which they stand. 
Again, it is beyond the scope of this research to assert a direct causal link here between 
the actions of the WNT A and these accomplishments. It should furthermore be noted that 
the position of historically excluded groups in India is still very precarious. Nonetheless, 
WNT A members believe this link and their achievements to be real enough, and invoke 
themselves as mobilising 'mediators' in the network they fmd themselves in (of statist 
formations and citizens), rather than discursively or ontologically reproductive 
intermediaries (Latour, 2005). 
So far in this chapter I have narrated a particular set of stories about GCAP. I have 
utilised statements from GCAP global assemblies and interviews and meeting reports 
from the Indian and Malawian GCAP coalitions to illuminate a narrative of GCAP that 
positions it, in certain spaces, as invoking a monitory, or even post-monitory oppositional 
subjectivity with regards to governments and statist formations. As I have stated 
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previously though, there is an inherent ambiguity to monitory oppositionality, which I 
will explore in the next section with reference to GCAP's relationship with the United 
Nations. 
5.3 Standing Up Against ... Who? What? 
October 17th every year is the International Day for the Eradication of World Poverty 
(http;//www.un.org/esalsocdev/sociaVintIdaysIIntlDay/index.html).Itis on this day, since 
2006, that GeAP has chosen to mobilise for what was first known as Stand Up against 
Poverty, and since 2008 as Stand Up and Take Action. It may seem fairly straightforward 
that this date was chosen by GCAP, but this particular interpretation. or 'translation' 
(Callon, 1986; Clegg, 1989) is only very partial, and leaves the relationality which has 
produced this scenario very opaque. In order to begin explicating this issue I will firstly 
outline the character of the Stand Up events attributed to them by the authors of various 
core GCAP documents. 
According to a key GCAP strategic report, the annual Stand Up events have attracted 
greater numbers in each year they have been held - 23.5 million in 2006,43.7 million in 
2007 and 116 million in 2008 (GCAP, 2008c; 6). The same report argued that these 
mobilisations " ... gave ordinary people around the world a simple way to engage in the 
fight against poverty", leading it to claim that "GCAP can amplify the voices of those 
living in poverty and/or suffering injustice, which are presently denied their human 
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rights" (ibid: 7). Another report claims that 90010 of the total participants for the 2007 
Stand Up event were based in the 'Global South' (Chapman and Mancini, 2009: ii). 
Taken together, these statements create a narrative which supports the contention that 
these massive mobilisations are constituted primarily by non-statist actors, the subjects 
articulated previously as "grassroots voices" and ''the people". This would appear to 
support the contention that through its Stand Up mobilisations, GeAP provides an 
oppositional and even counter-hegemonic force. This particular translation of Stand Up 
creates the context for the authors of the same strategic report to claim that GeAP will 
" ... continue to advocate for positive change through massive and strategic grassroots 
mobilizations, led by and involving impoverished and marginalized groups" (GCAP, 
200Sc: 23). 
Other accounts of Stand Up provide alternative translations of its meaning and its 
relationship with governments and other statist fonnations. The International Day for the 
Eradication of World Poverty was first established after intense lobbying from various 
civil society groups at the United Nations and was signed into being by the UN General 
Assembly in 1992 (OctI7th.org). This is of importance, because it points towards a key 
relationship which constitutes GCAP, both in its global dimension and also in many of its 
local contexts - that between GCAP and the United Nations, particularly the United 
Nations Millennium Campaign (UNMC), but also the United Nations Development 
Programme (UNDP). 
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It is difficult initially to identify exactly where the UNMC comes from Even though its 
name suggests it is a United Nations initiative, its website (endpoverty20JS.org) and its 
various proclamations make no mention of this. The UNMC merely " ... supports and 
inspires people from around the world to take action in support of the Millennium 
Development Goals" (endpoverty201S.orga). It is beyond the scope of this research to 
provide a genealogy of the UNMC, but a cursory glance at its contacts page confirms that 
whilst it claims to involve " ... a wide network of partners, including civil society 
organizations, faith-based groups, NGOs, youth, parliamentarians and local 
governments" (endpoverty2015.orgb), nearly aU of its offices are based in UN agency 
buildings, and its media officer is employed by the UNDP. The UNMC is also listed as a 
key member of the UN family for achieving the MOOs (un.orgb). The point here is not to 
suggest anything underhand, but rather and only that the UNMC is squarely an initiative 
of the United Nations. 
This is important because of the relationship which the UNMC maintains with GCAP. 
The initial brainstorming meeting which heralded the inception of GCAP in 2003 was 
organised at the behest of the civil society organisation CIVICUS and the UNMC 
(CMCUSIUNMC, 2003). The report from the meeting reveals that there were initial 
concerns amongst the participating civil society actors regarding the relationship. 
Sessions including topics such as 'Working with the UN: What Advantages and 
Possibilities?' (CIVICUSIUNMC, 2003: 13) may have been designed to allay some of 
these fears. Furthermore, key UNMC personnel maintained close relationships to some of 
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the central organisations involved in establishing and funding GCAP (Interviews 1, 12), 
such as the UNMC Director, Salil Shetty, who before taking up this post was the 
Executive Director of ActionAid International (Endpoverty.orge). When GCAP was 
eventually operationalised in 2005, the UNMC was therefore given observer status on 
what was then called the International Facilitation Team. and what is now known as the 
Global Council (GCAP's highest decision making body). As can be seen from the 
following table, the UNMC is also one ofGCAP's main funders, along with Oxfam OB, 
Oxfam Novib and ActionAid International 
Income sources: Total income received 
Principle funding lOO6USS lOO7USS 1008 USS 
sources 
OxfamNovib 210,000 195,000 312,475 
OxfamOB 320,000 320,000 310,000 
UNMC 120,000 70,000 80,000 
ActionAid Inti 155,000 71,000 40,000 
(GC)Up,2008d: 13) 
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In 2009 the UNMC gave GeAP national coalition members 40 grants in at least 20 
countries (Endpoverty2015.orgc) at a total of nearly 5600,000 (Endpoverty2015.orgd)." 
This money is given primarily for operational and organisational costs associated with the 
Stand Up mobilisations (GeAP, 2008d: 14). From my own experience in India it was 
apparent that in some cases these funds do not go to coalition secretariats or co-operative 
funds, but to individual organisations for particular mobilisations. This is a point I will 
return to shortly. 
It is now perhaps easier to understand why it was that GeAP chose October 17 th for its 
main annual showpiece mobilisation Already endorsed by the UN, the relationship 
between the UNMC and GeAP provides a possible explanation for this choice. 
Explaining the aftermath of the 2005 Make Poverty History campaigns, one member of 
the GCAP Global Secretariat commented that 
"it was agreed it [GCAP] would last until 2007. The end of 2007, so two more years 
essentially. But then as I said there was this gap [between 2005 and 2007], what do we do 
in this space? Yeh, we'll continue to focus on the G8, but what else? So the Millennium 
Campaign came along and suggested Stand Up" (Interview 12) 
The numbers suggest that Stand Up has been a great success, but its relationship with the 
UN system has created problems, mainly because of the opportunities that such a system 
provides governments, some with very questionable human rights records, to be involved 
'7 One issue which this fimding data throws up more broadly is the influence ofINGOs in GCAP. 
The relationships between INGOs and other organisations in GCAP is an issue I will explore in further 
detail in Chapter Six. 
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with an ostensibly progressive anti-poverty campaign. As one participant said to me, 
"governments stand up on October 17th too and we need distance from them or our 
message will be diluted. The UN can't say a word against the govemment..." (Interview 
5). Another claimed that 
"you know next weekend the Philippine armed bees will stand up against poverty and 
inequality .. .it's very difficult for GCAP Philippines, shouting about stand up and take 
action, to maintain their credibility as a radical grassroots movement" (Interview 12) 
This was corroborated during my participant observation at the GeAP Learning and 
Accountability Group (LAG), where my notes record a discussion amongst the group 
about the Stand Up events. The group included a member of GeAP Philippines, who 
reported that 35 million people had 'stood up' during the 2008 Stand Up events in that 
country. However, according to my LAG colleague only 5,000 of these were mobilised 
by GCAP Philippines. The rest were mobilised by the government, and the day included 
a televised event where President Gloria Arroyo also 'stood up'. GCAP Philippines has 
accused President Arroyo of gross human rights abuses and corruption, and stands on a 
platform of government reform. The GeAP Philippines member said that to see President 
Arroyo 'stand up' against poverty and inequality dealt a major blow to GCAP 
Philippines' credibility. 
In India the relationship between GCAP and the UNMC has created similar tensions. 
WNT A is constituted by over 3,000 individual organisational members, who form into 
226 
individual coalitions in each of India's federated states. The WNT A secretariat and 
Central Steering Group (CSG) coordinate activities and communications through this 
network, but do not fund it. Individual state partners or coalitions apply for grants from 
GeAP's core funders - Oxfam UK and Novib, ActionAid InternationaL and the UNMC. 
One problem is that because the UNMC is a UN agency, it is mandated to work with 
state-level governments, including those run by the Hindu nationalist Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP). This has created divisions within the WNT A: 
"we have lost some of our very important friends in India, because of the Stand Up. During 
the Stand Up the UNMC directly, not through us, did go and have alliances with State 
governments, and their logic was these are State governments, which is fair enough, elected 
governments, but these were all BJP governments, and BJP as you know, at least for me, is 
Fascist party, and, and working with them in any form is difficult and I've lost friends who 
are also very strongly anti-BJP. So that's been a huge issue, and then it becomes very 
difficult to defend our positim - they say, ok, you at [your organisation] do good work, but 
see what's happening to your GCAP work." (Interview 1) 
The UNMC's relationship with both GCAP and BJP state governments became so 
divisive that the WNT A Central Steering Group discussed pulling out of GeAP. Instead, 
an agreement was reached between WNT A, GeAP and the UNMC whereby WNTA as a 
national body does not now officially participate in the annual Stand Up events in India, 
although nor does it bar or dissuade its constitutive state partners from participating 
(EthInt 2). 
It is not necessarily the particularistic contexts of individual GCAP coalitions which are 
the problem here, but rather Stand Up's conditions of existence, created by GCAP's 
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relationship with the UNMC. So for example, in Malawi the government is also involved 
in the NCSTM's activities - "the Stand Up campaign, I think most of the activities, 
whatever, government also does, so talk of Labour Day, there are activities, we join 
forces with the government on issues" (Interview 13). These situations are not always and 
necessarily problematic, although they do significantly question the degree to which 
GCAP can be considered oppositional, or even monitory; of it speaking to power, when it 
is constituted, at least in part, by that very same power. 
Another way in which this can be illustrated is the manner in which Stand Up had been 
transformed into Stand Up and Take Action. It was explained at the Learning and 
Accountability Group (LAG) meeting that, as a response to internal criticisms after the 
2007 Stand Up mobilisations, the 'Take Action' tag was added in order to encourage both 
mobilisers and mobilised to do more than simply protest again inequality, and to actually 
do something about it. Once again though, the actions that were discussed at the LAG 
appeared to be at least in part constituted by the very power GCAP needs to transform if 
it is to succeed in eradicating poverty and injustice. At the very least these actions 
appeared piecemeal and symptomatic, rather than structurally radical. Examples of 
actions included handing out old coats to the homeless in Moscow, and shopping malls 
agreeing to turn their lights out at night in Indonesia (LAG Fieldnotes). This is not to 
detract from the utility of such actions, but in as much as they are symptomatic of broader 
structural conditions, they seem at least in part to merely reaifJrm these conditions. 
228 
So fur I have only really illustrated this by drawing on the ontological assertions of the 
research participants (people and texts) and the relationships they subject themselves to 
with statist, and particularly governmental formations. I want to now illustrate GCAP's 
ambiguous oppositionality further by exploring the ways in which this idea of speaking to 
power is challenged by the discursive and epistemological relationship between GCAP 
and neo-liberal hegemony. I will do this in two stages; firstly, I will explore the different 
ways in which research participants articulated notions of development and poverty, and 
how such poverty should be alleviated. In a second, more focused step, I will explore the 
discursive relationship between GCAP, particularly in Malawi, and the UNMC's primary 
campaigning resource and context, the Millennium Development Goals (MOGs). I 
intentionally deploy hegemony here because I want to distinguish it from particular statist 
formations per se, which are not always and necessarily hegemonic, but can also be 
mobilised counter-hegemonically in certain contexts, spaces and practices (for example, 
in this research the Indian constitution, or in another example, the South and Central 
American bloc of territorial states opposed to US influence and foreign policy in 
international politics). I also intend to illustrate how these discursive relationships have 
unexpected or unintended outcomes; how hegemony cannot therefore be considered as an 
all-seeing over-arching monolith, but how this analysis reveals the ambiguous and 
uneven nature of GCAP's monitory oppositionality, contextualised as it is by spatially 
specific sets ofreiationships. 
5.4 Empty Signiflers and Contested Meanings 
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"the Stand Up initiative is an important agenda for the United Nations Millennium 
Campaign, and it bas a mandate to engage a wide range of social groups towards its 
objectives. However the CSG [Central Steering Group] felt that we need to be informed and 
cautious of WNT A's association with groups who may be involved in Stand Up, but whose 
operational! ideological agenda is in clear contradiction ofthe core values and principles of 
the campaign." (WNTA CSG, 2007a) 
The above excerpt from the minutes of a WNT A steering group meeting reveals the ease 
with which groups with different normative perspectives can interpret and translate 
GCAP's main message, that of being 'anti-poverty', into their own ideological languages 
and interpretative schema. This has something of Laclau and Mouffe's (1985) 'empty 
signifier' to it (see also Day, 2005: 74-75). In this section I will explore the different 
ways that research participants discursively constructed 'anti-poverty' and 'poverty 
eradication'; the meanings and definitions participants gave to these terms. I will 
additionally illustrate how some of these meanings explicitly replicate what GCAP core 
strategic and positional texts identify as neo-Iiberal and therefore malign understandings 
of these terms. 
5.4.1 A Structural Analysis 
As with GCAP's ambiguous monitory oppositionality, at a 'headline' level GCAP 
displays a robustly structural analysis of poverty and what is required to alleviate it. A 
series of Global Assembly statements and strategy papers argue that the "institutions and 
processes that perpetuate poverty and inequality" (GCAP, 2008c: 3) need to be "fought" 
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(GeAP, 2007a: 2) and "defeated" (GeAP, 2008c: 3). The decision to extend GCAP 
through to 2015 is presented as a continuation of ''the struggle" (GCAP, 20078: 1). The 
talk is of " ... the underlying and structural causes that impoverish and exclude large 
sections of the population" (GCAP, 2008c: 3), whilst hegemonic articulations of 
development which responsibilise those living in poverty for their own deprivation are 
explicitly opposed: 
"economic growth, profit or well-being for some must inevitably be paid for by others who 
are then told they are 'not keeping up' (blaming the victims). Poverty is then seen as a 'fact 
oflife', something to accept and learn to live with." (ibid: 6) 
This is a highly oppositional translation of what being 'anti-poverty' entails and what 
'poverty eradication' means, and is not only articulated in the more rarefied air of GCAP 
Global Assemblies and working groups. In both the WNT A and NCSTM coalitions, 
participants articulated a similarly oppositional approach to 'anti-poverty'. Whilst this 
was more widespread and less swprising in India, where historical anti-colonial and 
ongoing anti-discrimination struggles lend WNT A a particularly critical edge, a minority 
of participants in the NCSTM also displayed a less explicitly formulated, yet stiU 
structural analysis of the causes of poverty. As subsequent sections and sub-sections of 
this chapter will show, this represented another 'ideological dilemma' (Billig et aL 1988) 
between counter-hegemonic and hegemonic constructions of 'anti-poverty' and 'poverty 
eradication'. Whilst ultimately it will be shown that neo-liberal hegemony provided the 
dominant interpretative schema through which participants in the NCSTM constructed 
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their meanings, this nonetheless reveals the contingent partiality with which discursive 
networks are constructed and embedded. 
Returning to the WNT A, coordination group meeting minutes reveal the extent to which 
members of the campaign articulate a strongly structural analysis of poverty - "Besides 
the eradication of poverty, the eradication of extreme wealth should also be the focus of 
our efforts" (WNT A CCO, 2006c: 8). This articulation of 'poverty eradication', of 
something which looks beyond and through those living in poverty to broader structures 
of inequality which require sustained pressure mounted against them. was prevalent 
amongst WNT A participants, as the following two examples illustrate: 
"To just say that we're fighting against poverty does not work in a CO\Ultry like India where 
anyway 500,4 of people are living below the 51 mark ... mypositioD and many of us believe 
is that for something like this you need to have a campaign which is not a one day 
campaign or a mooth campaign, its obviously for years, and it's a process, its about first 
building your power at the grassroots" (Interview I) 
"what we are also hoping is given the spread, the reach of GCAP that we can reaDy have a 
political campaign against poverty ... We need a much sharper political campaign where the 
structural causes of poverty are raised." (Interview 28) 
As already noted, amongst members of the NCSTM in Malawi such articulations were 
less explicitly put, but were nonetheless present. Whilst articulations of poverty and its 
eradication were predominantly representative of a neo-liberal normalisation of 
responsibilisation on to those living in poverty (which wiJl be illustrated shortly), some 
participants illustrated an alternative and structural analysis of the causes of poverty. A 
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possible implication of this will be discussed shortly, whilst the responsibilisation 
discourse will be addressed in Section 5.4.2. 
If less articulately put, participants in the NCSTM shared some of the views of their 
counterparts in the WNT A Looking to build a campaign that is sustained and high 
pressured rather than just focussed on one-off events, was one similarity expressed by an 
NCSTM participant - "I see it as a larger, longer ... a longer lasting engagement of people 
for processes in the world which include all the G8, and you know ... trade, and things 
like that, and debt" (Interview 15). Furthermore, two other participants articulated a 
structural analysis of the causes of poverty. 
"so it is also a call to those powerful economies to do something about the general economy 
of the world ... for them to be what they are, and have everything that they have, and 
continue grabbing and accumulating for themselves, then nothing win change. And as long 
as those countries which are way below the poverty level, like Malawi, you know, living, 
the majority living on one dollar - as long as the rich believe it's ok - per day ... " (Interview 
17) 
"Some have everything in extreme; some have little and nothing in extreme. Nothing. And 
so that imbalance is what we would be fighting for, so that at least there must be a litde 
something for those who cannot afford .... so that we should not say there is poverty when 
there are some who have extras, who have who are .... overly rich if we are talking of 
poverty... there shouldn't be other people who go without when others can throw 
away ... can throw to the dogs, when others have completely nothing." (Interview 19) 
It is clear here that both these speakers are drawing on a sense-making schema which 
understands the world as having enough resources to ensure a basic quality of life for 
everyone, but which sees these resources us unfairly and unevenly concentrated in the 
hands of the few. Nonetheless, both of these participants also articulated a responsibilised 
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poverty alleviation discourse, which sought to place the responsibility of poverty 
alleviation, at least in part, on those living in poverty. This will be explored further in the 
following section (5.4.2). For now one could speculate that this illustrates the power of 
hegemonic neo-liberal development discourses in somewhere like Malawi, where there is 
such a thriving and dominant donor presence, to order the responses of civil society to 
issues even when those issues are framed in a critical manner. As already discussed, and 
will be illustrated further in Section 5.5, the UNMC is one such actor that presents itself 
rather more radically than the solutions it proposes reveals it to be. For the moment it is 
important to note that structural critiques of the causes of poverty do proliferate within 
GCAP's differential sites and nodes. In the following section I will explore in more detail 
how a responsibilisation discourse to poverty alleviation is articulated, which complicates 
the manner in which GCAP's structural critique can be unproblematically thought ofas a 
sign that GCAP is a who lly oppositional or counter-hegemonic force, un-penetrated by 
the power which in some instances, as has just been illustrated, it positions itself against. 
5.4.2 'Sensitising' people living in poverty ... to their poverty 
In the previous section (see p.219) I highlighted a passage from a GCAP strategy 
document which explicitly critiqued a certain kind of development discourse which 
promotes the idea that the poverty which people live with is a 'fact of life', which 
logically must therefore be borne, and ultimately alleviated, by those same poverty-
stricken people (GCAP, 200Sc: 6). Whilst it is not the aim of this research project to 
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analyse the ways in which particular donor agencies construct the responsibilised 'poor' 
subject through contemporary development paradigms (see Parfitt, 2009 for a recent 
example), it is enough to take this claim seriously in the context of how it is able to 
discursively articulate together with and translate other nodes in GCAP's network into 
this problematisation. It is important to stress here that I am not arguing that this claim 
emanates from a single source, but rather that it has emerged as what Ferguson has called 
an "author less strategy" (2000: 401) constituted by a range of structural and hegemonic 
agencies. 
Whilst the previous section revealed the success with which GCAP's stated structural 
critique found resonance within the WNT A campaign in India (for a range of spatially-
specific historica~ and contemporary social reasons), in Malawi, the NCSTM 
predominantly displayed a rhetoric which took on features of the responsibilised 
development discourse which the GeAP strategy document critiqued. Furthennore, this 
discourse co-existed with the radical structural critique of the causes ofpoverty discussed 
in the previous section, as well as the alignment of "leaders" and ''bosses'', accountable to 
"citizens" and "the people", highlighted in Section S.2. This possibly results from the un-
intentionality, and thus incompleteness ofneo-liberal hegemony. 
Although only a minority of NCSTM members articulated this structural critique, those 
who did so (cited in the previous section) did not then prescribe a similarly structural 
course of action to remedy the problem. Instead, they spoke of "sensitising" people to 
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their poverty (Interview 19), and getting them to take "responsibility towards themselves" 
(Interview 17). "Sometimes", I was told, "ignorance [of those living in poverty] is what 
has always been the problem, ok?" (Interview 19) 
The theme of"sensitisation" was one that recurred through several other interviews also. 
As well as the examples cited above, participants claimed the following: 
"when you go into the community you talk about what you've gone there for but you also 
try to sensitise them about poverty reduction" (Interview 23) 
"make the masses realise that there is a part they can play towards their own poverty 
reductioo instead of waiting to be given something on a platter" (Interview 24) 
"sensitise them about the part they can play in reducing their own poverty" (Interview 30) 
This is an interpretative schema which draws on discourses of responsibilisation, which 
understands poverty alleviation as something which those living in poverty have 
primary responsibility for enacting. Co-existing with the belief that resources are 
unfairly distributed around the world was an interpretation of what needed to be done 
which included people living in poverty "taking responsibility for themselves" 
(Interview 17). 
Of course, the organisations and individuals I spoke to pre-date GCAP, as in all 
likelihood do the discourses they express. It is not the argument here then that GCAP is 
somehow responsible for the discourses expressed through its nodes and sites, but that if, 
as GCAP claims (2008c: 3), this kind of responsibilisation is common to hegemonic 
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discourses of development and poverty, then such responses make problematic any claim 
that GeAP is wholly oppositional and not constituted in part by the very powers it claims 
to oppose. 
This individualised discourse of responsibility is one which de-politicises the struggle 
against poverty. De-politicisation of this nature has created tensions within the GeAP 
network, particularly between structural and neo-liberal conceptualisations of poverty 
eradication, and what GeAP needs to do to help enact it. As this section has illustrated, 
this division is not necessarily geographical across reified lines of 'North' and 'South', 
but discursive. This discursive division and its implications will be the subject of the next 
chapter. For now I want to continue to draw attention to the ways in which parts of the 
GeAP network are not so much monitory but monitored. In this vein I will now narrate 
the epistemological and material power of the Millennium Development Goals (MOOs) 
in monitoring and ordering the NCSTM in Malawi, thus calling into question the claim 
that GeAP is wholly oppositional, even ambiguously in the critical-monitory sense. 
5.5 The Millennium Develqpment Goals (MDGs) 
It was when I received the following email that the MOOs really came to the fore in my 
research. The invitation to participate in this research project which I sent to this 
participant can be found in Appendix Two. It is recommended that it is read in 
conjunction with the response below, so that the full sense of how uninvited the MOOs 
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were can be conveyed. It was because of this that they immediately attracted my attention 
as a possible mediating actor (Latour, 2005) in the NCSTM network in Malawi: 
<UX@yaboo.com> writes: 
Dear Clive, 
I hope you are fine. I would like to confirm that i will participate in your research project. 
Our organisation is called xxx and I am the Executive Director/ Founder. 
Our address is xxx. Cell is xxx 
I'm a member of the Taskforce. 
I will be ready to participate in July. We are mainly focusing on MDG goal 1. 3 and 6. 
Thanks 
xxx 
(Personal correspondence with research participant, 13th April 2008: Italics added) 
The GCAP coalition in Malawi is called the National Civil Society Taskforce for the 
MOOs, and so in many respects it shouldn't be surprising if participants raise the MOOs 
in their talk about the coalition. Nonetheless, this response struck me as particularly 
unusual; so direct and seemingly automatic - 'You haven't asked, but this is what we do 
and we're good at it'. In Chapter One I discussed a general critique of African civil 
societies which argues that they are heavily influenced, and in some cases implanted by 
donors (Kasflr, 1998. Harrison, 2004), but it was interesting nonetheless to speculate 
about the spatially-specific dynamic which may have led to this in Lilongwe, Malawi's 
capital city. Many of the NGOs, donors, international financial institutions and 
government offices all based here, in a newly-built section of the city (known as 'Capital 
City') divorced by a national park from the older and more poverty-stricken section of the 
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city (known as 'Old Town'). The implications of Lilongwe's political topography remain 
speculative in the context of this research, and as I have often stated I am not trying to 
provide a sense of cause-and-effect here, a concrete truth. Nonetheless, as I began to 
immerse myself in Lilongwe and the activities and people of the NCSTM, such 
speculation found partial confirmation in certain occurrences of an everyday-in-practice 
(or ontological) sense, such as who attended NCSTM steering group meetings. I will 
return to this theme shortly. 
What I would come to understand in Malawi, however, was a very problematic 
relationship between civil society and the particular 'development hegemmy' (Kamat, 
2(02) of the MDGs, which challenged any claim of GCAP being entirely oppositional, 
even in a monitory sense. For now I think it will be useful to firstly introduce the MDOs 
more comprehensively, before contrasting the situation I encountered in the NCSTM with 
other ways in which that relationship (between GCAP and the MDOs) is understood 
within GCAP. This will serve to highlight in full relief the very particular understanding 
of that relationship in Malawi. 
5.5.1 What are the MDGs and where do they come from? 
"In September 2000, building upon a decade of major United Nations conferences and 
summits, world leaders came together at United Nations Headquarters in New York to 
adopt the United Nations Millennium Declaration, committing their nations to a new global 
partnership to reduce extreme poverty and setting out a series of time-bound targets - with a 
deadline of2015 - that have become known as the Millennium Development Goals." 
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"The eight Millennium Develq>ment Goals (MOOs) - which range from halving extreme 
poverty to halting the spread of }flV/AlDS and providing universal JXimary education, aU 
by the target date of 20 IS - form a blueprint agreed to by all the world's countries and all 
the world's leading development institutions." (lUl.orga) 
The MOOs consist of eight targets each with their own subset of targets. These include, 
by 2015, halving extreme poverty, increasing the numbers of girls in education and 
halving the spread of HIV/AIDS. A full list of the goals and associated targets can be 
found in Appendix Five. 
The quotes above are taken from the United Nations' MOOs website, and present a 
particular history of the MOOs. They were the result of UN summits and were 
developed and adopted unanimously by the whole host of world nations at the 
General Assembly. It is important to note therefore that other accounts of the 
MOOs' genealogy problematise this translation, and provide the context in which 
certain parts of the GCAP network are discursively constructed by the MOOs, 
whilst others position themselves in an ambiguous monitory oppositionality to 
them., simultaneously critiquing them but also re-affnming them as the only 
current development agenda in play. 
Colin Bradford was the United States representative to the Organisation of Economic Co-
operation and Development-Development Assistance Committee (OECD-DAC) during 
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the 1990s. In an unpublished account ofhis time at the OAC dwing this period, he relates 
the process by which the OECO's International Development Targets (lOTs) were 
formed. According to Bradford (and secondary accounts also - see Hulme, 2(07), the 
IDTs were important pre-cursors to the MOGs and formed the basis of those goals and 
targets (Bradford, 2006: 1). Indeed, a 1996 document produced by the DAC, 'Shaping the 
21 st Century: The Contribution of Development Co-operation', lists these lOTs, and 
claims to be the fIrst attempt at synthesising targets set at sector-specific summits and 
meetings from the previous decade (OECD-DAC, 1996: 9). A glance at these targets does 
indeed reveal their resemblance to the eventual MOGs (I have added the MOG numbers 
where relevant - see Appendix Five for comparison): 
Economic well-beine: 
A reduction by one-half in the proportion of people living in extreme poverty by 
2015 (MDG 1) 
Sodal development: 
Universal primary education in all countries by 2015 (MOG 2) 
Demonstrated progress toward gender equality and the empowerment of women 
by eliminating gender disparity in primary and secondary education by 2005 
(MDG3) 
A reduction by two-thirds in the mortality mtes for infants and children under age 
5 and a reduction by three-fourths in maternal mortality, all by 2015 (MDG 4) 
Access through the primary health-care system to reproductive health services for 
all individuals of appropriate ages as soon as possible and no later than the year 
2015 (MOO 5) 
Environmental sustainabiUty and reeeneration: 
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The current implementation of national strategies for sustainable development in 
all countries by 2005, so as to ensure that current trends in the loss of 
environmental resources are effectively reversed at both global and national 
levels by 2015 (MOO 7) 
(OECD Development Assistance Committee, 1996: 2) 
Bradford (2006) relates that the lOTs were an important stepping stone on the path to the 
formulation of the MOOs. Bradford reports that he was present at multilateral stakeholder 
meetings coordinated by the United Nations Development Group. Bradford claims to 
have argued for the inclusion of the lOTs in the MOOs at one of these stakeholder 
meetings (ibid: I). According to Bradford, his intervention at this meeting provided the 
basis for a further meeting " ... that brought people together from the World Bank, IMF, 
OECO and the UN which became the 'task force' that developed the MDGs" (op cit) 
Interestingly, Bradford claims that finding an alternative ideological narrative with which 
to • sell' development to development actors (including developing States) in the 
aftermath of the Cold War was a major motivation in the drafting of the lOTs (ibid: 2). 
One can detect issues of contention here for actors who might have different notions of 
development to that of the OAC. Potentially most problematically, the lOTs, which 
predated and defined the MDGs, were fommlated by a "groupe de reflex/on" which 
consisted of all and only the major bilateral donors at that time (ibid: 3). Furthermore, the 
lOTs were developed shortly after internal OECO negotiations were being held to 
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develop the subsequently controversial (and opposed by civil society groups) Multilateral 
Agreement on Investments (MAl). 
Whether or not we take Bradford at his word.. the above account clearly problematises the 
idea of the MDGs as an automatically benign and apolitical set of goals and targets. 
Whilst it is not the assertion here that the MOGs are necessarily malign (and indeed, who 
could argue with eradicating 50% of extreme poverty?), they do appear to represent a 
hegemonic and therefore exclusionary definition of development. The MOGs do not, for 
example, mention social exclusion, violence against women, or land rights, all of which 
have provided sites of civil society advocacy and contestation. They explicitly cite the 
private sector, and in particular large pharmaceutical companies, as the key to improved 
development outcomes. Like the heavily criticised 'Basic Needs' approach to 
development of the 1970's58, this is a view of development which significantly differs 
both conceptually and instrumentally from contemporary counter-hegemonic definitions 
of development (See, for example, Bello, 2004. Chang and Grabel 2004). With GCAP's 
close relationship to the UNMC, the MDGs figure largely within the GCAP network. 
Whilst the contested and ambiguous authorship of the MOGs is of interest, it is not the 
argument here that this authorship necessarily implies a steady and intentional identity 
". . Probably the most-cited critic of the basic needs approach would be Amartya Sen, ftx' whom this 
cntique served to underpin his 'capabilities' approach to development in which he accused the basic needs 
approach of "commodity fetishisation" - see Sen, 1984: 513-5 
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and impact through timeS9• Rather, it is the inter-relations with other agencies and the 
practices this creates which are of interest here as a way of interpreting GCAP's stated 
monitory oppositionality. It is the different contexts in which I encountered the MDOs 
'acting' in this research which reveal the somewhat authorless nature of their agency, and 
thus the ambiguity ofGCAP's oppositionality. 
5.5.2 The 'Minimum' Development Goals 
In this section I will illustrate the ways in which the MDGs are drawn upon by research 
participants counter-hegemonically, and the kinds of monitory oppositionality these 
understandings engender. This will firstly stand on its own as a narrative of GCAP's 
oppositionality, but also serve to contextualize the ambiguity and inconsistency of this 
oppositionality within the GCAP network produced by the uneven and co-imbricated 
relationships between GCAP's nodes, governments, Statist and networked neo-liberal 
hegemonic formations like the MOOs. This ambiguity and inconsistency will be 
illustrated in the section following this one, which will focus mainly on the discursive 
relationship between the MOGs and the NCSTM in Malawi. 
Despite GCAP's close relationship with the UNMC, many of GCAP's strategic 
documents and official statements do hint at an undercurrent of doubt or even cynicism 
~9 ~or a counter argument to this kind of linear perspective on temporality see Closs-Stephens' 
mterpretatl<n of Walter Benjamin's thought for the study ofintemational relations - 2009: 84 
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towards the promises of the MDGs. Meeting the MOOs is considered as a "first step" 
towards eradicating poverty (GCAP, 2004a: 5), which governments are called upon not 
simply to achieve but to "surpass" (GCAP, 2007a: 7). Whilst this language may not 
appear particularly dramatic or oppositional, it does match more anecdotal evidence 
which appears in GCAP evaluation and strategic documents. For example, at the 2003 
meeting at which civil society organisations and representatives discussed formally for 
the first time the formation of something like GCAP, the meeting report suggests that 
" ... there was a great deal of scepticism voiced by the participants about the Millennium 
Goals and the UN system's seriousness in pursuing the Goals" (CIVICUSIUNMC 2003: 
2). Despite this scepticism the meeting participants agreed to work within the framework 
of the MDGs, although on the understanding that the UNMC would not retreat from 
addressing what participants understood as the structural causes of poverty (op cit). It 
remained the case though that an evaluation study conducted in 2008 found that many 
national coalitions felt that the link between GCAP and the MOOs was "driving the 
strategic decision making within GCAP rather than issues being thought through 
independently" (GCAP, 2008d: 20). 
An interesting discussion reflecting this tension occurred at the filce-to-filce GCAP 
Learning and Accountability Group (LAG) meeting which I was invited to participate in. 
In response to the complaints of several participants from GCAP coalitions in countries 
with high levels of poverty, a representative ofa large INGO, who was also chairing the 
meeting, acknowledged that the MDGs were ''terribly reductionist" and had previously 
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alienated some groups, particularly feminist groups, from GCAP. However, she went on 
to dismiss the discussion as one that kept on repeating itself, saying that the MOOs were 
not just going to disappear and had to be worked with (LAG Fieldnotes). The power 
dynamics of discussions between INOOs and other civil society actors who constitute 
GCAP will be explored in the next chapter. For now it is simply interesting to observe the 
ongoing tension over the MOOs within one ofGCAP's more central advisory bodies. 
This tension appears to be much more keenly feh within some of the national coalitions, 
particularly those who have the UNMC in-country as a funding partner (roughly 30 
coalitions, including the WNT A). When the 2007 Global Assembly took the decision to 
continue GCAP on to 201S (thus shadowing the MOOs), a GCAP evaluation report noted 
one participant who claimed that such a relationship had been ambiguous: 
"On the one side the MOOs have more or less detennined the activities of GeAP, 
particularly Stand Up events, while at same time you have GeAP members who go much 
beyond the MOOs and are in fact critical of the MDOs and see it as a restrictive 
framework." (GeAP, 2008d: 20) 
This was a sentiment explicitly expressed a great deal amongst the members of the 
WNT A Some criticised the MOOs for only focussing on macro quantitative targets, 
which they claimed fail to take into account the huge demographic differentials of 
poverty in India (Interviews 10, 11). Another summarised the situation thusly: 
"many of us, and continue to do so, are sceptical of the MOOs, and ... often we call it 
'minimum development goals', so there has, various groups have also bad issues with 
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MDGs - it doesn't talk about violence against women, there are quite a few issues" 
(Interview 1) 
Talking about the campaign strategy in terms which transcended the MOOs also served 
to illuminate the monitory oppositionality of the WNT A, the way in which it sought to 
invoke a counter-hegemonic, or hegemonic ally expansionistltransformative discourse and 
practice. Focussing on the rights of excluded groups (Interviews 3, 7, 8, 10) in a MDGs 
context sinrultaneously affirms the MOOs as a framework but also expands its narrow 
parameters to groups which carry the possibility of transforming the content of that 
framework. 
This kind of perspective was best articulated by a member of the GCAP Global 
Secretariat who has spent a great deal of time working with the WNTA campaign: 
''with the MOOs to use it as a tool for groups in the North and South to really hold their 
governments to account on their promises. To push their governments to say, even these 
promises you're making you're not gonna meet the MOOs, even if you meet the MOOs 
you're not gonna make much difference in our country because halving poverty, so what? 
Yw're gonna increase inequality so on and so forth. Basing it on that, so that the point that 
civil society is, is credible enough, powerful enwgh, that we can really dictate the post 
2015 agenda, to create an agenda which is radical, which takes into account climate change, 
inequality, so on and so forth, that's, very personally, that's what I'd like to see GCAP 
doing" (Interview 12) 
This discussion serves to illuminate one example of how discourses of monitory 
oppositionality are articulated within GCAP's network nodes. As I have previously 
asserted this is an ambiguous oppositionality, not only because it operates within the 
framework of a hegemonic discourse of development, but also because it operates 
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alongside other discourses or schemas which complicate any sense in which one could 
talk of GeAP embodying a monitory oppositionality per se. I will now illustrate this with 
continuing reference to the MOOs, and the discursive relationships between them and the 
NCSTM in Malaw~ and the material implications of this. 
5.5.3 'Like ... being in heaven' 
Time and again during my conversations with NCSTM participants in Malaw~ the 
MDGs were deployed without invite. I say 'deployed', rather than 'referenced' or 
'mentioned', because the MDGs appeared to be active, not only in shaping the discourses 
being employed by the research participants, but also in mediating both their activities as 
a coalition and my own research. In this way they served as an 'actor' (Latour, 2(05) in 
the NCSTM network, albeit on that required summoning in the specific networked 
context of the NCSTM in Malawi For example, the following exchange took place 
during the first interview I undertook in Malawi: 
NCSTM Participant: Are you meeting Oxfam? 
CO: In Malawi? 
NCSTM Participant: Mm. 
CG: Well, I was going to ask you about them actually ... I'd like to ... basically, [NCSTM 
Secretariat] sent me everyone on the taskforce's contact details ... 
NCSTM Participant: Ok 
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CG: And, some of whom I then contacted ... some got back to me and some didn't, but I 
didn't notice an Oxfam address - in fact I didn't notice any international NGOs' 
addresses. 
NCSTM Participant: But who are you meeting? Your list. .. 
CG: Ok, so I've got, [pause, papers taken out of bag] these are the people who have so fur 
agreed to be interviewed ... and then ... this is the list of email addresses ... 
NCSTM Participant: Hmm ... ok ... this is all? 
CG: yeh ... this is ... the email addresses that [NCSTM Secretariat] sent me ... and I don't 
know if that's .. .1 didn't notice any international NGOs on that list ... 
NCSTM Participant: Yuh ... 
CG: And I was going to ask you if that's because they're not directly involved on the 
taskforce .. ? 
NCSTM Participant: Yuh, yuh ... but I think they are doing some work around it 
CG:ok ... 
NCSTM Participant: This one I think you should meet ['This one' refers 10 a UNDP 
programme officer whose buSiness card the NeST participant hands me] 
CG:ok 
NCSTM Participant: Because she will give you another perspective 
CG: yup ... what's her relationship to the taskforce? 
NCSTM Participant: UNDP are also .. .1 think they are supporting the taskforce 
CG:umhmm 
NCSTM Participant: But they are into the Millennium Development Goals, so if you 
want to hear some stories in terms of what progress government is making In the eyes of 
the UN system so you can get that perspective. 
(Interview 14) 
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So the participant took my question about International NGOs, and referred me to the 
UNDP. Later on in the conversation, he said the following: 
''f<1' me, there is the GeAP movement, and there is the MOOs ... not everyone who is doing 
the MOO work is in the GeAP ... that's why I was mentiooing these people so you can meet 
them, and just get progress on the, on the MOOs b Malawi ... yeh" Onterview 14) 
It appeared that this participant felt compelled to direct my research to actors who were 
not obviously part ofGCAP. The participant could be said to have been ranking GCAP as 
subordinate to the MOOs. Here then were the MDGs acting, not simply to shape the 
NCSTM's practices, but also my own. This did not necessarily have negative 
implications for my research, as it resulted in a very productive encounter when I was 
invited to a meeting of the NCSTM steering group held at the offices of the UNDP in 
Lilongwe, which I will return to Shortly. 
For the moment I want to briefly illustrate the manner in which the MOGs discursively 
orientate the NCSTM's imaginings of their coalition's objectives, and poverty eradication 
in Malawi more broadly. All of the participants in Malawi invoked the MDGs as a 
defining frame of the coalition. Furthermore, many of them imagined that achieving the 
MDGs would result in the eradication of poverty. For example, this participant described 
GCAPas: 
"A coalition of different players especially in the civil society, you know, who want to see 
poverty gone, ok? So, but they want to see poverty gone by using the framework of the 8 
MDGs ok?" (Interview 30). 
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Similarly another participant claimed that 
''Meeting the MOOs, they are put in a way that they should actually eradicate poverty and 
hWlger, whatever, so for Malawi, a third world country, I mean, that would cure everything, 
the economy, that would be, that would be the day we are looking forward to ... I think 
meeting the MOOs in Malawi .. .1 guess .. .it's .. .it would be like ... being in heaven I guess" 
(Interview 13) 
The MDGs though only promise to reduce extreme poverty by 50% by 2015. Even if the 
65.4% of people living below the nationally defined poverty line in Malawi (UNDP, 
2(08) are all living in extreme poverty, rather than 'regular' poverty, then that still leaves 
nearly a third of the population living in extreme poverty. Nonetheless, an MOO shadow 
report produced by the NCSTM claims that " ... the MDOs ... look at all people" 
(NCSTM,2007: 19). So whilst the members of the NCSTM are trying to enrol the MOGs 
to their problematisations of poverty alleviation in Malawi, the MOOs are in fact acting 
in ways which contradict this, and render the NCTSM participants as hegemonically 
reproducing intermediaries (Latour, 2(05) in many important respects. This significantly 
problematises any cJaims that GCAP is oppositional in any universal sense, as tbe 
discourses of poverty aUeviation amongst the NCSTM in Malawi appear to be more of 
the 'monitored' variety than the monitory. This impression was further reinforced by the 
practices of the coalition in Malawi 
The 'monitored' discursive constructions of the NCSTM members appear to be 
intertwined with the material locations and practices of the NCSTM constituent 
251 
organisations. Government ministers and appointees are reported to be ubiquitous at 
NCSTM events (NCSTM, 2(08), whilst one of the criticisms levelled at the Blantyre-
based NCSTM secretariat (some four hours away from Lilongwe (Malawi's political 
centre) by road) is that it does not appear often enough at government consultations in 
Lilongwe (Interviews IS, 21). Meanwhile, the UNMC (whose nearest office is in 
Nairobi) and the UNDP (with offices in Capital City/the 'newer' Lilongwe) play 
significant roles in devising the 'work-programmes' of the coalition. I was fortunate 
enough to be able to observe an example of this, the significance of which I will now 
illustrate. 
5.5.4 Please d!2. attend 
A few pages ago I presented an excerpt of a conversation I had with one of the research 
participants in Malawi. In it he recommended that I go and speak to a UNDP employee 
based in Lilongwe to discuss the government's perfonnance on the MOO targets. For me, 
this was already an example of the MDGs acting in a very ontological sense, intruding 
directly on my research in unexpected ways. As I pursued my list of participants in 
Malaw~ I put the UNDP to the back of my mind for a couple of weeks. I was, initially at 
least, resistant to the idea of getting distracted by government performance targets and 
UN measurements. Later, finding myself with a couple of days to kill back in Lilongwe, 
and feeling uncomfortable about the met that here was an actor which had been 
introduced to the NCSTM network which I hadn't yet chased, I gave the UNDP 
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employee a calL and made an appointment to see her that afternoon. Slightly later on she 
gave me a call back and told me that there was a meeting being held an hour before our 
appointment at the UNDP offices which I should come along to. It was going to be 
addressed by someone visiting from the UN in Nairobi to talk about the MDGs. I 
expressed my concerns to her that I might be a bit of an intruder, but she insisted I come 
along. I was soon to find out why. 
When I entered the room where the meeting was being held I saw a round table with 
people sitting around it, like a committee meeting. The meeting had already got under 
way. so I focused first on locating an empty seat and quickly made my way to it, trying to 
cause as little fuss as possible. But as I sat down and looked around me I realised that I 
knew every single person sitting around the table, apart from about four people, who, it 
transpired were UNDP employees and the person from the UN in Nairobi; the UNMC 
(Millennium Campaign) in Nairob~ as it turned out. The reason why I knew everyone 
else was because I had interviewed them. They were aU NCSTM members. This was, it 
seemed, a coalition meeting being addressed by the UNMC representative. 
The meeting provided an example of the MOOs acting and embodied through their UN 
representatives to order the NCSTM in Malawi - its understandings of poverty and its 
actions to alleviate it. The UNDP representatives talked of how much they supported the 
Stand Up events because of their 'Take Action' approach. This, they said, was important 
in avoiding "dependency syndrome" and encouraging "the poor to take ownership". 
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Malawian society, another UNDP representative said, "loves to suffer in silence", and 
should be more critical of the government (NCSTM Fieldnotes). Setting the context in 
this way meant that any anti-poverty campaign had to be constructed in a certain manner. 
For example, this implicitly ruled out a critique of international economic structures, and 
placed the responsibility for poverty in Malawi equally on government policy, civil 
society organisations and people living in poverty. We have already seen bow this latter 
discourse permeates throughout the NCSTM network. 
The role of the MOOs and UN system in ordering the NCSTM's ontology was not so 
much a single process of ordering, but consisted of a series of different moments which 
served to prod the NCSTM members along to certain agreements and outcomes. For 
example, the coalition secretariat representative was admonished by the UNDP 
representatives for not attending enough government consultations - "Please ~ attend!" 
he was very publicly scolded. The UNMC representative asserted the importance of 
concentrating on formal government engagement, arguing that this was how po licy 
makers could be bound to decisions and pressure could be brought publicly. This was 
despite an earlier call by one of the NCSTM members for less reliance on these formal 
political opportunities, and the success of civil society demonstrations outside the 
parliament building in Lilongwe to break a deadlock in negotiations over the budget a 
year earlier (NCSTM Fieldnotes). 
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Furthermore, as the meeting progressed, it became apparent that the UNDP and UNMC 
representatives were at first translating discussions into 'actionable' points, and then 
simply taking some decisions themselves, addressing each other in the process rather than 
the NCSTM members present. Simultaneously, the UNDP and UNMC representatives 
responsibilised the NCSTM members, particularly the secretariat. The coalition, they 
were told, were in a position the UN agencies could not occupy, that of being able to 
critique government, a role they must take on with greater vigour (although as we already 
know, this could only be done through 'formal' channels). Similarly, when the secretariat 
tried to give the UNDP representative responsibility for a task, she refused, responding 
"You lead this, the UNDP only supports". 
It is important to bear in mind here that nowhere in the MOOs, nor the UN Millennium 
Declaration, is it stated that civil society should be instructed, ordered or managed. 
Indeed, civil society isn't mentioned much at aU - not once in the MOOs, and only in the 
Millennium Declaration with reference to building a "strong partnership" in pursuit of the 
MOOs (Article 20) and to provide more opportunities for civil society to contribute to the 
development of the UN (article 30) (un.orgc). It is the particular spatial context in which 
the MDGs converge with other temporal factors in the NCTSM and Malawi which 
produces their ordering effect. In this sense then whist the MOGs represent neo-Iiberal 
hegemonic interests, there is no simple cause-effect relationship here. It has taken a 
COmbination of factors to produce the NCTSM's 'unauthored' (Ferguson, 2000) 
monitored agency 
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In this section on the MOOs, I have attempted to illustrate the complex and contradictory 
ways in which they are a very active mediating and ordering actor in the GCAP network 
which represent a particular and hegemonic articulation of 'development'. Whilst in the 
WNT A the MOGs have provoked counter-hegemonic articulations of the meaning of 
development and a form of monitory oppositionality, in the NCSTM they have acted to 
epistemologically and materially order both understandings and practices of the NCSTM, 
fixing it as a hegemonicaUy dominated entity. If we were to apply Chatterjee's model it 
could be argued that the NCSTM represents his notion of the 'fictive' of civil society 
(2004: 36-38), subjected only in so nmch as it can fulfil its role in extending the diffuse 
control of hegemonic formations. What seems clear is the manner in which the MDGs 
have not necessarily intended effects in the spaces in which they converge with other 
productive discursive repertoires and embodying actors, and that the various articulations 
and practices which are produced in these spaces problematise ideas of GCAP as either 
universally oppositional or co-opted They reveal the messy, unintended and multiple 
agencies ofGCAP, and call into question any notion ofGCAP's unity, either of purpose 
or origin. 
5.6 Oumter Conclusion 
In this chapter I have presented a set of at times contradictory narratives about GCAP's 
oPpositionality regarding governments, statist and other networked and begemonic elite 
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formations. I began the chapter by highlighting the way in which GCAP's participants 
and texts understood their own agency as a uniformly oppositional one, although 
ultimately this was understood to be monitory, and thus, in my own interpretation, 
ambiguous. I continued to illustrate this ambiguity through narrating the history and 
networked relationality ofGCAP's Stand Up against Poverty/Stand Up and Take Action 
annual mobilisations. This revealed the problematic relationship between GCAP and the 
United Nations Millennium Campaign; problematic both for some of the research 
participants as they described it, but also for the articulations and practices of the 
NCSTM in Malawi as narrated further on in the chapter. 
I continued to explore this monitory and oppositional ambiguity by again highlighting the 
contradictory discourses and ideological dilemmas prevalent within the parts ofGeAP in 
which I was researching and acting. Whilst GCAP's Global Assemblies and more 
historically radicalised nodes, such as the WNT A coalition, articulated a structural 
critique of the causes and solutions to poverty (resulting in contingently transformative 
relations with statist and neo-libeml hegemonic formations), in the NCSTM coalition 
campaign participants articulated a discourse of poverty alleviation which responsibilised 
those living in poverty for solving their situations, a discourse which was explicitly 
critiqued by GeAP's more radical nodes as being emblematic of neo-liberal hegemonic 
development discourses. Lastly. and in a further attempt to illustrate the problematic 
relationship between GCAP and the UNMC, I told the story of the MOOs in Malaw~ and 
the power they are enabled to enact by the distinctive spatial and historical armngement 
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that exists in the spaces and sites of Malawi I engaged with. This power is 
epistemological and ontological, discursively and materially ordering the understandings 
and practices of the NCSTM in Malawi. 
These narratives of GCAP's agency regarding governments, statist and neo-liberal 
hegemonic formations have been contradictory because GCAP is not one single entity, 
but is instead composed of many different nodal points, themselves contextualised 
relationally by social and historical events and modalities. I have attempted to utilise this 
contradictory set of agencies productively to problematise homogenising claims about the 
agency of GCAP and by extension alter-globalisation networks, of either the over 
celebratory or dismissive kind. 
In the following chapter I shift the focus of analysis from what might rather simplistically 
be described at GCAP's external relationality, to what might equally simplistically be 
described as GCAP's internal relationality. These are simplistic descriptions because one 
of the aims of this research is to collapse such binaries when dealing with alter-
globalisation networks, and as I have tried to explain in this chapter, some of these 
supposed externalities are in fact internally constitutive ofGCAP's agency (or some of its 
agencies). Such a distinction does however help to understand the context of the 
following chapter, which will focus on the relationships between the different actors who 
explicitly constitute GCAP in its day-to-day activities and operations i.e. INGOs, national 
constituency groups, social movements, trade unions l faith groups and other civil society 
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actors. In particular I will be analysing the degree to which GeAP incubates various 
forms of cosmopolitan and post-colonial discourses, and the degree to which they fuse or 





In the last chapter I explored the ways in which GCAP's relationships with governmental, 
statist and hegemonic formations helped to explain its oppositionality vis-a-vis those 
formations and discourses. Whilst I argued that GCAP's own uneven and inconsistent 
constitution rendered futile a perspective that saw these relationships as being between 
two distinct and autonomous bodies, one could very crudely say tbat the last chapter was 
about GCAP's external relationships, the relationships between its constituent nodes and 
their externalities (even though those nodes were constituted, in discursive and material 
terms, by both civil society 'internalities' and govemmentaJistatistlhegemonic 
'externalities'). I am stating this here as a way of introducing the subject matter of this 
chapter, which, whilst not distinct from that which was discussed in the previous chapter, 
could again rather crudely be understood as an analysis ofGCAP's internal relations. 
It should be clear by now that I do not view these relations as untainted by their 
externalities, but, whereas the last chapter concentrated on statist and hegemonic powers, 
those actors and discourses to which GCAP in certain articulations of itself is opposed, in 
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this chapter I will be analysing the relationships between the actors which very explicitly 
compose GCAP - international and national NGOs, social movements, trade unions, faith 
groups and other civil society actors. I will furthermore be analysing these relationships 
through the particular prism of inclusion and exclusion, and discursive normalisation and 
abnonnalisation. Rather than asserting the existence of all-powerful universals silencing 
the voices and actions of weaker, local particularisms, I instead draw on Laclau's (1995) 
assertion that anything with the appearance of universality is in fact merely a hegemonic 
particularism The question then is to what degree such hegemonic particularisms can be 
or have been extended and transformed by minority voices in an attempt to include more 
and more particularisms within its purview. Whilst GCAP is a network of cosmopolitan 
nodes, in this chapter I will not be seeking to understand the relationships within GCAP 
as ones between an actually-existing universalistic cosmopolitanism, silencing 
particularistic claims against it, but rather as the meeting of several cosmopolitan 
particularisms, some of which are more successful than others in translating themselves 
into apparently cosmopolitan universals. The argument developed in this chapter 
therefore will be that different actors in GCAP draw on different cosmopolitan discursive 
resources and interpretations of those resources. As expressions of cosmopolitanism are 
therefore always partiCUlaristic, this chapter will address itself to the different 
cosmopolitan particularities which circulate within GCAP, and their associated inclusions 
and exclusions. 
The core research question this chapter will seek to address therefore is: 
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Which processes of exclusion and inclusion constitute alter-globalisation networks? 
In Chapter One I sketched out, theoretically, the component aspects of a Western liberal 
imperial cosmopolitanism, characterised by a constitutive destructiveness of the other it 
attempts to 'save' (Douzinas, 2007), whilst in Chapter Three I sketched out are-centred, 
post-colonial cosmopolitanism, characterised by the Arendtian notion of "action", 
plurality (Arendt, 1958/1998: 7) and the centring of "border thinking" (Mignolo, 2000). 
As with the previous chapter, the fauk lines of these relationships are not simply 
geographical (i.e. North and South) but more aptly described as discursive. In this way I 
draw on de Sousa Santos' concept of the "Epistemologies of the South" (2008) to 
collapse the geographical distinction between 'North' and 'South'. In other words, this 
allows us to imagine modes of construction and engagement which may be distinct from 
fIXed geographical places. 
The chapter will begin therefore by interrogating the roles played by international Noos 
(INoos) within GCAP (not aU of them based in the 'Global North' or structuraUy 
privileged environments), particularly focussing on their sometimes contradictory roles in 
supporting, dominating and ordering the GCAP network. The implications of these roles 
will be to reveal the specific form of cosmopolitanism enacted by the INGOs, and the 
degree to which this cosmopolitanism can be considered to be inclusionary of GCAP's 
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multiple constitutive nodes~ the degree to which it is based on 'making' or 'action' in the 
Arendtian sense (Arendt, 1958/1998: 220) 
This will heJp to set the context for the deployment of the theoretical framework 
developed in Chapters One and Three, in the exploration of the multiple forms of 
cosmopolitanism considered in those chapters and which became apparent throughout 
this research. These will be shown to be particularistic in that they 'come from 
somewhere', and draw on specific interpretations of cosmopolitan discursive resources. I 
will draw on examples which illustrate the ways in which these forms of 
cosmopolitanism interact in moments of tension and co-production, which again carries 
implications for the ways in which GCAP enacts inclusions and exclusions of its network 
sites and nodes, both discursively and materially. 
6.2 The multiple and contradictoIy practices ofINoos in GCAP 
One immediate question which must be addressed in prefacing this section is why it is 
that an analysis of the role of INoos in GCAP is necessary. After all, there are many 
actors which constitute GCAP, and most of them are not INGOs. Why then should I be 
taking INGOs as my point of reference? Doesn't this reify the significance of INoos to 
the detriment of other actors in GCAP, before I have even sought to ascertain the relative 
importance of their discourses and actions in constituting GCAP? 
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Well, possibly, although I will be addressing this imbalance further on in this chapter. 
However, there is good reason to begin with the INOOs. Firstly, the dominant role of 
INoos has been well documented in other similar networks (see, for example, 
Yanacopulos, 2(09), and secondly, a brief analysis of GeAP reveals the ubiquitous role 
INoos play. As illustrated in the previous chapter, ActionAid, Oxfam GB and Oxfam 
Novib are three of the four core GeAP funders. Secondly, two of the three co-chairs of 
GeAP work for INoos. That one of these INoos is based in the 'South' is not 
necessarily meaningful and challenges the easy geographical distinction between 
'Northern' and 'Southern' discourses of poverty and cosmopolitanism. Thirdly, INoos 
are bestowed with official representation within GeAP's constitutive national coalitions, 
which are recommended to include relevant INoos on their steering groups (GCAP, 
2007a). Lastly, INoos have provided the majority of GCAP's full-time secretariat staff 
on secondment. It is clear, then, that INOOs are important in GeAP. How important they 
are, and what this says about the cosmopolitan pretensions and inclusions ofGCAP, will 
be the subject of this section. 
6.2. J INGOs and the expansion of GCAP's particularities 
It is clear that INoos do play some supportive roles in GCAP which do enable 
particularistic discourses to achieve universal-type recognition. Research participants in 
the WNT A and the NCSTM, working for national and constituency-based civil society 
actors, identified INoos as providing "connections" (Interview 17), "links" (Interview 4) 
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''platforms'' (Interview 7) and "facilitation" (Interview 9), bridging national campaigns to 
the larger GCAP group. In this way, INoos helped to "maintain a space" (Interview 1) in 
which many different actors could come together and communicate in ways which had 
previously proved difficult because of organisational or individual agendas. 
In an example of how GCAP has expanded its cosmopolitical agenda to include the 
demands of marginalised groups, the head of a Dalit organisation in India praised the 
INoos, because they had ..... provided us platforms where we can voice our concerns, 
where we can put our demands to the larger group" (Interview 3). Specifically, this 
individual had been asked to lead a social exclusion taskforce in GCAP, in an effort to 
mainstream caste and religious minority exclusion within GCAP's narratives around 
poverty alleviation. Whilst this is something that has emerged from the WNT A, INoos 
have played a supportive role in expanding GCAP's particularism to include this 
previously maligned minority issue60. 
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An issue to be dealt with here concerns why it is we should consider relations like these 
cosmopolitan. Clearly it is not enough to rmder any relation of mgaganent cosmopolitan. I have 
~epeatedly stated that cosmopolitan relations must involve a degree of other regarded-ness. Normally there 
IS an assumption that such relations should unfold over distance. However, this mogs us to consider how 
we define distance. In Chapter Three I argued that we need to consider distance in social, as well as in 
geographical terms. By doing so cosmopolitan relations can be understood to be practiced across cultural, 
social and economic as well as spatial, difference and 'distance'. Indeed, one issue which appears to unite 
an ideological range of the writers considered in Chapters One to Three, despite the serious divisions which 
otherwise exist between them, is their analysis that neo-liberal capitalist relations have eroded social ties 
between individuals and communities living in close geographical proximity (Day, 2005; Massey, 2005; 
Chandler, 2007; Newman, 2007). This is not therefore an issue only of class solidarity, but also of 
economic (between different classes), cultural and geographical solidarity. When members ofGCAP 
express solidarity with members ofmarginalised groups, they are establishing cosmopolitan relations 
~cross a range of socio-economic divisions. This is why these relations are cosmopolitan, because they 
mvolve an mgagement with 'others' over social, cultural, spatial and economic distance. What remains to 
265 
Even though some of them are country coalition funders, the INoos do not largely 
involve themselves in the day-to-day running of the WNT A and NCSTM secretariats. 
They themselves appear to be aware that this would be seen negatively by their in-
country partners on the coalitions. For example, an INoo employee and member of the 
WNT A steering group claimed: 
''Donors give WNT A the space it needs to be a natiooal campaign. Without this space 
WNT A would have no credibility at a grassroots level, especially with Dalits, Adivasis, 
groups like that. Many people are suspicious or unmotivated by big global initiatives. The 
donors understand this" (Interview 8) 
And from the NCSTM: 
"Now as the national civil society organisations, especially some of the Noos, collectives, 
and their secretariats take a stronger hold, then there is a ... phasing out of INOOs to 
actually pitch in, so we are at the stage now where initially Oxfam and ActionAid have 
played a very critical role. Now they are very ... objective, outside support, we are not part 
of the day to day secretariaf' (Interview 16) 
The INGOs therefore appear to provide and/or support inclusionary spaces for smaller, 
national or constituency-based civil society actors to make their voices heard within 
GCAP's larger structure, and in turn to inform GCAP's positions vis-a-vis its 
engagement with various governments, statist formations and publics. Nonetheless, there 
also appear to be many instances of INoos asserting their agendas with national 
be judged of course is the content of these relations. and whether they are emancipatory and horizontal or 
dominating and hierarchical. 
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coalitions, creating tensions and divisions within GCAP. Funhermore, INoos sometimes 
inadvertently order the GCAP network by virtue of them being best resourced and 
positioned to do so (this echoes Cumbers, Nativel and Routledge's 'imagineers' (2007». 
These issues will be the subject ofthe next two sub-sections. 
6.2.2 Practices of INGO Domination 
According to a GCAP evaluation report, some constituent members of GCAP are 
reported to believe that" ... it is organizations with funds that have ended up and been the 
primary decision makers" (GCAP, 2008c: 24) and that " ... the strong presence of donor 
agencies in the campaign [undermines] the presence of local organizations, creating other 
movements that keep a distance to GCAP" (ibid: 25). This highlights the way in which 
INoo domination of the GCAP network acts to exclude less resourced actors and their 
particularistic concerns. This is a process of exclusion which challenges claims that the 
cosmopolitanism of alter-globalisation networks is universa~ open and inclusive, and that 
it automatically invokes the 'border' voices (Mignolo, 20(0). See Chapter One for a 
discussion of those authors who adopt this universalistic position. 
This eventuality was further reinforced by some of the interviewed research participants. 
According to one, the initial domination of the WNTA campaign by INoos led to a great 
deal of scepticism and criticism from Indian Noos and activists (EthInt 1). It seems this 
frustration persists: 
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"How you even plan for campaigns, there's always a disrupture that happens ... where the 
INoos planning the campaigns quickly get onto what will we do? And then for us the 
question is why do you want to do it? And probably we need, we don't get enough time to 
really, you know, put both together, because what is also important - there's a great sense of 
discomfort for many of us when we say you are jumping straight to what you will do, and 
then what is often dictated by someone sitting in London, who feels that what works in 
London is a global phenomena .. .1 mean that the GCAP global agenda, I wouldn't say gets 
dictated, but gets influenced significantly by what is going to look good on BBC. So, so 
that's where the tension comes in because that's what comes back to India" (Interview I) 
For one participant in the NCSTM, a question about the role of INoos in the coalition 
instigated an angry response about INoos in general: 
"there's somebody between those who provide resources and between the ones who 
implement, like a conduit of some kind, but that conduit has so much influence that 
sometimes they end up implementing themselves. So that kind of approach to some of us is 
wrong, because it, it's not like you're building the capacity of the locals, you're saying 'we 
got the money, we have the money', and you get the master and servant approach" 
(Interview 18) 
Such responses invoke INOOs as mediators (Latour, 2005) in the GCAP network and 
suggest that their role is controversial, resuhing in some instances in the domination of 
less resourced organisations and activists. This is a process of exclusion which speaks 
back to some of the more positive roles played by INOOs outlined earlier. However, in 
both cases the focus has been on individual cases of critique or support. Neither really 
speaks to the broader processes of discursive inclusion and exclusion which INoos 
proliferate throughout GCAP. This is what I will now address, as I seek to understand 
how the GCAP network is imagined and ordered through the presence ofINoos in it. 
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6.2.3 The INGO translation of GCAP 
This sub-section will explore the following questions: how do INoo representatives 
imagine and narrate GCAP's purpose and actions at the level of the national coalitions? 
How successful and dominant are these (particularistic) translations and orderings? In 
what ways do these narrations draw on particular types of cosmopolitan discursive 
resources? And what do they teU us about the kinds of cosmopolitan inclusions and 
exclusions that GCAP embodies? 
In addressing these questions it will become clear that whilst INoo narratives remain 
largely similar across the WNT A coalition in India and the NCSTM coalition in Malawi, 
as well as in other areas of the GCAP network, the success with which these narratives 
order and enrol non-INoo actors is significantly contextualised by the local setting. So in 
the WNT A this operation has been unsuccessful in many ways, whilst in NCSTM the 
opposite is largely the case. 
But first a note of clarification: I have deliberately avoided the word 'national' in relation 
to the WNT A and NCSTM campaigns as I want to avoid the impression of essentialised 
bounded features which dictate local responses in India and Malawi. Clearly it is difficult 
to describe the space in which either country campaign opemtes in as 'national' when 
members of the respective campaigns regularly tmvel to other places beyond national 
boundaries, when members of other country coalitions regularly visit, and when the 
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discourses drawn on are mediated through different dimensions of geographical 
boundedness. In this way then the coalitions are presented as operating in localities which 
serve as the sites of different dimensions of the global, national and local. 
I also want to avoid the impression that the individuals involved can be bisected along 
lines of nationality (or 'inter' nationality in the case of the INoos). In every case, the 
members of INoos that I spoke with in India and Malawi were nationals of those 
countries. They largely shared their coalition colleagues' respect for (in the NCTSM) or 
ambivalence towards (in the WNT A) the MDGs. As I will now argue though, they also 
displayed a common problematisation (in common with INoos across both countries and 
those I encountered in other parts of the network) ofwbat GCAP was, and how it should 
operate, drawing on neo-Iiberal cosmopolitan discursive resources and donor logics 
(which I will go on to outline). The discourses of the INoos therefore did not come fully 
from 'outside' ofIndia and Malawi, but were part of the fabrics of those localities, vying 
with other discourses to order and translate the meanings of civil society activity in those 
localities. 
Hence it is the degree to which certain relations of locality and globality, or weaker and 
more powerful particularisms (Laclau, 1995), intersect which produce the coalitions' 
contexts. So in Malawi it is the degree to which the 'local', and civil society in particular, 
has been penetrated by neo-liberal donor logics, combined with the relative isolation of 
NCSTM members from the more politically radical elements ofGCAP's network, which 
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has made the coalition particularly open and resonant to INoo narratives which mirror 
this neo-liberal cosmopolitan logic. In India, on the other hand, where civil society has a 
long history outside of the World Bank-driven civil society agenda of the late 19805 and 
mid 1990s, and where severa) non-INoo activists play centra) roles in not just GeAP, but 
also many other alter-globalisation networks, non-INoo activists retain a degree of 
disregard for the logics and narratives ofINoos. In this way therefore they work to speak 
back to and rework the hegemonic particularisms of the INoo neo-liberal cosmopolitan 
logics, expanding and transforming them. This section therefore is also in part a story of 
actant powers (Law, 2(03), and how they serve to epistemically dominate, order, re-order 
and resist in different contexts. 
In this section then I will be exploring the narratives of the INoos themselves, and how 
and where they successfully enrol other actors to their problematisations of GeAP. In 
subsequent sections I will explore the tensions these narratives produce, and the 
alternative problematisations of GCAP which arise from them. This will assist in 
assessing the degree to which the INoos engage in relations of inclusion and/or exclusion 
with other members of GeAP, and the degree to which they produce GCAP as an 
inclusionary or exclusionary network. 
In total I interviewed four INoo representatives in the WNT A and two in the NCTSM. I 
also had access to the written opinions of three other INoo representatives who were part 
of the WNT A coalition in India, and participated in the GCAP Learning and 
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Accountability Group which involved members of three other INoos. Two broad themes 
arose from these interviews and observations. The first was the manner in which the 
INoo participants sought to quantify the campaign's success, either locally or across 
GCAP more broadly. Success was repeatedly equated with mobilising large numbers of 
people (which is what distinguishes this as a narrative of quantification, rather than 
mobilisation per se), with little reflection on who was being mobilised and what for, 
although as will become clear further on, this was not a narrative shared unanimously by 
other non-INoo actors. The following comments from INoo members about the WNT A 
are illustrative of this quantitative narrative: 
''the success of the [campaign] according to me. is the way it mobilised over 3000 groups 
across the country. Even when they ... started the 9 is mine campaign. that was a huge 
success, because me is the whole idea of 9 is mine, the slogan, such a catchy slogan. and 
then, involving students across the country. it was a huge success" (Interview 6) 
"ever since the secretariat came into being, it's got a much more robust identity ... the 
secretariat has managed to mobilise a lot more players than what they did at the beginning. 
That's one. The identity has becOOle more distinct because there have been specific 
initiatives that have been identified and then those initiatives have been followed through, 
so for example, the 9 is mine campaign was a very successful campaign, it mobilised school 
children. a very large mUDber of children" (Interview 10) 
Both of these excerpts not only equate success with the mobilisation of people and 
organisations around WNTA's '9 is Mine' campaign (a campaign which sought to lobby 
for 9010 of government expenditure to be attributed to beahh and education), but also 
further transJates campaign success by equating it with "catchy slogans" and the 
development of "robust identities". Large numbers, catchy slogans, robust identities; this 
is the terminology of corporate marketing, rather than radical structural critique. It is 
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reminiscent of Kamat's critique of the technical managerial solutions which the neo-
liberal logics ofNoos bring to the social issues of power and oppression (2004: 168). 
This focus on quantification was also apparent amongst the INoo participants at the 
Learning and Accountability Group meeting I participated in during April 2009. As 
already discussed in the previous chapter, the annual Stand Up against Poverty days are 
often ambiguous for many of the coalitions who participate and mobilise for them. 
Nonetheless, the INoos at this meeting stressed the importance of 116 million people 
standing up in 2008. Furthermore, it was presented as a wholly positive sign of Stand 
Up's success that whilst GCAP had official coalitions in 115 countries, reports bad come 
in of mobilis at ions that had occurred in a further 15 countries on top oftbat. Nobody was 
sure who had initiated these mobilisations, or who had participated in them. This appeared 
to be of secondary importance, despite the concerns which had already been raised 
regarding Stand Up mobilisations being co-opted by governments with dubious human 
rights records (see the discussion of this in the previous chapter) (LAG Fieldnotes). 
The importance of this is that, where this particular interpretation of success is dominant, 
it focuses coalitions on quantifiable outcomes rather than content. This was very clear in 
the NCSTM, where, in addition to the quantifJable agenda of the MOOs addressed in the 
previous chapter, the NCSTM were responsible for mobilising the largest number of 
people across the whole of Africa for the Stand Up days in 2007 and 2008. Indeed, during 
one interview with a NCSTM member, when asked what GCAP mlS, the participant 
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reached for her diary and spent a significant amount of time leafmg through the pages 
until she got to October 17th (International Day for the Eradication of Poverty) to tell me 
that GCAP was Stand Up against Poverty. Furthermore, it became increasingly clear to 
me that donor funding (especially from the UNMC) to the NCSTM was predominantly 
given for the purposes of mobilising for Stand Up, resulting in much of the NCSTM's 
energies being spent on this mobilisation. 
This is also important because it de-politicises and technocratises GCAP, and creates 
exclusions for groups or individuals who are either unwilling or unable to meet these 
managerial markers of success. So for example, at the Learning and Accountability Group 
meeting it was also reported that some coalitions in Central and South America were 
beginning to withdraw from GCAP at protest against reporting requirements which were 
being imposed by INGO-donors (LAG Fieldnotes). 
This quantification narrative drew on the kind of cosmopolitan discursive resource 
outlined in Chapter One. The concern with quantity over content is an other-regarding 
narrative which seeks to flatten and silence the diversity of the other. It is, in Arendtian 
terms, a politics of "making" (Arendt, 195811998), of seeking a false unity of numbers 
which simultaneously closes down opportunities for dissent through the discursive 
externalisation of it. Before drawing any further conclusions from this I want to explore 
briefly the second theme that emerged from the interviews and observations of INoo 
participants in GCAP, that of the centrality and importance of 'expertise', and the role 
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such 'expertise' plays in enrolling the imaginations and ordering the activities of the 
GCAP network nodes. 
In the previous chapter I explored how research participants, regardless of their 
organisational affiliation, positioned GCAP as speaking on behalf of the "marginalised" 
(Interview 9), and the "grassroots voices" (Interviews 4, 6, and 8). This suggests a 
plurality-based (Arendt, 1958/1998; Mouffe, 2005) cosmopolitanism which unfolds 
across socia~ cultural, economic and geographical distance, and is inclusive and centring 
of these 'border' (Mignolo, 2000) voices in formulating solutions to agreed problems. 
However, many of the lNoo participants seemed to hierarchicalise this relationship. In 
other words, whilst GCAP and its nodes were to speak on behalf of these groups, it could 
not rely on these same groups to articulate their core messages. The following two 
excerpts from the same interview with an lNoo participant in the WNT A campaign 
reflect this ideological dilemma (Billig, 1998): 
"if you have a national or international agenda but you don't give a damn to the local, 
localised district and state level agendas, then I think your campaign will not be successful, 
Somebody sitting ... in a district will not be related to the national campaign because be 
doesn't see any relevance, so that's where he needs to see the linkages ... and so the national 
groups need to adopt local agendas ... " 
"I think when you talk to government one thing is very challenging that )'OIl need to, 
whatever you say, you need to have evidence for that, because they will come with their 
own evidence and say 'this is what we think is wrong', so you need to meet that with your 
own evidence, because they will say 'what you say is not right'. That is one challenge, a 
more scientific way of looking at issues ... they may be very good at protesting, but when it 
comes to sitting accoss the table from government, and sitting with government officials 
who are very senior peq>le, who have you know, they bave machines and systems to 
suppon them then how do you substantiate your argument, and that is what is important for 
Wada Na Todo now, because I think now it has reached a stage where you get into 
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dialogues with Minister of Health, with Planning Commission chairpersoo, so I think there 
you really need to stand your ground. And, that is also a challenge to bring in experts within 
the campaign, not maybe in a formal, formal place in the campaign, but definitely as people 
who support us technically, with expertise ... " (Interview 8) 
Ultimately this dilemma is resolved. Note how in the first passage the participant repeats 
the assertion that GCAP, and specifically the WNTA coalition, must place "local 
agendas" at the heart of their campaigns, in order to build "linkages" with those local 
activists. This participant interprets GCAP's effectiveness as being contingent on the 
articulation of the authentic loca~ which is therefore positioned as central to the success 
of the broader campaign. In the second passage, though, "experts" are called upon to be 
brought ''within the campaign" which assumes that they, and their expertise, are currently 
outside of the campaign. The authentic local is here positioned as "very good at 
protesting", but not sufficiently expert about their own social problems to "substantiate 
[their] argument" and sit down and match government officials with their "machines and 
systems". This is a reproduction of the colonial imagining of the authentic local (Heins, 
2000; Kapur, 2(02) as both important for the legitimacy of the ruling elite, but distant also 
in terms of shaping the decisions and policies which affect their lives. 
In the WNTA campaign, this discourse was not shared by all participants, with many of 
the non-INoo participants measuring the success and challenge of the WNT A campaign 
by their ability to engage with a wide range of marginalised groups, and bringing their 
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voices into conversation with government officials61 • In the NCSTM though, this 
discourse was articulated by many participants regardless of organisational affiliation, and 
possibly for the particularistic spatial dimension pertinent to Malawi's localities discussed 
in the last chapter and previously in this chapter. 
This discourse and reliance on external 'expertise' amongst the non-INoo NCSTM 
participants was drawn upon fairly regularly in response to questions regarding the role of 
INoos in the coalition. The responses displayed a reliance upon the INoos, although one 
which was seen as unproblematic: 
"they are well resourced, they are able to pool all these bits and pieces like people to put 
them on the table and say these are the issues. So they have resources for example to do 
research. Or to even bring in and share issues of for example the economy, yeb, to put that 
on the table" (Interview 17) 
''we need some expertise from a research institution, so that is wby we have all these things 
in the taskforce." (Interview 20) 
"I remembered last year we had uh.... I think two people from UK, can't remember her 
name um .... first, uh ... she came after we had already done .. .it was like she was coming to 
review the things we had done. But we always have that internatiooal suppm, it is always 
there" (Interview 30) 
The final response above provides further interest as it draws a link between the uses of 
external expertise as a monitoring device on their own activities, and then brackets this as 
a form of "support". Of further interest is the manner in which this unreflective attitude to 
61 It is not my intentioo here to reify the authenticity of these groups or their representatives. The 
~oint h~e is merely to distinguish this more qualitative, group-based approach to the quantitative, 
expertIse' approach of the 1N00s. 
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INoos amongst non-INoo participants in the NCSTM was actually viewed as a problem 
by one of the INoo participants in Malawi: 
"So we should come in with our agendas, and share the agenda and cqly the agenda, 
whatever ... but in Malawi we do not have as many organisations that are able to do that and 
it ends up being international organisatioos, and in my view its because of resources, 
finances, that there are a few organisations that have money that they can use for like ... for 
networking, or advocacy work. Other local organisations are starving, so for them to leave 
what their donor had agreed to and come to these platforms and put in resources, that 
doesn't happen. So the challenge is, ok do we continue having this as international 
influenced, or ok if we leave out these international influences it's really a dilemma that we 
do get" (Interview 16) 
This last comment does little to challenge the notion that many of the non-INoo 
participants in Malawi have internalised the necessity of external 'expertise' to the 
sustenance of the NCSTM campaign. Nonetheless it does problematise any 
straightforward relationship between the presence of INoos per se and the neo-liberal 
discourses ofmanagerialism and technical expertise which were prevalent in the NCSTM 
coalition, and point perhaps to broader influences in localities dominated by donor 
agendas in what Harrison (2004) has called 'governance states', 
Nonetheless, for the purposes of this thesis, it remains the case that the last example was 
the only one where an INoo participant reflected critically on the role of INOOs within 
the different national coalitions. It appears then that whilst INOOs can playa supportive 
role within the national coalitions and GCAP more broadly, this can and does slip very 
easily into an ordering of the GCAP network in ways which problematise this 
relationship as a purely enabling one. By quantifying success and asserting the necessity 
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of external expertise, the INoos in this research have served to perpetuate a discourse 
which professionalises the network and marginalises the value and the expertise of those 
voices who one could argue have the most to gain from poverty eradication; those living 
in poverty themselves. 
This answers the frrst part of the question with which I opened this section: how do 
INoo representatives imagine and narrate GCAP's pwpose and actions at the level of the 
national coalitions? It also suggests that the INoos in GCAP perpetuate the form of 
exclusionary neo-liberal (managerialistic) and colonial (construction of the authentic 
local) cosmopolitanism critiqued in Chapter One, which in the NCSTM at least has 
proven quite dominant (see Chapter Five). A point to be addressed here is the degree to 
which it is valid to label these INoo discourses as cosmopolitan. I do not intend to use 
the term as a 'catch-all' for GCAP's relationality. Rather, I draw on the critique of 
western, colonial and neo-liberal cosmopolitanism which I offered in Chapter One. If 
cosmopolitanism can be described as an open orientation to the world (Youngs, 2009), or 
an 'ethic of universal concern' (Erskine, 2(02), then the narratives of the INoos 
certainly do embody this. They are concerned with the 'grassroots' and the 
'marginalised', in other words, those who are removed by sociaL economic, cultural or 
geographic distance. However, as I have argued previously, it is to the content of these 
relations that we must pay attention, in order to understand what form of 
cosmopolitanism is being expressed and practised. For it seems the case that, conversely, 
in opening out to the world, the discourses of the INOOs have the effect of closing it 
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down. As I argued in Chapter One this is because it is a form of cosmopolitanism which 
destroys the subject of its concern (the 'grassroots', the 'marginalised') by silencing it. It 
is a form of cosmopolitanism as 'making' (Arendt, 195811998), one which discursively 
centralises power in the hands of 'experts', whilst simultaneously reifying the 
voicelessness of the 'authentic local'. 
With respect to the second and fourth questions which opened this section (how 
successful and dominant are these (particularistic) translations? What do they teU us 
about the kinds of cosmopolitan inclusions and exclusions that GCAP embodies?), these 
discourses are only partly successful in enrolling other coalition members and GCAP 
network nodes. It is in this partiality, in the spaces where counter-discourses are forged 
and expanded, where GCAP incubates a different form of costmpolitanism to challenge 
what might be called the neo-liberal and colonial cosmopolitanism described above. This 
counter-hegemonic cosmopolitanism draws on the post-colonial experience, inserting 
itself into the broader cosmopolitan discourses ofGCAP. As will be shown, this is not an 
uncomplicated and straightforward process, and is not necessarily horizontal and 
emancipatory because it is post-colonial. In other words, such a form of costmpolitanism 
does not necessarily transcend the relations of domination (Laclau, 1995) which 
characterises the neo-liberaVcolonial cosmopolitanism of the INoos. It nonetheless 
signifies the potential of GCAP to incubate both neo-liberal and more radical 
cosmopolitan discourses and critiques. It is not the case that these discourses would not 
have existed without GCAP, but rather, that GCAP opens spaces where these different 
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discourses can challenge each other and in some cases articulate with each other. This 
will be the subject of the following section and sub-sections. 
6.3 Re-working pOwer 
In the previous section I argued that the kind of narratives with which INOO 
representatives imagined the GCAP network represented a form of nea-liberal, 
managerialistic and colonial cosmopolitanism which excluded by defmition certain voices 
and practices which are unable to articulate themselves in these terms. I argued that in the 
sites occupied by the NCSTM, a 'weaker' locality more readily dominated by agents from 
'stronger' localities (Massey, 2(05), such narratives have contributed to the self-
understanding of the broader NCSTM network participants as viewing success in de-
politicised and quantifIable terms (How many MDOs can be met? How many people can 
be encouraged to 'stand up'?) and viewing themselves as being in need of external 
expertise, thus devaluing their own experiences, and those of people living in poverty. 
In this section I wish to explore further the nexus of this managerialistic neo-liberal and 
colonial cosmopolitanism and the resistance it met (and arguably part-produced) within 
the WNT A coalition. Where in the NCSTM the resistance this power produced was 
negligible, in India, a much 'stronger' civil society locality, this power circulated and 
produced resistance to it. However, I also wish to illustrate the way that the power of this 
neo-liberal cosmopolitan discourse has been subverted into something which transcends 
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pure resistance and is in fact, albeit contingently and delicately, productive itself of a 
different fonn of cosmopolitanism. one based on the co-imbrication of colonial and post-
colonial spaces in India. This echoes Allen's (2004) argument that power travels, and thus 
cannot be analysed predictably or in a linear manner, but is in fact twisted and re-formed 
as and where it 'touches down'. 
I am going to illustrate this in two steps; frrstly, through a brief analysis of the 
cosmopolitan discourses of the WNT A non-INoo steering group participants. This will 
set the stage for the second step, which will involve narrating an incident which occurred 
in mid-2007 where the WNTA campaign discussed bidding to host the GCAP Global 
Secretariat, which was due to move from its then base in South Africa. This incident will 
illustrate the manner in which the neo-liberal and colonial cosmopolitan power of the 
INoos produced and was re-worked and transcended by the differently constituted 
cosmopolitan ethic of the non-INoo WNT A participants, drawing on and re-centring 
post-colonial cosmopolitan discursive resources. The section, and chapter, will end by 
contextualising this post-colonial cosmopolitanism in subsequent debates which ensued 
across the GCAP network regarding GCAP's legal status and formalisation. This will 
illustrate the continuously tense environment in which GCAP's cosmopolitanisms co-
exist and produce each other, neither succeeding wholly in translating GCAP as they 
would envisage it. 
6.3.1 A post-c%niaJ cosmopolitanism? 
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Non-INoo WNT A steering group participants very explicitly understood their role in 
GCAP as one of leadership. Indeed, this was represented in official WNT A 
documentation, which could suggest that all participants, INoo and non-INoo alike, 
shared this narrative. As I will illustrate in the next sub-section though, this was not 
always the case. Nonetheless, a WNTA funding bid for 2007-2008 makes the following 
assertion (note the instrumental reference to the MOGs - this bid was compiled for 
WNTA's INoo and UN funders): 
''This initiative [WNT A] also emerged in response to the fact that India has a crucial 
role to play in enabling the global achievement of the MOOs - and not only because one-
fourth of the world's poor reside in South Asia and the achievement of critical targets 
such as in relation to Infant and Maternal Mortality are dependent on a rise in its 
national average. We believe that in its role as the world's largest democracy, and host to 
among the most diverse and historically significant civil society initiatives in the world, this 
country can set important precedents for the world in relation to the policy actions and civil 
society efforts that need to be initiated to achieve the Millennium Declaratioo." (WNT A. 
2007b: I) 
This passage reveals the way in which the WNT A campaign seeks to frame itself as 
transcending the silent subjecthood of the victimised other which in Chapter One I argued 
was both sustained and destroyed by a western, colonial and neo-liberal cosmopolitan 
nonnativity. The passage seeks to construct a more assertive and proactive subjectivity 
which is based on the specifically anti and post-colonial experiences of Indian civil 
society. It is simultaneously a subjecthood which seeks to reach out beyond the Indian 
experience to lead efforts to achieve the MOGs. In that this therefore draws on post-
colonial discursive resources to articulate an other-regarding normativity, we might call 
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this a post-colonial cosmopolitanism, although it is unclear at this stage as to whether by 
simply representing an alternative form of cosmopolitanism it is qualitatively different 
from the Western cosmopolitanism which I have thus far critiqued. 
Nonetheless, many non-INoo participants of the campaign sought to articulate this 
subjecthood, either asserting the current actuality of Indian leadership in GCAP or 
identifying the need for there to be more of it: 
''we believe we are ahead of GCAP, because our campaign, our national level campaign, is 
more important, but we are also equally contributing to the global agenda" (Interview 2) 
"there needs to be a partnership which utilises India's power. SOOle international partners 
still see India as a country that just needs more aid and that's a perspective that needs to 
change." (Interview 31) 
"the global in a country like India, which is so big, with so many issues, so many problems, 
the global is very real, and the need is very urgent, but still is 1iIr away, and I wish it wasn't, 
but its still, you know, it does impact, but to be able to, uh, so, just to see c08litims as 
implementers, I dOll't know how effective it will be" (Interview 9) 
As I argued above, it is unclear to what extent this post-colonial cosmopolitanism reflects 
a cosmopolitanism which is qualitatively more horizontal, or other-regarding. Certainly 
in the above excerpts it appears that WNT A participants draw on an interpretative 
schema which frames India's engagement with the world in self-referential terms. In this 
way one might argue that this post-colonial cosmopolitanism does not, as Laclau (1995) 
and Fraser (2008) recommend, transcend the relations of oppression created through 
traditional forms of western, neo-liberal and colonial cosmopolitanism and instead 
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merely inverts them. The degree to which this is the case will become clearer further on 
in this chapter. What does seem apparent is that by virtue of being post-colonia~ this is a 
cosmopolitanism which both contextualises the exclusionary cosmopolitanism of the 
INoos and inserts into GCAP meanings and narratives which would otherwise be absent 
throughout the network. 
An example I wish to highlight to illustrate how different forms of cosmopolitanism in 
GCAP articulate with each other draws on Mignolo's (2000) concept of the cosmopolitan 
'connector' referenced in Chapter Three. In his conceptualisation, Mignolo illustrates how 
words or concepts like 'democracy' are invested with different interpretations in colonial 
and post-colonial contexts and are then 'connected' at particular sites where these 
discourses are simultaneously in conflict, but also open to each other, infecting each other 
with their respective meanings and creating new co-produced meanings.62 In this way 
language and meaning itself is invested with cosmopolitan potential. What therefore 
begins as an encounter between seemingly reified colonial and post-colonial discourses is 
simultaneously infused with cosmopolitanisms, as the encounter itself involves an other-
oriented openness. 
In GCAP, one example of this kind of post-colonial cosmopolitan (redefining) 
connectivity can be illustrated by different understandings of 'accountability' within the 
62 Mignolo uses the example of different and clashing interpretations of democracy between the 
post-colonial Zapatistas and the colonial Mexican State (2000; 742). 
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GCAP network. In 2007, the International Facilitation Team (the precursor to the GCAP 
Global Council) established a Future Structures Taskforce, following the decision of the 
GCAP Global Assembly that year to continue GCAP until 2015. The ensuing Future 
Structures proposal document, which was circulated throughout GCAP's national 
coalitions, noted the following: 
"We view the current GCAP structure as having weaknesses in its accountability system at 
various levels ... [GCAP needs to] strengthen transparent and accountable system[s] where 
who is responsible for what is clear and the responsible parties are held to account for the 
outcomes of activities ... Repeatedly, we are reminded that the national coalitions are the 
base for GCAP. When we consider the long-term development ofGCAP, we feel that some 
system will need to be in place to ensure that the national coalitions are broad.based, 
inclusive, democratically-run and outcome-driven." (GCAP, 200k 3-4) 
It is clear here that it is the national coalitions which are to be held to account. It is not 
entirely clear by who or what, but what is clear is that accountability here is understood as 
a top down process. In response to this document, WNT A framed accountability 
differently, arguing that: 
"The entire question of accountability ... the issues of political or functiooal accountability 
to the countries and constituencies whom GCAP ultimately represents, the General 
Assembly (which represents the interests of these constituencies), the Regional Governance 
or even the 'building-blOCk national coalitioos' appears to have been insufficiently explored 
or represented" (WNT A, 2007c: 3) 
In ways I was able to observe, this term "accountability" served as a form of 
cosmopolitan connector between two different cosmopolitan perspectives, replete with 
their own normativities and historical specificities. In the former, expressed in the GCAP 
strategy document, cosmopolitanism is rendered as a prescriptive demand for other-
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regarded-ness ("broad-based ... inclusive ... democratically run ... "). Cosmopolitan 
openness is therefore situated as core to GeAP's agenda, but only on the part of those 
constituent nodes on whom lays GCAP's claims to legitimacy - the national coalitions. 
In the latter case, WNT A expresses a post colonial cosmopolitanism which is rendered via 
the articulation of accountability as being a process which empowers those whom GeAP 
is supposed to be other-regarded to, " ... the countries and coalitions whom GeAP 
ultimately represents". 
Much of the discussion at the Learning and Accountability Group (LAG) meeting I 
attended in April 2009 centred on GeAP's continuing quest to build structures of 
accountability that would satisfy the top-down understandings of accountability expressed 
in the proposal document cited on the previous page. However, the chair of the LAG, who 
is also one ofGCAP's co-chairs and a representative ofan INGO, expressed the following 
sentiment (recorded in my field notes) through which much of the resultant accountability 
discussion was subsequently refracted - "When we talk about accountability, I think it's 
important to talk not about donors, but about accountability to people living in poverty" 
(LAG Fieldnotes). This suggests that the interpretation of that concept expressed by the 
WNT A campaign, and possibly by other constituent GCAP campaigns in similar post-
colonial contexts, acted to fuse with more classically colonial interpretations of 
accountability to result in a co-produced, 'balancing-act' materialisation of the concept. 
This 'balancing act' was evident throughout the LAG meeting, where, resonating with De 
Sousa Santos's "epistemologies of the South" (2008), representatives from campaigns 
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working in post-colonial contexts constantly reasserted 'bottom-up' accountability to 
balance out the 'top-down' accountability of the INGOs and structurally privileged 
campaigns, which occasionally, as shown in the remark above from the LAG chair, cross-
fertilised. This suggests a degree of cosmopolitanism to the language of accountability 
itself as expressed in this context. 
This constantly unstable connectivity is an example of the kinds of conflicting and co-
productive cosmopolitanisms which GCAP incubates and expresses. It illustrates that 
these cosmopolitanisms, of either the neo-libera~ western and colonial or post-colonial 
varieties, are particularistic, and thus can not be entirely all-encompassing but are more 
likely to clash, fuse and re-work each other in unpredictable, inclusionary and 
exclusionary ways, depending on the sites where such cosmopolitanisms materialise. 
Cosmopolitanism here then, is not something which is universal, horizontal and benign, 
set against the particular, or against the verticalities and structural violence of 'the Global 
North' (See Youngs, 2009 for this kind of binary). Rather, cosmopolitanism here is 
understood as a discursive resource, spatially unbounded, and as an always particularistic 
outward-looking perspective which can take on a range of different, benign and malign 
features. 
In the following sub-section I intend to illustrate the inclusionary and exclusionary results 
of these fusing and clashing cosmopolitanisms, with continuing reference to the WNT A 
campaign. 
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6.3.2 Power-resistance-power: ongoing tensions between competing cosmopolilanisms 
The declaration produced following the first meeting of the Global Assembly in 
Johannesburg, 2004, began an oft-repeated process of asserting the national coalitions as 
the "building blocks" ofGCAP (LAG Fieldnotes). The Johannesburg declaration asserted 
that GCAP must be ''CSO-Ied and focus on sustainable and long-term national processes" 
(GCAP,2004a: 14). Similarly, the Beirut declaration from the Global Assembly of 2006 
positioned the national coalitions as explicitly national actors (GCAP, 2006: 5), whilst the 
Montevideo declaration in 2007 claimed that ''National coalitions are the base for our 
action and cooperation and should play a key role in developing policy messages that 
reflect local contexts" (GCAP, 2007a: 8). These declarations were assembled following 
days of debate and discussion between global assembly participants (EthInt I), many of 
whom were from coalitions based in structurally disadvantaged localities. 63 
One marker of the constitution of the Global Assemblies is the degree to which the 
language of the assembly declarations is distinctly more radical than the literature which 
is produced by the professionalised GCAP Global Secretariat to support mobilisations 
such as Stand Up. The point of this is that it appears that the Global Assembly 
declarations are not purely or even mostly the resuh of INoo agendas dominating the 
discussions. Nonetheless, what I do want to argue is that the resuh of this mandatory 
63 Grants were made available by GCAP's funders for resource-poor organisations to attend. 
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focus of the national on the national, is that whilst this was intended and has allowed 
national coalitions a degree of autonomy from INGOs and other international agendas 
within their campaigns (although not everywhere, as illustrated in the previous chapter), 
this positioning has also made it much harder for national coalitions to transcend their 
subjectivity as solely national actors, in order to take on more network-wide leadership 
roles. 
The void this creates is therefore filled either by INoos and their employees, or those 
non-INoo civil society actors with the resources to send their employees flying around 
the world to meetings of the Global CounciL or the Learning and Accountability Group. 
In the WNTA, for example, whilst some individuals on the steering group who work for 
non-INoo civil society organisations, have been active in GCAP's various policy and 
leadership bodies, the coalition as a coalition has found it much harder to take advantage 
of particular leadership opportunities as they have arisen. The arguments deployed (by 
INoos active in the WNT A campaign) against their involvement in this way have been 
precisely those contained within the Global Assembly declarations - national coalitions 
should focus on 'the national'. 
In this section I will explore the particular example of this tension which I encountered 
between the INoo and non-INoo members of the WNT A steering group, by 
investigating the positions which evolved around a debate about whether WNT A should 
bid to host the GCAP Global Secretariat, which in 2007 was soon to leave its then current 
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host in South Africa. It should be noted here that whilst I will claim that two distinct 
narratives developed amongst lNoo participants on the one hand, and non-INoo 
participants on the other hand, this does not speak to a simplistic North-South 
geographical distinction. All of the participants on the WNT A steering group are Indian 
nationals, and so, as I have argued previously, if there is a distinction it is absolutely 
discursive. It was beyond the scope of my research to investigate how such discourses act 
within different organisational actors, although this discursive distinction does appear to 
support those who have argued that international Noo workers or activists have formed 
into a distinct class of their own (see for example, Calhoun, 2(08). 
According to members of the WNT A steering group who have also been active at the 
Global Assemblies, when news fihered around the GCAP network that the GeAP 
Secretariat would require new hosts, India was approached by a number of other country 
coalitions to bid for it (EthIntl. Ethint2). This framed the responses of the non INGO 
participants in the campaign, who talked about the issue as one of leadership. The 
following remarks are all from individual contributions to an email discussion which took 
place between all of the steering group members regarding the possibility of WNT A 
bidding to host the secretariat. 
" feel this is really a recognition of the way WNT A has been able to build and C<lIlsoIidated 
its work 00 the ground, and thereby, in a unique position to expand its global role." 
"the proposal has clearly to do with the identification of this political leadership that the 
India! Asia process may have to offer in terms of offering a more political, policy &: 
oonstituency oriented future to GeAP" 
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"it is also an opportunity for all ofus to see that the issues of the most vulnerable gets 
prominence in this new scenario. Asia house largest number of poor of the world and hence 
GCAP secretariat provide an opportunity to centre its strategy, actions, policy advocacy and 
lobbying with the international agencies and the governments to echo the voices of these" 
'1f we get an opportunity to playa more proactive role in shaping up some of the civil 
society discourse of poverty, should we not take it up (if not then, why should we worry 
about domination of northern led campaigning styles)?" 
(WNTA CSG, 2007d) 
It is clear from these contributions that these steering group members understood the issue 
of hosting the secretariat as one ofleadership. This was not just a leadership ofparticuJar 
organisations or of self-promotion (although undoubtedly this also played a role, as is 
clear from the first response in particular), but a leadership which invoked the voices of 
the "most vulnerable" and drew explicitly from a post-colonial contextualisation of this 
issue. This is evident from the final response and the way it extemalises "northern-led 
campaigning styles" from the way in which the contributor imagines WNT A would 
operationalise its own campaigning style across the GeAP network given the opportunity. 
In a cosmopolitan sense, these statements also illustrate the manner in which the non-
INGO members of the WNT A steering group sought to transcend their subjectivity as 
national actors, and furthermore as structurally silenced others. It is this very structural 
inequality experienced in India which these participants claim gives WNTA a louder, 
more political and more radical voice. The degree to which such an empowered 
particularism would transcend both 'poles of oppression' (Laclau, 1995) in prefiguring a 
post-colonial cosmopolitan horizontality is still unclear, though, largely because it has 
thus far not been operationalised. However, one might argue that in seeking to take on a 
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leadership role in GCAP, the WNTA would indeed simply invert, rather than transcend, 
the modes of hierarchy and exclusion which currently constitute some of GCAP's inter-
nodal relationships. 
Putting this co~ecture aside for the moment, I need here to underline the degree to which 
this email discussion completely divided the contributors into two opposing camps, one 
which understood this issue as one of leadership, entirely composed of non-INoo 
participants, and the other which understood the issue as one of resources, entirely 
composed of INoos. It is to this second camp that I will now turn. 
The following excerpts from the same email discussion cited above were contributed 
solely by members of the WNT A steering group who work for INoos and are based in 
India. They are drawn ftom longer passages, but constitute the total number of INoo 
representatives who contributed to this debate. The responses share very similar features, 
and constitute an interpretative schema which frames the issue of hosting the GCAP 
Global Secretariat as one of resources. 
"WNT A should focus on its original mandate and further strengthen its work by effectively 
influencing public policies and constantly playing a role to bridge the gap between 
grassroots level COOS [community based organisations] and the natiooal level advocacy 
effocts" 
''WNT A needs to advance its own mandate (far from being achieved) and hosting and 
managing a GeAP secretariat is an entirely different cup of tea. There are issues of 
registration, financial resources (though one or the other donor may decide to support for an 
year or so), leadership, and national and intematiooal dynamics" 
293 
"it is perhaps premature to explore the possibility of WNT A hosting the GCAP secretariat. 
While WNT A has covered considerable ground, much more needs to be done and the 
network (or platform?) needs strengthening. It is still very young, faced with a large 
nwnber of unresolved issues, and the length of its life is unclear as of now. Given all this, it 
really makes sense to focus on strengthening WNT A nationally" 
(WNTA CSG, 2007d) 
As well as asserting the resource burden of hosting the Global Secretariat, the tone of 
some of the contributions is often paternalistic and admonishing - WNT A. for example, 
is " ... still very young". Furthermore, the contributions draw back to the positioning of the 
'national' on the 'national' as first deployed in the GCAP Global Assembly statements. 
The INoo contributors assert that WNT A needs to "advance its own mandate" which 
involves "strengthening WNT A nationally". Whether this was the kind of national 
focussing the chair of WNTA (from a non-INoo civil society organisation) had in mind 
when he was asked to negotiate the autonomy of national campaigns on behalf of the 
Asian and Latin America/Caribbean regions at the Beirut and Montevideo Global 
Assemblies (EthInt2) is doubtful. What is clear is that this sentiment can be and has been 
refracted through different interpretative schema, which in this case resulted in (the 
possibly unintentional but nonetheless real) stifling of WNT A's leadership aspirations, 
and the potentially resultant post-colonial cosmopolitanisation of the GCAP network. 
Nevertheless, a steering group meeting that followed this discussion resuhed in a 
translation of the debate into a seemingly consensual position statement, invoking 
Melucci's (1996) assertion that collective identity formation and processes of positioning 
tend to mask contentious disagreements and debates which in part constitute those 
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resulting identities and positions. The meeting minutes show that the participants agreed 
that the resource burden of hosting the secretariat could be great, but concluded that: 
"this is possibly the most opportune time for the Abhiyan [WNTA] to play an influencing 
role in the global process - which should not be seen only as a role but also a responsibility 
that cannot be escaped also in the context of the global factors that influence the issues that 
we are trying to deal with locally." (WNTA eSG, 2007e) 
The language deployed here suggests that it was the non-INOO participants who managed 
to win this particular debate, for whilst the local/national focus of the campaign is 
reiterated, it is done with the recognition of the co-production of local and global 
processes and spaces - "the global factors that influence the issues that we are trying to 
deal with locally" - and thus the unavoidability of engaging with these processes. Whilst 
the INOOs understood WNT A as having a responsibility to an India posited as a bounded 
national space, the passage above appears to assert a co-imbricated and networked 
imagining of space which leaves WNT A with the ''responsibility'' of influencing the 
"global process". 
Despite the seeming finality of the above statement, similar sentiments were still being 
expressed by research participants when I was in India in August and September 2008, a 
year later. The INoo participants still drew back to the 'national' mandate ofWNT A, and 
voiced a concern over resources. Non-INOO participants still drew heavily on a more 
post-colonial understanding of what this opportunity to host the secretariat meant. For 
example: 
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"there's always this problem where if you're from the Global South )UU can be a voice but 
you can't, you can't be a visionary, you know, the decision maker. I think that, I find it 
problematic and I think if there is, you know, another world is possible, and if we're talking 
about alternatives, then how is it different from any other, what we call structures of 
imperial globalisation? So I think that as a principle ... ifit's a southern process it also has to 
have southern leadership" (Interview 9) 
Nonetheless, by this point the internal debate amongst the WNT A secretariat bad become 
slightly outdated. In another move which demonstrates the tensions between the different 
types of cosmopolitanism which GCAP incubates, the idea of a GCAP secretariat being 
hosted anywhere had been rejected. Instead, and against the wishes of a majority of 
participants at the GCAP Global Assembly in 2007 at Montevideo (GCAP, 2007c), the 
GCAP Global Council had taken the decision to explore and then enact the 
institutionalisation of GCAP as a legal body. The secretariat could then be part of this 
legal body, thus negating the need for any particular national coalition to host it. This 
therefore replicates a form of outward-regard which simultaneously silences the other. It 
is a form of 'making' (Arendt, 1958/1998) which works against the 'diversality' with 
which Mignolo (2000) recommends we conduct cosmopolitan projects. 
The following passage reveals the manner in which the Global Council-appointed Future 
Structures Taskforce moved the discussion on from what had been agreed to at 
Montevideo, explicitly overriding what the report itself admits is GCAP's perceived 
strength, its plurality: 
296 
"At the Montevideo [2007 Global Assembly] meeting, the majority of participants 
expressed by the straw poll results and general discussion their preference for the non-
formal, non-legal global structure for GCAP. Our understanding is that it is primarily based 
on their general assessment that GCAP's strength lies in its diversity, spontaneity, political 
strength and leadership, dynamism and flexibility and that legal registratioo would work 
against maintaining and furthering this very strength. 
. .. At the same time, we have come to recognize that the current structure needs to 
gradually evolve so as to make GCAP on the whole stronger, more democratic and more 
sustainable as an effective and impact-oriented anti-poverty global campaign led by civil 
society. Now that GCAP has decided to continue at least till 2015 and possibly longer, it is 
apt for us to consider this structural question with a long-term view ... it [is] unavoidable 
and adequate to create an independent legal organization for the global secretariat" (GeAP, 
2007c: 3 [italics added)) 
At the Learning and Accountability Group (LAG) meeting I attended in April 2009, one 
of the participants from a Southern GCAP coalition said something to me which was at 
once both hopeful and sceptical. My notes record that the participant told me that GCAP 
could be a "new" kind of movement; not a social movement, but not just a group of 
NGOs either. Instead, it could be something which bridged the latent power, analysis and 
resistance of the first group to the resources of the latter. "If we get this right", I was told, 
"it could be fantastic" (LAG Fieldnotes). ''Getting it right" was the LAG's agenda, 
although this was proving to be a contested process. By the time I was invited into the 
LAG in early 2009, the legal registration of GCAP was already a fait accompli. 
Nonetheless, participants of the group from structurally disadvantaged contexts continued 
to express discomfort with the direction of events, particularly given the implications of 
legal registration which were being presented in the group discussions ie. uni-directional 
accountability procedures, including the introduction of memoranda of understanding 
which national coalitions were going to be expected to sign (LAG Fieldnotes). This built 
upon a recommendation by the Global Council-appointed Future Structures Taskforce, 
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which appeared to transform the nature ofGCAP's Global Assemblies. In previous years 
they were open to any organisation that was a member of a national coalition and wished 
to attend, discuss and vote on issues. However, the taskforce recommended that only 
those organisations which had signed up to the MoU should in future have voting rights 
(GCAP,2007c: 10). 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, those members of the LAG most comfortable and insistent on the 
need for MoUs were those from the INGOs. This was an issue that had already come to 
my attention through the analysis ofGCAP's core documents and some of the documents 
that the WNT A campaign had sent me. It appeared that the WNT A campaign had 
prepared a highly critical and detailed response to the Future Structures Taskforce's 
proposals, accusing GCAP of amongst other things departing from the "strong verdict of 
the Global Assembly" (WNTA, 2007c: 3), whilst constructing the new centrally directed 
Global Secretariat as " ... the 'driver' of GCAP, while the national coalitions and other 
constituents of the Global Assembly are reduced to subsidiaries" (op cit). My experience 
at the LAG had confirmed that these concerns were not limited to the WNT A campaign. 
Nonetheless they were, according to a GCAP evaluation document, ''minority'' concerns 
(GCAP, 2008c: 24). Furthermore, the same report asserted that, of 50 countries who had 
returned comments on the Future Structures Proposal the majority had been supportive of 
the registration ofGCAP as a legally centralised agency (ibid: 4). 
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It should be noted at this point that the proposals for the legal registration ofGCAP made 
an explicit distinction between the legal and the political The legal registration was 
recommended so that GCAP could be more accountable to donors and thus raise new 
funds (GCAP, 2007c: 4). Politically, GCAP would still be 'owned' by its national 
constituent nodes. This seemed a very murky distinction, which was evidenced by the 
discussion regarding the introduction ofMoUs at the LAG. 
I wish to deal here with a broader issue which addresses the exclusionary nature of the 
cosmopolitanism expressed in the GCAP Future Structures (GCAP, 2007c) and 
evaluation (GCAP, 2oo8c) documents discussed above. Specifically, I wish to explore the 
connotations of describing opposition to the legal registration of GCAP as "minority" 
(ibid: 24). It is not my contention that a greater deal of opposition to the legal registration 
of GCAP exists than the evaluation report admits. This was beyond the scope of my 
research, as it would have involved a much wider study, thus sacrificing the depth I 
wished to pursue. Rather, I wish to discuss what asserting these concerns as 'minority' 
connotes, particularly for a cosmopolitan network like GCAP, which seeks to champion 
the voices of the 'silent majority' of those living in poverty around the world. 
Firstly, it seems important to think through the degree to which country-coalitions submit 
responses to calls from the Global Secretariat or other core bodies. For example, the 
reason I was asked to be on the Learning and Accountability Group was because not a 
single country coalition had responded to the caU for members - eventually, individuals 
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were just asked. Is it therefore reasonable to base network-wide support for an initiative 
on the responses of 50 country coalitions, and relegate opposition to it as being in the 
'minority', especially when that opposition was articulated so broadly at the Montevideo 
Global Assembly meeting in 200n More importantly, though, how can these concerns be 
relegated as 'minority' when they are articulated by a country coalition (WNT A in India) 
which, at least as far as the participants in the GeAP network are concerned, speaks for 
455 million people living on less than $1.25 a day (Ravallion and Chen, 2006: 5)? 
According to World Bank estimates, this constitutes around a third of the total world 
population living on less than $1.25 a day (op cit). It appears questionable, then, that the 
concerns expressed by the taken-for representatives of these people can be considered a 
'minority' position. 
My argument is that the positions of the authors of these documents reflect a 
cosmopolitan discursive resource which resonates with the exclusionary Liberal 
cosmopolitanism which I critiqued in Chapter One of this thesis. It is premised on an idea 
of autonomous equality between actors, which are in met differentiated by a vast array of 
structural inequalities. It is a type of cosmopolitanism which fails to take Fraser's (2007) 
"all-affected" principle into account and instead propagates the idea that no matter the 
issue of concern, every member of the GCAP network has opinions of equal value. Given 
the inequality of resources between these actors, it seems that this kind of liberal 
cosmopolitan equality has in fact excluded the very voices supposed to be represented by 
GCAP. 
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6.4 Chapter Conclusion 
In this chapter I have sought to address which processes of exclusion and inclusion 
constitute GCAP, and the implications of this for how we understand alter-globalisation 
networks. I began by establishing the prism through which much of the chapter 
proceeded; that of cosmopolitanism. I then analysed the processes of exclusion and 
inclusion incubated by GCAP which challenged or buttressed the kinds of 
cosmopolitanism GCAP represents. I focussed on the role played in GCAP by INoos, 
who have taken on leading roles in funding and mobilising the network at many of its 
nodaJ points, including in the two case study coalitions researched for this thesis. 
Individual research participants were shown to highlight instances of both support and 
domination by lNoos. In the former case, INoos have enabled the discursive and 
practical expansion of rhetoric around poverty eradication to include the social exclusion 
of minority groups, particularly drawing on the Indian Dalit and Adivasi experience, and 
projecting this experience into forums, of both civil society and statist formations, which 
have previously excluded it. On the other hand, research participants also accused INoos 
of monopolising GCAP's agenda, at both a network-wide and coalition-specific level. 
This illustrated the contradictory agency of INOOs within GCAP, but revealed little 
about how these contradictory agencies served to include or exclude forms of knowledge 
and practice beyond the individual testimonies of the research participants. 
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I therefore attempted to analyse how the INoos involved in the WNT A and NCSTM 
coalitions and across the network more broadly, narrated and imagined GCAP's purpose 
and agency. I then explored how discursively successful and dominant these 
particularistic problematisations have become amongst the non-INoo participants in this 
research, in order to ascertain the alternative know ledges and practices which are either 
silenced or produced through interacting with these INGO problematisations. 
Two main INoo problematisations of GCAP became evident to me, both of which were 
characterised as being other-regarding, but which drew on neo-liberal and managerialistic 
cosmopolitan discursive resources. Firstly, GCAP's success was taken to be measured 
quantitatively. The aim was to measure how many people had participated in the Stand 
Up Against Poverty mobilisations, not who or why. Secondly, INoo participants 
expressed an ideological dilemma between the 'authentic' local voices which were 
needed to legitimate GCAP but which were simuhaneously not authentic enough to speak 
with authority about the poverty they lived in. Thus external expertise was needed to 
make the campaign more effective. This is indicative of a particularly neo-Iiberal, 
colonial cosmopolitanism discursive resource which was critiqued in Chapter One. It 
excludes the voices of those who are supposed to be represented by GCAP. Leaving aside 
how seriously we take the claims of representativeness of civil society organisations (see 
Chandler, 2004, for a critique), it is clear that GCAP is constituted on the basis tbat at 
least some of these organisations are representative of people living in poverty, yet even 
these organisations are excluded by the INoo insistence on external expertise. 
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These two particularistic and Western. neo-liberal and colonial cosmopolitan 
problematisations were especially dominant amongst non-INoo members of the NCSTM 
coalition, many of whom reafflI1lled the need for external expertise in the coalition, and 
even equated GCAP solely with the Stand Up mobilisations. More materially, it was clear 
that the NCSTM's main energies were expended on the Stand Up mobilisations, for 
which it mobilised the largest number of people in Africa during the 2006 and 2007 
events. The success and dominance of these discursive problematisations in the NCSTM 
can be linked back to the spatial and social dynamics of the donor presence in Malawi 
discussed in the previous chapter, and explored by critics of the application of the civil 
society model in African countries such as Harrison (2004) or Kasfir (1998). 
Nonetheless, the NCSTM is part of a broader network, and it is perhaps surprising that 
some ofGCAP's more radically oriented nodes and actors have not O¥)re influenced the 
NCSTM in some way. This will be explored more fully in the following chapter. 
As much as the INoo (particularistic-cosmopolitan) problematisation ofGCAP's success 
and purpose was dominant in some respects and sites, the WNT A coalition illustrated 
how it also produced resistant discourses and practices, although in O¥)bilising historical 
discursive resources distinct from the neo-liberal and managerial discourses of the 
INoos, I argued that this resistance represented a post-colonial cosmopolitan discursive 
resource. Non-INGO WNT A participants adopted a subjecthood which sought to 
transcend the status of silenced and victimised 'other' and project a cosmopolitan other-
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regardingness which drew on particularistic historical discursive resources to re-translate 
core GCAP initiatives and framing concepts, such as 'accountability'. In this way 
WNT A's re-translations, informed by a particularistic colonial and post-colonial 
experience, fused with more colonially informed discourses to produce new meanings 
and understandings. Importantly, in turning to the core question of this chapter (Which 
processes of exclusion and inclusion constitute alter-globalisation networks?), it was 
apparent through the account of the GCAP Secretariat and GCAP's legal registration, that 
this post-colonial cosmopolitanism was itself unstable and unfixed, especially in fusion 
with other forms of West em, Liberal and colonial cosmopolitanism. 
In this way, then, the processes of exclusion and inclusion which constitute GCAP can all 
be understood to be cosmopolitan. This is because all of these processes, and the 
discourses discussed in this chapter which constitute them, are deployed to speak and act 
for a greater global community. As this is the case, understanding GCAP, or aher-
globalisation networks more broadly, as cosmopolitan is not analytically useful for 
understanding the inclusions and exclusion of such networks. Cosrmpolitanism as 
understood here is not a transcendental universal posed against particuIaristic 
fundamentalisms or hegemonic structural violence, but itself comes from somewhere, and 
can take on several contradictory features, as iIIustrated here. It is not necessarily the case 
that the WNTA campaign's post-colonial cosmopolitanism is flatter, more anti-
hierarchical or emancipatory than the Liberal colonial cosmopolitanism of the INoos, 
nor that it prefigures a situation where poles of oppression/emancipation will be 
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transcended (in Laclau's sense - see 1995). However, simply by being deployed, 
WNTA's cosmopolitanism illuminates the particularity and multiplicity of 
cosmopolitanism(s) enacted in GCAP. Once understood as such it becomes clear that 
aiter-globalisation networks are not inclusionary because they are cosmopolitan, but that 
they may in fact incubate several forms of fusing, resisting and reinforcing 
cosmopolitanisms, each replete with their own inclusions and exclusions. In GCAP's 
case, there are certainly many exclusions which constitute it, but it has also opened up 
space for different cosmopolitanisms to interact with each other, producing (partial yet 






In the previous chapter I recalled a story about a research participant who, when asked 
what GCAP was, spent several minutes flicking through her diary in order to tell me that 
it was 17th October, Stand Up Against Poverty. This was interesting for what it meant that 
GCAP was not for this participant. It was not "the world's largest civiJ societyaJliance 
fighting against poverty and inequality" (GCAPa). It was not a campaign, a network, a 
coalition or a social movement. It was merely a one-day mobilisation written in a diary. 
This incident focussed my mind on something that had been bothering me throughout the 
conversations I had been having with some of the NCSTM participants in Malawi. In 
several cases, I couldn't be sure whether they had actually heard ofGCAP. It wasn't that 
they dido't talk about GCAP, but rather that when they did they seemed to talk about it in 
very broad and general terms. I was wondering what influence my ethics-committee 
necessitated information sheet was having on the participants; whether by referring to 
GCAP (see Appendix Three), it was acting as some kind of 'mediator' (Latour, 2(05) and 
rendering some of the GCAP Malawi participants as intermediaries through which its 
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knowledge flowed. In other words, if they had not seen the information sheet, would they 
have mentioned GeAP at all? 
I will be exploring this issue in greater detail further on in this chapter, but I introduce it 
here to contextualise the broader theme tackled in this chapter, where I will seek to 
address the following question: 
Where are alter-globalisat;on networks located? 
I wish to unpick this question slightly in the context of GCAP. Clearly, GeAP is 
somewhere. It has a secretariat, recently moved to the Netherlands, where GCAP as an 
entity is now formally registered. However, this chapter will seek to address the ways in 
which these fi1cts are relevant for those whom GeAP claims to speak on behalf of and 
involve. In a dimensional sense, where 'the global' converges and dissolves with other 
scales, and is thus only partly constitutive of everyday ontologies and discursive 
repertoires, can GeAP be said to be located beyond the imaginations and constructions of 
a few seconded (and relatively well-paid) INoo employees who work for or participate 
in GeAP's global bodies and who author its repons? Indeed, can the 'convergence 
spaces' (Routledge, 2003a) of different temporalities and trajectories I encountered in the 
places where this research was conducted be understood as being imbued with the global 
dimension which GCAP might normally be taken to represent? 
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These questions relate back to issues discussed in the last two chapters, which is why this 
discussion has been left to last. Can GCAP be located, for example, in Malawl where 
poverty eradication discourses contradict GCAP's stated analysis? Or in India, can GCAP 
be said to be anything other than an external irritant, given the WNT A's struggles to open 
its own space with regards to Stand Up against Poverty and bidding to host the GCAP 
secretariat? 
This chapter will seek to locate GCAP from several perspectives. It will begin by 
exploring the manner in which GCAP is constructed, through its core evaluation and 
strategic documents and declarations, as a grassroots network, implying that GCAP can 
be located in specific 'local' sites. This will be shown to be imagined and therefore 
always partial and incomplete, in the sense that, as shown in the previous chapter, GCAP 
seeks to site itself in its constituent national coalitions, and is imagined as doing so 
unobtrusively, even though the evidence suggests that this is an uneven and contested 
process. 
The chapter will then continue to explore the manner in which GCAP constructs a 
reciprocal relationship with its constitutive coalitions and sites by summoning them into a 
picture of what GCAP is. GCAP therefore is sited in its nodes, and in return these nodes 
are constructed as being part ofGCAP. GCAP is therefore constructed in such a way that 
it enrols its nodal localities regardless of their willingness to be enrolled in this way. In 
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this construction, therefore, GCAP is located in the locaL and in turn the local is located 
in the global, i.e. the local is constructed to provide GCAP its global legitimacy. 
Finally, the chapter will assess the degree to which these constructions are affirmed or 
contested by the actors and ontologies these constructions of GCAP seek to enrol It will 
explore the way that GCAP does indeed act and add a degree of global dimensionality to 
the convergence spaces where this research was conducted, but also how GCAP is 
simultaneously silent or even absent from some of these sites, thus questioning its 
legitimacy and representivity. It will be argued that these silences and absences are a 
result of the other agencies with which GCAP co-exists in its convergence spaces. It 
means that GCAP is an immanent and never finalised network. 
7.2 Constructin& OCAP at the grassroots 
In Chapter Five I illustrated the ways in which GeAP's main policy statements and 
strategic documents created distinctions between the diffuse statist networks on the one 
band, and 'the poor', 'the people' or 'citizens' on the other band. GCAP's role in this 
regard was to speak to and monitor the former on the behalf of the latter. This suggests 
that GCAP is based on a representative model. In this section though, I will explore how, 
through these same texts GCAP is constructed as a network which is not simply 
representative, and not therefore located separately from that which it represents. Instead, 
I will argue that subjects are created in these documents in which GCAP is explicitly 
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located. These subjects are ordinary, everyday, marginalised and non-marginalised 
people. They are 'the poor', 'the people' and 'citizens' referenced above, and their 
particular subjectification allows GCAP to claim a degree of authenticity and legitimacy 
in not just speaking for them, but speaking with them. 
The processes of constructing GCAP as representative of and implicated in a world 
citizenry are not mutually exclusive, and develop concurrently in OCAP's core 
documents. As related in Chapter Five, there are several instances where GCAP has 
posited itself as a representative network. In the declaration made following the 2007 
Global Assembly, for example, it is stated that GCAP is "committed to democratizing the 
values, mechanisms and processes of negotiation and decision making in the interest of 
the poorest and marginalized people" (GCAP, 2007a: 2). Additionally, in the same 
declaration, and in the one preceding it, the following statement is made: 
"National coalitions ensure that our activities are designed around the priorities and 
demands that are closest to the people [andJ enCOW1lge and provide space for other civil 
society sectors, grassroots organizations and local groups - particularly women, children 
and youth and marginalized groups - to play larger roles in the campaign." (GCAP, 2006: S; 
GCJlP, 2007a: 8-9) 
GCAP is thus not only constructed and located as being autonomously representative, 
working "in the interest o/the poorest ... " (GCAP, 2007a: 2 - italics added), but it is also 
located in the subjects it seeks to work on behalf of - women, children, youth, 
marginalised groups - in order to articulate their priorities and demands. This lends 
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GCAP's proclamations a degree of legitimacy they could not claim if GCAP was simply 
constructed as a network working in the autonomously defined interests of these groups. 
Other documents perform this construction and location ofGCAP in a similar manner. A 
strategic report claims that, "The Global Call to Action against Poverty embraces a 
growing number of civil society actors and people in both the South and North" (GCAP, 
2008c: 6). A report from meetings of the International Facilitation Group (pre-cursor to 
the Global Council) constructs GCAP as " ... reaching mass peoples" with ownership of 
the campaign being ..... devolved to the grassroots movements" (GCAP, 2005: 7). The 
report also claims that, "There are over ISO million people supporting GCAP currently 
and a known distribution of 50 million white bands around the world" (ibid: 6). The 
report does not offer a way of verifying this level of support, but the claim once again 
locates GCAP as a known and participated-in entity in particular sites and spaces of 
convergence across the world. 
In Chapter Five I illustrated the way in which GCAP mobilisations are in some instances 
co-opted, and how there is uncertainty amongst core GCAP activists as to the degree that 
mobilisation participants are aware of what they are 'standing up' for; the same might be 
said of the white wristband. Does the distribution of 50 million white wristbands mean 
that GCAP can be located quite literally in the minds and on the wrists of SO million 
people? This research has not been designed to explicitly address such a question. 
although this chapter will seek to problematise such an assumption, and the role this kind 
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of assumption plays in constructing GCAP as a network sited in a muhiplicity of 
authentic and legitimising localities. 
In Chapter Six I explored the manner in which GCAP positioned its constituent national 
coalitions as exclusively national entities, thus empowering them in matters of national 
concern, beyond the prescriptions of any globally agreed policy position, but 
simuhaneously disempowering them when it came to national coalitions being able to 
direct global processes. In appearing to empower the national coalitions though, GCAP's 
core documents construct them with the same function of authenticity and legitimacy as 
'the people' and 'the masses'. So for example, a strategic report claims that "National 
activities ... are home grown, but by sharing experiences these activities 'travel'" (GCAP, 
2oo8c: 7). Whilst this may well be the case, it again constructs GCAP as a network 
constituted by specific sites, therefore locating GCAP in those sites. 
Because GCAP locates itself in the national coalitions and the general populace, it can 
lay claim to the achievements of these actors. For example, amongst many other things, 
GCAP is claimed to have contributed to increased levels of spending on health and 
education in India (GCAP, 2oo8c: 6). This presumably refers to the '9 is Mine' 
campaign, which was mentioned in Chapter Six. The '9 is Mine' campaign sought to 
lobby the government of India to allocate 9l'1c! of the national budget to health and 
education (they eventually committed to 8% - EthInt2). Many WNTA participants 
referred to this as a great success of their campaign, but none of them ever mentioned 
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GCAP in reference to it. Such was the evident 'WNTA-ness' of the campaign that it 
never struck me to explore GCAP's involvement with it, for to do so would have been to 
introduce GCAP as an actor where it simply was not acting. Of course to describe any of 
WNTA's activities as purely WNTA-ish, or even Indian, would be to subscribe to a 
notion of space which is bounded and impenetrable. Nonetheless, GCAP's enrolment of 
'9 is Mine' appeared problematic when compared to the manner in which WNTA 
participants talked about the campaign. I will explore the significance of the way WNT A 
participants talked about GCAP in section 7.3.3, but for now it is important to note how 
GCAP being constructed as a network located in its nodal sites allows it to claim the 
successes of those sites and subjecttty them as being part ofGCAP. 
In this section I have explored the ways in which GCAP is constructed in such a way as 
to implicate it in and enrol groups of the general population at large as well as national 
coalitions and their activities. This allows GCAP to situate itself in what it can claim is an 
authentically constituted form of representation and legitimation. It also constructs GCAP 
in such a way as to claim credit for successes achieved by national coalitions. In the 
following section I will consider the manner in which GCAP acts in the network it is 
constructed through, in an attempt to illustrate the degree to which GCAP can be 
considered to be located beyond the imaginations of the contributors to GCAP's core 
documents and texts. 
7.3 GCAP Acting ... 
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It is not my intention in this chapter to claim that GCAP cannot be found in the network 
which is constructed through its core documents and texts. After all, it was only after a 
preliminary analysis ofthese texts that I was able to identify what I have been referring to 
as GCAP's constituent national coalitions, in particular those in India and Malawi. The 
significance of this beyond what it says about the imaginations of GCAP's core authors 
and narrators remains nonetheless debatable. Assessing the degree to which GCAP is a 
known entity with, and can thus be said to be located amongst, the most marginalised 
groups or the general population at large was beyond the purview of this research. 
Therefore, the following sub-sections will explore the ways in which GCAP is ta1ked 
about and registered by the supposed nodes of the GCAP network (i.e. the national 
coalitions). This will be taken to be indicative of where GCAP can be located, and the 
degree to which GeAP contributes to the construction of the spaces in which these nodes 
operate. 
7.3.1 GCAPActing .. , (EVidently) 
In this sub-section then I will be addressing the degree to which it is evident that GeAP 
does in fact act in the network that has been constructed by it 64. A GeAP evaluation 
document makes severa) claims which suggest that GCAP can be located within its 
64 It is worth noting at this point that the coalitioo data for this sectioo is drawn almost entirely from 
the WNT A. The reasons for this will become clear in the section to follow this one. 
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constituent national coalitions, and which are confirmed by the comments of WNT A 
participants I spoke to. So for instance, the GeAP evaluation suggests that GeAP has 
connected " ... constituencies across the globe to address issues of poverty and inequality" 
(GCAP, 200Sc: i). As I illustrated in Chapter Six, this has certainly been the case with 
Datit groups in India who have connected their cause to other network nodes focusing on 
the broader relationship between poverty and social exclusion. As one participant told 
me: 
"So I guess our voice bas been taken ... across the globe ... now we are able to influence a 
larger number of the organisations, Indian organisatioos, INooS, and we can really bave a 
dialogue with them ... so I guess our voice bas amplified ... Otherwise we bad been talking to 
the Dalit organisations" (Interview 3) 
This response points to the possibility that GeAP has contributed to the construction of 
spaces where the dissolution of scalar boundaries has taken place, in this case dissolving 
the boundaries between localised Datit struggles (" ... Otherwise we had been taJking to 
ourselves") and broader, supra-sited social struggles. This is related to a further claim 
made in the GeAP evaluation report, which goes on to say that: 
''One of the key achievements of GCAP has been to get organisatioos, constituencies and 
people working together wbo badn't done so before. GCAP has managed to forge an 
alliance that brings together a broad range of organisatioos and constituencies who would 
not nmnally engage with each other in advocating against poverty and injustice" (GCAP, 
2ooSe: ii) 
Again, this claim is supported by the comments of a WNT A participant, who told me 
that: 
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..... the kind of spread that we have of the coalition, it is because of GCAP. It is extremely 
difficult in this country to see Oxfam, Actionaid, Christian Aid, all sitting together, also the 
UN sitting together, so it's a huge benefit we have, and then they bring their partners with 
us, all these coming together, you have the trade unions. Now we are able to talk to the 
informal trade unims because of our links globally, so the coalition space that GCAP has 
created globally is something we are using, and that's of huge benefit, a huge, huge benefit 
I think ... So the possibility of building alliances is enormous because ofGCAP, and which 
unfortunately, is extremely difficult if you try and do that linking up locally." (Interview 1) 
This comment is reminiscent of the "localised global actions" which Routledge argues 
takes place in convergence spaces (2003a: 346). WNT A is able to engage with informal 
trade unions because the global is brought into Indian localities tbrough the links both 
WNT A and the trade unions have to other supra-site struggles and campaigns. Whilst 
GCAP was not expressly referenced65, this sentiment (of GCAP opening up previously 
closed spaces of convergence) was also expressed by an NCSTM participant: 
" ... you know when you have an isolated voice, for example if gender is talking on its own, 
you discover that gender becomes a cross cutting issue. If you have no support from the 
education sector, you have no support from the agriculture sector; at times you tend to be 
narrow minded. But if you are in a taskforce ... because if we are just talking as isolated 
voices it will not be easy to advocate and ensure these targets are achieved." (Interview 18) 
Finally, the GCAP evaluation claims that: 
''OCAP's work has genuinely contributed to broadening the debate and actims around 
poverty in the localities where GCAP has worked. Thus ensuring that issues of poverty and 
injustice remain visible and on the agenda of decision makers and amongst a broad range of 
publics across the globe." (GeAP, 2oo8c: S) 
The possible reasons for this will be explored in the next sub-section 
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This is a bold claim. asserting as it does a concrete presence in the spaces in which the 
national coalitions operate. As I argued in Chapter Five, this is somewhat problematised 
by the ordering presence of the MOGs in the NCSTM. Just as this claim is difficult to 
cOll1'letely verify, it is similarly difficult to completely dismiss. For example, it is 
apparent that the WNT A coalition shares the belief that GCAP has contributed to opening 
up debates on poverty in India, if not in the sense that GeAP exists beyond their 
enrobnent of it, then at least in certain instrumental respects: 
" ... the GCAP activities around the UN Climate Change Conference cwld serve as an 
opJl(Xtunity for us to orient ourselves and our partners on how we want to build our position 
on Climate Change in relation to Poverty & Social Exclusioo" (WNT A CSG, 2007a) 
It seeIm evident therefore that GCAP does act in certain important respects. It connects 
otherwise isolated voices; it brings actors together who otherwise would fmd it bard to 
work together; and it enables national coalitions to enrol transcendental discourses in an 
attempt to force policy changes from their governments. GeAP therefore can be found 
within the subjects that are constructed for it in its core strategic and policy documents, 
and can be said to contribute to the construction of the convergence spaces which are 
created at GeAP's nodal points. As I will now illustrate, this is a deeply uneven and 
contradictory process. Even in the WNT A coalition, where the data for this sub-section 
bas mostly been drawn, GCAP is more of an irritant-actor than constructive-actor, and 
rather than enrolling the WNT A, is enrolled itself but only selectively and instrumentally. 
Alternatively, in the NCTSM coalition, GCAP is barely detectable, the space being 
constructed by other powerful actors such as the MOOs. This will be explored in the next 
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sub-section Before I move on though, I want to consider something that a member of the 
GCAP global secretariat told me, which perhaps goes some way to explaining this 
unevenness: 
" ... the name was kind of intentionally shit; it's not supposed to be a name that everyone 
knows about, because what we didn't want was a global campaign ... that was going to take 
away power from the national coalitions. So where you've already got the Wada Na Todo 
Abbiyan they shouldn't change their name to GeAP India, (X" Make Poverty History India, 
it's the Wada Na Todo Abbiyan, part of the Global Call to Action against Poverty." 
(Interview 12) 
This statement is interesting in that is constructs GCAP as being simultaneously present 
and absent. In being present, GCAP is an actor which emols national coalitions into its 
construction ofwhat it is and what it has achieved, but in being absent. as we are about to 
see, GCAP is made silent by other more powerful actors and discourses. such as those 
explored in the previous two chapters. 
7.3.2 GCAP Acting '" (Absently) 
I want to return now to the NCSTM participant I mentioned at the beginning of this 
chapter; the one who when asked what GCAP was, responded by spending several 
minutes (I even switched off my Dictaphone at this point) flicking through her diary until 
she remembered to go to October 17th so she could tell me that GeAP was Stand Up 
against Poverty. 
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As I said in my introduction to this chapter, this encounter was a prime example of what I 
bad been feeling throughout my conversations with NCSTM participants up to that point 
but could not quite put my fmger on. At first, I turned my attention to the participants 
themselves: why were they not more aware of GeAP? They were, after al~ involved in a 
GCAP network. Were they simply ignorant of what they were involved in? 
But then I realised that it was GeAP that was trying to act in this network, and that if 
NCSTM participants were not articulating themselves with GCAP's translation of the 
network, then this was maybe something more to do with GCAP, rather than the NCSTM 
participants. I therefore shifted focus, and asked in what ways was GCAP not acting in 
the NCSTM, and why? 
There were several examples of GCAP not acting in the NCSTM during my time in 
Malawi. These shifted between a complete absence, to a presence, although one that was 
co~letely extema~ distant even. The following interview excerpts illustrate how GeAP 
was almost entirely absent from NCSTM participants' imaginations of what they were 
involved in66: 
CG: What is GCAP? 
NCSTM Participant: GCAP? (CG: yeh) GCAP is ... what is GCAP? 
CG: }fa ha hal That's a great answer. 
66 I have retained the pauses in these excerpts as I believe they are illustrative of the Wlcertainty and 
absence I am illustrating here 
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NCSTM Participant: Mmmm ...... of course I know what is GCAP, but I cannot 
say ... um ... as a workers organisatioo we are fully involved in the GCAP, maybe ab ... ab .. J 
cannot tell you much about this GCAP 
co: I guess it's more like if someooe said, someone came into your office and they said 
I've beard about this thing, I went to the Stand up Against Poverty, I've beard about this 
thing called GCAP, what does it do? What is it? Does it do anything in Malawi? 
NCSTM Participant: Yell of course they are doing a lot, of course they are doing a lot, and 
the, sure they are doing a tremendous job, they are doing it right, they are doing it with 
the ... um ... the community, at the village level...they are doing a lot at the village level at 
the community level, trying to empower the women, also trying to help the government in 
how they can combat the poverty levels and how you can reduce the poverty levels with the 
community and they do it at the, with the chief: mostly they do it in the villages. 
co; And sorry, who is it you are talking about? Who is 'they'? Who's doing that? 
NCSTM Participant: At the community level? (CO yeh) They do it with the chiefs 
co: But who's doing that? 
NCSTM Participant: The CONGOMA. (CG ab ok.) CONGOMA, yeb CONGOMA, it's 
CONGOMA who does it, CONGOMA who champions it, CONGOMA. 
(Interview 25) 
The Council for Non-Governmental Organisations in Malawi (CONGOMA) is the 
organisation which hosts the NCSTM secretariat. It was established by the government of 
Malawi to register all NGOs in the country. By equating GCAP with CONGOMA this 
participant revealed two important points. Firstly, that GCAP, for her, bas no presence in 
the NCSTM beyond the actions ofNCSTM coalition members. In this way then GCAP is 
absent in form. Secondly, even though GCAP is thought to be synonymous with the 
actions of other NCSTM coalition members, it seems clear that this is the result not of 
strategic positioning on the behalf of GCAP, but of GCAP's absence from the NCSTM. 
In other words GCAP for this participant became a signifier through which she could talk 
about the actions of the NCSTM broadly and CONGOMA specifically, actions which in 
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no way represent how GeAP constructs its own agency. GeAP does not claim to work in 
villages and with community chiefs. GCAP claims to organise mass mobilisations and 
lobby the international institutions of global governance67• By this participant's rendition 
then, GCAP is absent from the NCSTM and the spaces in which it operates in both form 
and content. 
This next excerpt from a different interview possibly illustrates the degree to which my 
information sheet introduced GCAP into the imagination of this NCSTM participant, 
onc:e again supporting the contention that GCAP was entirely absent from the NCSTM: 
co: If I said what is GCAP, then what would you say? 
NCSTM Participant: Ha ha hal 
co: And a few people have done that, a few people have laughed! 
NCSTM Participant: Ha hal I think .... a Global ...... . 
co: A Olobal Call to Actioo against Poverty? 
NCSTM Participant: Yuh, against, against er ... [looks down at information sheet] 
CG:Ydl 
(Interview 22) 
Both of these responses illustrate the degree to which GCAP has failed to permeate into 
the NCSTM network. It means that if one were to look for GCAP in the NCSTM, one 
" In' . d . Its core documents GCAP articulates its aims as being to stage ..... massive an strategic 
paaoots mobilizations" (GCAP, 2oo8c: 23). 
321 
would rarely fmd it. Even those participants who had participated in some of GCAP's 
other nodal points beyond the NCSTM, such as INoo participants, did not construct 
GCAP as an actor in the NCSTM. Rather than being completely absent from their 
descriptions however, in these cases GCAP was external acting somewhere else, 
somewhere distant, but not in the NCSTM. One such participant commented: 
"But in terms of knowing where actually is the GeAP secretariat, and how it is raising 
money, and eh, how it is implementing its programme, I don', have bigger details of that 
(CO bmm) but the one big event is the Stand Up event which is coordinated whether from 
the UK, or the US .. .1 think mainly from the UK, so that's the little that J know" (Interview 
14) 
In this construction GCAP is not above but beyond. In other words, the NCSTM and 
GCAP are not in some kind of hierarchical relationship; GCAP is simply somewhere 
else, somewhere distant. It touches down in the NCSTM once a year through the Stand 
Up against Poverty mobilisation, but nothing more. This chimes with another NCSTM 
Participant who told me that aU she knew of GCAP was when some people came to 
Malawi for the Stand Up against Poverty mobilisation. She could not tell me who they 
were, or where they were from, simply that they had something to do with GCAP. Of 
course this lack of hierarchy and diffuse and uncertain attribution is not simply a failure 
of GCAP to enrol the NCSTM into its problematisation of the network, but says 
something about GCAP itself. As the member of the GCAP global secretariat quoted on 
page 306 said, the intention has not been to impose GCAP on national coalitions. 
Furthermore, GCAP's taskforces and evaluation groups are mostly composed of 
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volunteers from constituent network organisations, or even from beyond the formal 
membership of the network (such as in my case and my membership of the Learning and 
Accountability Group). If people 'from GCAP' visited Malawi, it may well be the case 
that they were actually not from GCAP at all in a formal sense, and thus any confusion or 
uncertainty about who they were and their role is perhaps understandable. 
It nonetheless seems the case that GCAP is at most a distant externality to the NCSTM, 
and even entirely absent for some NCSTM participants. This means that one can not 
automatically locate GCAP in the spaces which it claims constitute it. With regards to the 
discussion around global dimensionality in Chapter Three, this means that the way the 
NCSTM is experienced by its participants is lacking the global dimension which GCAP 
affects to bring, and which it was shown to enact for some participants of the WNT A 
coalition. This is not to say that global dimensionality does not circulate and act in the 
NCSTM network. As I illustrated in the previous two chapters, the MDGs, and neo-
liberal managerialistic discourses, are both significant actors in the NCSTM. It appears 
that in the convergence space which the NCSTM occupies then, GCAP is simply not 
strong enough to compete with these other discursive actors and thus is not able to 
establish itself as a place-specific actor. 
A participant in the WNT A reinforced this point, when she told me the following: 
"So, how does Global Call against Poverty impact on the partner in Orissa, unless that 
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linkage is very tangibly established ... how do you get a partner working in Orissa, who's 
main concern is hWlger, and how do you get them to be a stakeholder, so .. .it's not very 
evident. I don't know." (Interview 9) 
This participant was very aware of and active in GCAP; for example, she was a member 
of the Learning and Accountability Group of which I was also a member. However, her 
COmment about the partner in Orissa (a state with one of India's highest poverty levels) 
highlighted the degree to which GCAP has to battle not just those actors we might 
traditionally think of as 'actors' in the sense of defining poverty eradication (i.e. the 
institutions of global governance), but also everyday experiences of hunger or 
homelessness. GCAP claims to be constituted in part through the IOOst marginalised, but 
this participant's comment brought to mind Jones' (2005) assertion that for those living 
in the most poverty, in the most desperation. ideas and concepts like global networks and 
campaigns are utterly meaningless. Hunger, disease, and hornelessness are filr more 
powerful actors ordering the networked realities of these peoples' lives, in patterning 
their constructions of and engagements with the world. This reveals the manner in which 
convergence spaces, however constituted, are always in the process ofbeing made, as are 
the actors and discourses which constitute them. In other words, it is not the case that 
GCAP cannot penetrate the NCSTM, merely that thus far it largely has not. 
In this sub-section I have i1lustrated the difficulty I encountered in 'fmding GCAP' in the 
NCSTM. Rather than seeking explanations in the actions or knowledge of the NCSTM 
participants, I realised that I was encountering this difficulty simply because GCAP was 
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not there. It was quite literally, nowhere to be found. Where GeAP was acknowledged it 
was as fur away, distant, and un-locatable. This challenged the construction of GeAP in 
its core policy and strategic documents as being constituted through the national 
coalitions, and further comments from WNT A participants challenged the assertion that 
GCAP was also constituted through the actions and consciousness of the most 
marginalised. In the next section I will explore further the ways in which WNTA 
Participants constructed their understandings ofGCAP. I will argue that just as GCAP is 
largely absent from the NCSTM, in the WNT A, GCAP is present, but stilJ distant, and in 
many ways unwelcome. 
7.3.3 GCAP Acting ... (Uninvited) 
As I have recounted in previous Chapters, many WNT A participants are involved in 
GCAP governance and evaluation processes and bodies. The WNT A convenor is a 
member of the GCAP Global Council, and two other WNT A participants are members of 
the Learning and Accountability Group of which I am also a member. Another WNTA 
participant convenes the GCAP social exclusion taskforce, and the secretariat coordinator 
has recently left this role to become the new GCAP Global Secretariat campaigns 
coordinator. Clearly then, the WNTA is very present in GCAP. One might expect 
therefore, to find GCAP very present in the WNT A. 
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Rather, and perhaps symptomatic ofthe tensions recorded between WNTA and GCAP in 
the previous chapter, several WNT A participants, including those involved in GCAP's 
governing and evaluation bodies, expressed a mixture of uncertainty and mild disdain 
towards GCAP's role in the WNT A. This was laid out in quite official terms in the 
minutes of a WNT A steering group meeting: 
"x reminded the group that we need to be clear about the independence of the WNT A, 
which is not seen as an India G-CAP campaign" (WNT A CCG, 2006) 
It is clear that such a position may also be strategic, and does not necessarily contradict 
the construction of GCAP as being located in and articulated through its national 
coalitions. For example, one member of the Global Secretariat told me that: 
"[GCAP} should be diverse, it should be really diverse, every c08litioo should have 
representatives, or represent, trade unions, faith groups, um, traditional civil society 
act~vists, ab, student groups, wOIllen's groups, its really important, and, it should be a body 
which doesn't dictate what national coalitioos do" (lnteaview 12) 
In this way then GCAP's relationship with the national coalitions might be imagined as 
being one-way. In other words, national coalitions may not identify with GCAP, but 
GCAP will identify with the national coalitions. At the Learning and Accountability 
Group (LAG) which I participated in though, it seemed that this kind of enrolment was 
not sufficient to maintain GCAP as a cohesive alter-globaJisation network. Indeed, one of 
the core reasons for the formation of the LAG was to develop systems which would draw 
all ofGCAP's constituent parts together in processes of mutual accountability. 
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It became apparent though that for those working in some of the national coalitions, 
GCAP seemed not just absent, but irrelevant. This was clear from a discussion at the 
LAG during which it was revealed that members of national coalitions attending the 
World Social Forum did not feel comfortable or willing to speak on behalf of GeAP. 
Rather, they were speaking on behalf of their own organisations and constituencies. The 
GCAP co-chair present at the LAG expressed great surprise and shock at this. The way 
the discussion then developed signified the distinction between GeAP being absent in the 
NCSTM, and irrelevant in the WNT A The GeAP co-chair imagined that the issue at 
stake here was one of ownership. My notes record her asking: "How do we get some of 
that bottom-up ownership?" (LAG Fieldnotes). And indeed, with the NCSTM, more 
involvement in GCAP's processes might well engender greater degrees of knowledge and 
ownership of GeAP. However, many of those unwilling to express what GeAP was at 
the WSF, and many of those unwilling to articulate GeAP as part of their own activities 
in the WNTA. are already involved in GeAP's governance and evaluation processes and 
bodies. This suggests then that the issue here is not one of ownership, of GeAP and its 
national coalitions being absent from each other, in need of more connectivity, but is 
instead an issue of relevance. It is an issue of mattering. In shon, GCAP, in many 
important respects, just doesn't seem to matter. 
This seemed especially evident in the WNT A, and shed further light on the distinction 
made by the campaign between being seen as 'GCAP India' and WNT A One passage 
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from the email discussion amongst the WNT A steering group members regarding hosting 
the GCAP Secretariat (discussed in the previous chapter) was particularly revealing in 
this regard. The passage is written by the WNT A coalition convener, and relates to the 
degree to which initial discussions about hosting the secretariat tailed off (they picked up 
again shonly after this email): 
"I was surprised that the discussion died so quickly. An abrupt end to discussions OD such a 
major issue made me ask several questions. For instance, is our linkage with GeAP organic 
or artificial, how does the GeAP benefit the campaign, why do we put in so many energies 
in GeAP (I am a member of GeAP International Facilitation Team, x is the Convenor of 
South Asia GeAP, x gives time to Asia Facilitation Team, x, without any formal role has 
been giving a lot of time to supporting the South Asian and Asian secretariat, particularly 
around mobilization and work on maternal mortality, etc.), what is our learning from the 
larger campaign, are we being able to influence the larger (at least civil society) discourse 
on poverty from the southern perspective?" (WNTA, 2007d) 
This passage raises the issue of GCAP's relevance quite explicitly. Despite the 
involvement of several WNTA participants in GCAP's governance and other processes. 
the passage queries the relevance ofGCAP to WNTA's activities. The passage questions 
both directions of the relationship. that between GCAP and WNTA (u ... what is our 
learning from the larger campaign?") and the relationship between WNT A and GeAP 
(" ... are we able to influence the larger (at least civil society) discourse on poverty ... ?"). 
The words "at least civil society" suggests the composer of this passage is talking 
explicitly about GCAP, or GeAP's other constituent nodes, rather than the discourses 
which circulate through statist and hegemonic networks more broadly. If the former 
statement questions the relevance of GCAP to WNT A, then this latter statement 
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questions the degree to which GCAP is located in, and thus articulatory ot: its' 
SUPPOsedly constituent nodes. 
The degree to which GCAP is articulated as Jargely irrelevant by members of the WNTA 
steering group, including those involved in GCAP's governance structures, is quite 
widespread. A LAG colleague, who is also a WNTA steering group member, told me 
that: 
"GCAP is not Wada Na Todo. GCAP, of course at one level we can say this is Indian 
coalition ofGCAP. but we really look at it as a local approach, and Wada Na Todo has a lot 
of functions in its work, at the national level, and India's just very big, and the issues here 
are just so much so, sometimes, so it really doesn't, it's not in the day-to-day that we are 
actually concerned .. .its not something that crosses the mind, the day to day functioning of 
Wada Na Todo" (Interview 9) 
Other WNT A participants reported tbat: 
"coalitions here, organisations here are not here because of GCAP. Organisations that have 
built Wad Na Todo are older and wi)) be here longer than GCAP, or may not stay for 
different reasons, so our existence is not because of GCAP" (Interview 2) 
"I'm more interested in national, and state and district level. So from that perspective, I 
would say ... you know, the role of GCAP, and the relevance of GCAP needs to be viewed 
from that perspective." (Interview 10) 
These articulations of GCAP construct it as something which is present, but which is 
largely irrelevant to the spaces which WNT A occupies and in which it converges with 
other actors and scalar dimensions. GCAP in these renditions even seems intrusive. The 
degree to which we can 'fmd' GCAP in the WNTA therefore is highly constrained by the 
ways in which WNTA participants discursively de-construct GCAP as a globaUy 
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networked initiative. As is clear from these statements, WNT A participants clearly 
conceive of the WNT A as an Indian initiative. This is not to say that WNTA participants 
view India, or the Indian experience, as pure, essentialised and national. This should be 
apparent from Chapter Six, where WNT A sought unsuccessfully to host the GCAP 
Secretariat in the belief that their experiences were part of a broader struggle which 
articulates itself and is responded to in India, but is also part of broader networked issues 
of inequality and discrimination which require responses beyond any particular nation-
state. This is why WNTA participants involve themselves in GCAP's processes and 
structures beyond India. and underpinned several participants' belief (discussed in 
Chapter Six) that GCAP required 'Southern' leadership. Nevertheless, WNT A 
participants clearly question the value and relevance of what they construct as an external 
actor seeking to enrol them into actions (such as the Stand Up mobilisations, discussed in 
Chapter Five) which are not particularly relevant in the (globalised) Indian context. 
Unlike in the NCSTM then, where GCAP was not present, in the WNT A GCAP Is 
present. just slightly unwelcome. 
7.4 Chapter Conclusion 
This chapter began by highlighting the manner in which GCAP discursively constructs 
itself as a network constituted by its national coalitions, and population groups of the 
most marginalised. It has illustrated the ways in which GCAP claims authenticity and 
legitimacy from such a construction, and how this enables it to claim a convergence with 
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the successes of distinctly national coalition-based initiatives and achievements. In these 
ways then. GCAP was shown to locate itself in its constituent nodes and the convergence 
spaces/converging actors that exist there, including constituencies of the marginalised. 
Indeed, it was shown how in some instances, particularly with regards to the kinds of 
spaces and connections GCAP helps to construct, GCAP is present in, and enables the 
coDStruction of these nodes. Without GCAP, some participants claimed, the broad 
coalitions that constitute the WNT A and NCSTM may not have come into being. 
The chapter continued to greatly problematise the degree to which it could be said that 
GCAP is present in its nodes beyond the momentum it has given them to construct 
themselves. This was in turn shown to disrupt GCAP's construction of itself as being 
constituted by its nodes. In the NCSTM, GCAP was shown to be largely absent from 
participants' imaginations of the network they were involved in. For a number of reasons, 
including the discursive power of the MDGs which were discussed in Chapter Five, 
GCAP was simply not strong enough to assert its presence in the NCSTM. Alternatively, 
in the WNT A, GCAP was acknowledged and present, but mostly constructed as ill-
fitting, and even unwelcome, despite the activism of several WNT A participants in 
GCAP's processes of governance and evaluation. Linked to the reticence of national 
coalition members in other countries to voice representation of GeAP at the World 
Social Forum, it seemed that in many cases for WNT A participants. GCAP just did not 
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matter with regards to issues and processes in India, despite the recognition of the global 
dimensionality which part-constitutes those issues and processes. 
So to return to the question which began this chapter, where are alter-globalisation 
networks - in this case GCAP - located? As has been the case throughout this thesis, the 
answer is not straightforward, and is highly differential. GCAP has a presence beyond the 
imaginations of its core activists and authors of its core texts. At the same time GCAP is 
a discursive network as much as anything else, and in this respect has to do battle with, 
and is penetrated by, other powerful discourses seeking to shape civil society responses to 
poverty eradication, both more radical than it is (post-colonial, social movement 
discourses - see Chapter Six) and less so (statist and hegemonic discourses - see Chapter 
Five). In this sense then aker-globalisation networlcs, and any global dimensionality they 
claim to bring to the convergence spaces in which they and their nodes act, can only be 
located where they are embodied and enacted. Locating GCAP therefore is highly 
dependent on where one is looking, constrained and defmed by spatial arrangements of 
discursive orientations and socia) relations. In the concluding chapter of this thesis, I will 
discuss this, and the conclusions and implications from my other data chapters, in the 
context of alter-globalisation networlcs more broadly. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
Implications and Conclusions 
8,1 Introduction 
This thesis has explored the agencies and powers of a large alter-globalisation network. 
the Global Call to Action against Poverty (GeAP), in an attempt to evaluate the potential 
of such networks to effect socio-economic transformational change. This thesis has also 
explored power. It has explored power directly, in a methodological and epistemological 
sense, but it has also explored issues of power pluralities and potentialities, of power In 
and of Power bas been viewed productively, through networks of unpredictable, 
contradictory and malleable relationships. It has been a partial study; not because I tried 
to capture GCAP and couldn't, but because GeAP is not a single unit of analysis simply 
waiting to be discovered and studied. It is as much a product of the imaginations of those 
who participate in it as it is located in the 115 countries which form its nodal points. 
This concluding chapter will at first recap and summarise the narrative of the thesis, 
before taking this as a departure point to discuss some of the implications and broader 
claims that have arisen from the research. Whilst it bas never been my intention to 
generate universalisable truth claims, I am also aware of the danger of simply stating 'this 
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is what happened'. It is therefore the case that this chapter will address important 
methodological and normative issues that have been produced during the research 
process. Finally, I will illustrate a future research programme which arises out of both the 
general and specific findings of the thesis. 
8.2 Framinf the research 
So many labels could be applied to GCAP: Part of global (Kaldor, 2003), or transnational 
(Bandy and Smith, 2005) or international (Colas, 2(05), civil society; a global justice 
movement (Saunders and Rootes, 2006); a transnational advocacy network or coalition 
(Reck and Sikkink, 1998). This proliferation of labels left me feeling reticent to commit 
to anyone or the other. Key conceptual problems exist with all of them, and were 
discussed in the first three chapters of this thesis. Nonetheless, I had to be able to refer to 
GCAP as something. I therefore sought to develop, in the introduction to this thesis, some 
appropriate language with which to talk about GCAP, and actors like it. I settled on the 
term 'alter-globalisation network'. This was to be distinguished from the alter-
globalisation movement (Gilbert, 2(08), which involves similarly problematical 
assumptions about the actors invoked as some of the other labels mentioned above. The 
term aIter-g)obalisation network was deployed to invoke the widest possible spread of 
possibly contradictory agencies which constitute actors like GCAP. It drew attention to 
the networked and relational construction of such actors, and recognised that being ailer-
globalisation was not the same as being anti or even necessarily radically alternative. 
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Being alter-globalisation allowed for different degrees of normativity and political 
strategy to coexist, and thus the virtue of being alternative did not necessarily frame that 
alterity in radical terms. 
Having settled on some adequate language to refer to GCAP by, the thesis proceeded to 
explore the manner in which alter-globalisation networks had been framed by two key 
schools of thought in the literature on such networks: the liberal cosmopolitans (Chapter 
One) and the radical alter-globalisationists (Chapter Two). In referring to them as schools 
of thought I was being slightly heuristic, although I argued that there were significant 
theoretical and conceptual linkages which made considering these writers in this way 
productive in framing this study. 
8.2.1 Liberal Cosmopolitans 
In Chapter One I argued that there are a group of scholars who have been significant in 
analysing aIter-globalisation networks and who uncritically celebrate such networks as 
being a part of what they term as 'global civil society', I argued that global civil society 
(GCS) is celebrated as representing the pluralisation of power away from the territorial 
state, involving a set of autonomous actors which, whilst perhaps at times contradictory. 
nonetheless incubate an inclination to DOn-violence, deliberation and progressive ideals 
of social justice. These claims, whilst sometimes presented as analytical. and thus 
potentially appropriate for trying to understand the agency and potentials of alter-
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gIobalisation networks, were found to be unduly normative and thus unable to 
cotq>rehend and conceptualise contradictions to their prescriptive content. 
In particular I argued that global civil society theorists displayed two key normative 
problems. The first involved the ideological basis to their claims, which was shown to 
derive from classical and modern liberal ideas, which theorised aker-globalisation 
networks as being rational, autonomous, deliberative, and representative. In this vein, the 
territorial state was held to be of decreasing relevance to politics, which was re-sited to a 
'new' global governance structure which the members of aker-globalisation networks 
held to account. I argued that this ignored the role of statist hegemony in constructing this 
politics, and the continuing and in some cases increasing relevance of some territorialised 
state actors. 
This is therefore what made the theorists I discussed in this chapter liberal. The second 
key normative problem these theorists displayed is what makes them cosmopolitans. I 
argued that these theorists imply claims about the normative visions of aJter-gJobalisation 
networks which assumes a shared COStmpolitan agenda between those who populate 
GCS. This either makes GCS a very small and self-referential community, excluding 
those who may not share this outlook, or means that GCS as an analytical category is 
simply unable to conceive of the wide range ofparticuJaristic experiences of the actors 
who constitute aker-globalisation networks. Additionally, I argued that the liberal 
cosmopolitan project, in establishing itself as a universal project, ignored the 
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fundamental and particularistic structural inequalities which constitute it, and created a 
process of destructive othering which results in the discursive or sometimes physical 
silencing of particular and/or marginalised groups. In understanding alter-globalisation 
networks within a liberal cosmopolitan frame however, such destructive processes are 
rendered invisible. I therefore concluded that GCS represented a normative liberal 
cosmopolitan project which was poorly equipped (in the specifity of its normativity) to 
analyse and describe the relationality, agency and potentials of aker-globalisation 
networks. 
8.2.2 The Radical Alter-Globalisationists 
In Chapter Two I focussed on a second normative school of thought which I termed 
'Radical Alter-Globalisationist'. Unlike the liberal cosmopolitans considered in Chapter 
One, these writers did not share a unique ideological background, but drew on hybridised 
radical structural and post-structural traditions. Thus, what they shared as a group was not 
so much an ideological affmity as a shared sensibility about the prospects and 
characteristics of contemporary alter-globalisation networks. I further argued that despite 
a lack of 'pure' ideological distinctiveness, there were still points of convergence 
between these theorists, particularly around the axis ofhegemony/post-hegemony, which 
I argued influenced the more normative aspects of their thought. 
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In exploring the thought of radical alter-globalisationists I argued that they created two 
sets of binaries which carry both opportunities but also constraints for the degree to 
which radical alter-globalisationist thoUght could be used analytically in the study of 
aher-globalisation networks. With the first of these binaries, concerning oppositionality, I 
argued that a hegemonic/post-hegemonic binary existed. between those who saw the 
possibility of socio-economic transformation in some form of relationship (often a 
contesting one) with statist and neo-liberal hegemonic formations, and those who rejected 
this position and viewed any such relationship as being inherently structured and 
dominated by these formations. This created a dilemma for the study of alter-
globalisation networks ie. whether to judge them by the degree to which they engage 
witbltransform statist and neo-liberal formations, or the degree to which they 
evade/escape these formations, discursively and materially. 
With the second binary, concerning strategy, I argued that there was a distinction 
between those radical alter-globalisationists who advocated the necessity of a strategic 
orientation as an essential pathway to the creation of a universal transformational subject, 
and those who believed that such a subject would be inherently and necessarily 
exclUSionary and dominating. Despite this binary, I also argued that some common 
ground existed between the two sets of thinkers, which allowed for an approach to the 
study of alter-globalisation networks which sought to address both the structural 
dOmination of their own subjectivities (and the way they rework this domination), and 
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simultaneously the ways in which such networks dominate or exclude other forms of 
political subjectivity. 
I therefore argued that these binaries only had limited use for the study of alter-
globalisation networks. This is because, presented as such, radical alter-gJobalisation 
approaches only allowed us to view one or other of its binaries as being authentically 
radical This was particularly the case with regard to the normative positions adopted vis-
a-vis the relationship between alter-globalisation networks and their externalities (i.e. 
statist formations and neo-liberal hegemony). It meant that, for example, it was not 
possible to theorise alter-globalisation networks within a radical alter-globalisationist 
paradigm as operating both within and without statist formations, unless one adopted a 
degree of epistemological flexibility; it was to the development of such a theoretical 
framework that the next chapter addressed itself. 
8.2.3 Grounded and Normative - an Epistemology of Aller-GJoboJisallon Networks 
This chapter was essentially concerned with developing a theoretical thlmewolk for the 
study of alter globalisation networks. It took an empirically directed. yet normative 
approach in the sense that I was simultaneously concerned with getting underneath the 
normativity which had plagued the approaches considered in Chapters One and Two, but 
also wished to retain a sense of concern for transformational social cbaDge which many 
of these writers also exhibited. 
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In setting up this framework I established the theoretical groundwork for investigating 
three areas of relevance and importance which had arisen from my consideration of the 
literature in Chapters One and Two, namely: 
i) Statist and neo-liberal hegemonic power; 
ii) Cosmopolitanism; 
iii) Locating alter-globalisation networks. 
I then proceeded to elaborate theoretical and epistemological approaches to each oCthese 
themes which would underpin my study of GCAP. With regards to the first theme, I 
Proposed that we should understand neither alter-globalisation networks, nor statist 
formations, as fIXed entities, but instead as sets of relations which can both affirm, negate 
and transform the contents of each other. I argued that this approach takes into account 
the complex ways in which alter-globalisation networks may re-subjectivise themselves 
and contingently and perhaps te~rarily transform the seemingly dominant powers of 
statist and hegemonic neo-liberalism. Such an approach would move beyond the 
automatic celebrationism of the Liberal cosmopolitans in their rendition of alter-
globalisation networks as being autonomous and self-directed actors. It would also 
transcend the binary oCthe radical alter-globalisationists with regard to their exclusionary 
definitions of what it means to be oppositional 
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With regards to developing a theoretical approach to understanding the cosmopolitanism 
of alter-globalisation networks, I argued that whilst the cosmopolitanism of the Liberal 
cosmopolitans could be rightly critiqued as constructing relations of neo-imperialism, it 
was in the immanence of this process that we might discover other forms of 
cosmopolitanism which challenged the verticality of historically western 
opel'ationalisations of the concept. I argued that it was therefore necessary to collapse the 
universaJlparticular binary often used to critique cosmopolitanism with, in order to make 
it possible to theorise cosmopolitanism from the periphery, using the writings of post-
colonial theorists to illustrate this. This discussion pointed again to the importance of 
paying attention to the relations which constitute aher-globalisation networks to assess 
the degree to which such non-western cosmopolitanisms are possible, and if they are, to 
what degree they represent more horizontal or equitable modes of enacting solidarity with 
distant others. 
Lastly, I sought to develop an epistemological and theoretical framework for 
understanding how alter-globalisation networks spatiaJised, or in other words, 'where' 
they were. I sought to transcend global-national or global-local binaries in the study of 
aher-globalisation networks, and what this means for their agency. I argued that the 
various approaches to alter-globalisation networks which cite them as trans-national, 
global. nationally bound, or multi-scalar, all in their own ways fix aher-globalisation 
networks at one particular site of existence. In adopting a dimensional approach, I argued 
that seeing aher-globaIisation networks as heterogeneously constituted by and productive 
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of converging dimensions of globaL national and local allowed an understanding to be 
developed of these networks as existing beyond immediate spatial fixity. This would 
have implications for how we understand the powers of such networks to transform statist 
and neo-liberal hegemony. 
8.3 Implications Qfthe research 
Having established an epistemological framework in Chapter Three, I went on to 
elucidate my methodology and research design in Chapter Four, establishing the grounds 
for a relationaL post-govemmentality approach to the study of a set of research questions 
generated through my analysis of the literature in Chapters One, Two and Three. These 
questions were: 
Core Research Question: 
i) What do the powers in alter-globalisation networks reveal about the power of 
them? 
Sub-research Questions: 
ii) In which ways can alter-globalisation networks be understood as oppositional? 
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iii) Which processes of exclusion and inclusion constitute alter-globalisation 
networks? 
iv) Where are alter-globalisation networks? 
The remainder of this concluding chapter will involve explorations of these questions, 
and what light my case study of GCAP can shed on them. This will involve addressing 
the implications of my study of GeAP for both the theory and the practice of alter-
globalisation networks. In seeking to make these linkages therefore I will address the 
questions above in reverse order, beginning with the sub-research questions and finishing 
by addressing my core research question This is because of the manner in which my sub-
research questions build into my core research question 
8.3.1 In which ways can aJter-gJobaJisation networks be understood as oppositional? 
In Chapter Five, where 1 addressed this question in relation to GCAP. I argued that 
GCAP was in part constituted through its relationships with various statist agencies and 
neo-liberal hegemonic discourses. This had certain enclosing effects, particularly in the 
National Civil Society Taskforce on the Millennium Development Goals (NCSTM) 
coalition in Malawi, which was highly discursively and onto logically ordered through its 
relationship with various UN agencies and their embodiment of the MOOs. 
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However, this relationship was also productive, in that it created the conditions for some 
parts of the GCAP network to creatively transform and expand meanings of social justice 
and poverty eradication. It was through these contradictions that GeAP embodied a form 
of monitory oppositionality quite distinct from that developed by the Liberal 
cosmopolitans (and most widely expounded by Keane, 2009). As developed in Chapter 
Five, GCAP's monitory oppositionality was always and inherently ambiguous, dependent 
as it was on the 'monitory' as a distinct form of relation between its contextualised nodes 
and other statist or neo-liberal hegemonic actors and formations. This monitory 
relationality is distinct in that it is a form of relationship which can only ever be other-
regarding, and thus imbued with that same otherness. In this way GCAP challenged the 
wholly celebratory tone of the Liberal cosmopolitan literature, as well as the 
inside/outside binary displayed in the radical alter-globalisationist literature. 
Turning this towards alter-globalisation networks more broadly, what fiu1her claims 
could be made? Just because GCAP exhibited monitory oppositionality does not mean 
that such a relationship would or should only ever display the same characteristics which 
were displayed through the GCAP network. Indeed, whilst in the pans of GCAP I studied 
such relationships were often found to be problematic, this was because GCAP's 
monitory oppositionality was produced specifically by the particular constellations of the 
convergence spaces in which GCAP's nodes operated. It is precisely because it is an 
ambiguous form of oppositionality that a greater attention to its ambiguity (on the part of 
aker-globalisation activists and actors) could also make it more consciously malleable. 
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No alter-globalisation network can exist in isolation from the forms of globalisation to 
which it proposes alternatives. All such networks are therefore in temporally and spatially 
produced monitory relations with the agencies of the dominant and hegemonic forms of 
globalisation they are in alterity to (wherever such agencies may 'touch down' and 
deploy - 'locally', 'nationally', 'globally', etc.). The point therefore is not whether alter-
globalisation networks should adopt 'outsider' or 'insider' strategies in creating their 
alternatives (the binary established in the radical alter-globalisationist literature in 
Chapter Two); this creates a smokescreen which conceals the inherent and simultaneous 
inside/outside nature of these relationships. The more pertinent issue is the degree to 
which such networks are able to become aware of how monitory relationships can 
produce them as subjects, so that they may then be able to release their multiple 
subjectivities. By this I mean that GCAP illustrated the manner in which relations of 
monitory oppositionality can produce both uniform consenting subjects (as in the 
NCSTM) and diverse resisting and even transcendent subjects (as in the Wada Na Todo 
Abhiyan (WNT A) in India). The spaces of the NCSTM and the WNT A were historically 
produced, yet this did not make these spaces absolute. In the NCSTM there were 
examples of a more structural critique, and in the WNT A examples of highly ordered 
consent. Whilst these were minority positions in each case, they point to the potential for 
agency to interact with the structural conditions of time and space in the construction and 
operationalisation of relations of monitory oppositionality. 
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Alter-globalisation networks can be understood therefore to be oppositional in a highly 
ambiguous and power-implicated sense. It is in the contradictions which these features 
create, however, that the potential transformative agency of alter-globalisation networks 
might be found, and self-consciously and strategicaUy deployed. 
8.3.2 Which processes of exclusion and inclusion constitute alter-globalisation networks? 
In Cbapter Six I explored the manner in which GCAP was constituted by a range of 
inclusions and exclusions which could all be framed as cosmopolitan. In this way I 
disputed the notion that cosmopolitanism is inherently universal, underpinning sets of 
ever-increasing relations of inclusion. By asserting the particularity of cosmopolitanism, 
that it always has to come from somewhere and is therefore unavoidably limited, I 
created space for other forms of particularistic cosmopolitanism to be analysed on the 
same terms. This was significant as it transcended the universaJlparticular, 
domination/resistance binary which can often be deployed in analyses of this kind. 
I argued that cosmopolitanism is not just a Western, liberal and imperial constI"Uct. This 
allowed for the inclusion of other potential and immanent forms of cosmopolitanism in 
my analysis. Another innovation I adopted in my approach to this chapter was to analyse 
cosmopolitanism as a discursive resource deployed by the research participants fur 
understanding the role of GCAP's agency. As such it was possible to map the degree to 
which certain forms of cosmopolitanism were successful in discursively enroUing actors 
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to its problematisations. It was thus the case that different cosmopolitan discourses 
intertwined and fused with each other in productive modes of inclusion and exclusion in 
GCAP's convergence spaces. This was most evident in the WNTA. where research 
participants interpreted GCAP's potentials and limitations through a prism of radical 
post-coloniality, yet found GCAP to be an uneven field of opportunities for such radical 
discourses to articulate themselves. In the NCSTM though, very few expressed similarly 
radical forms of cosmopolitan interpretation and were instead subjectified by more 
exclusionary forms of imperial cosmopolitanism, which enclosed research participants in 
managerialistic and neo-liberal interpretative repertoires. 
For aher-globalisation networks more generally this has several implications. It means 
that they are not inclusionary because they are cosmopolitan, but that they may in fact 
incubate several forms offusing, resisting and reinforcing cosmopolitanisms, each replete 
with their own inclusions and exclusions. COSImpolitanism therefore appears as an other-
regarding discursive resource, itself constructed through various interpretative repertoires 
of solidarity over economic, socia~ cultural and geographical distance. It is these 
interpretations which give cosmopolitanisms their discursive power. always particular 
and distinctive. Cosmopolitanism therefore becomes more akin to an analytical tool with 
which to assess the normativity of aher-globalisation networks. rather than a universal 
prescriptive agenda which all aher-globalisation networks should subscribe to. 
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Chapter Six also pointed to the power of a particular and post-colonial form of 
cosmopolitanism This served to challenge understandings of cosmopolitanism as always 
and inherently destructive, regardless of where it is 'from'. Whilst it was not possible to 
ascertain whether this post-colonial cosmopolitanism was flatter, more horizontal or more 
equitable than its imperial other, its very articulation did reveal a potential shift in the 
discursive and practical orientations of alter-globalisation networks of the kind that 
GCAP represents. 
For instance, GeAP, with a genealogy which stretches back to Make Poverty History and 
Jubilee 2000 before that, emerged from a critique of those networks and campaigns as 
being dominated by international NGOs and structurally privileged interpretations of 
justice (See Gorringe and Rose, 2006; Yanacopulos, 2009). It has therefore become 
simple to dismiss such mass-scale public-lOObilising networks as at best ineffectual and at 
worst dominating and exclusionary. Nonetheless, despite the nq,erfection with which 
GCAP embodies post-colonial forms of cosmopolitanism, and however much imperial 
forms of coslOOpolitanism still dominate, that GCAP actively embodies and is produced 
by these different coslOOpolitan discourses suggests that alter-globalisation networks of 
this kind may be learning some of the lessons from previous iterations of them. This is DO 
more than a contingent and uncertain assertion, based as it is on immanent processes, but 
it is a case for qualified optimism nonetheless. 
8.3.3 Where are alter-global/satton networks? 
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In Chapter Seven I argued that GCAP constructed itself as being embodied through the 
authenticity of marginalised and poverty-stricken groups, and their representatives. 
Despite the fact that GCAP appeared to have created opportunities for actors to coopemte 
with each other who might not normally have done so, this became a problematic 
construction when compared to the everyday articulations of GCAP which were 
expressed by research participants in the NCSTM (where GCAP was largely either absent 
or distant) and the WNT A (where GCAP was largely present but irritating). 
Rejecting the global, national and local as distinct spheres or scales, and considering any 
space as co-constituted by all of these dimensions in collapsed interaction, it meant that 
GCAP was therefore often simply unlocatable beyond the imaginations of a few 
relatively well-paid and structurally advantaged seconded INoo e~loyees. It was 
certainly often not locatable in the very spaces from which it claimed to be constituted. 
This was largely because GCAP could not compete with the discursively more powerful 
relations which co-constituted the spaces in which GCAP claimed to be legitimised and 
enacted. This illustrates the continuing weaknesses exhibited by alter-globalisation 
networks in the face of statist, or neo-liberal hegemonic formations and agendas. as well 
as the dangers faced by alter-globalisation networks if they are perceived by some of their 
nodes as not being radical enough. This challenges overly-celebratory renditions of alter-
globalisation networks' power. By addressing the issues which have been discussed in 
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Chapters Five and Six i.e. how self-conscious they are of their monitory oppositionality 
and the processes of inclusion and exclusion which constitute them, alter-globalisation 
networks can make themselves more present in a constructive and emancipatory manner. 
The degree to which aher-globalisation networks will always be co-present with other 
contradictory and oppositional actors means that they must engage in processes of 
immanence or 'always-becoming', of re-asserting and re-defining their legitimacy (a 
necessarily inclusive process) in the light of ever-changing conditions. This is one 
possible interpretation of why GeAP's centralised formalisation was unpopuJar for many 
constitutive members, because it was seen as closing down the possibilities for an 
always-updating process of inclusive legitimation. 
To summarise, then, I have thus tar argued that from this research have emerged a 
number of theoretical insights into the agency, potentials and limitations (the powers) of 
aher-globalisation networks. Firstly, these networks exhibit relations of monitory 
oppositionality, which represent an ambiguous and malleable power. Secondly, aIter-
globalisation networks incubate different forms of particularistic cosmopolitanisms, 
which should be understood analytically as discursive resources for understanding and 
operationalising engagements with the world. It is in the interaction of these different 
forms that optimism lies for the potentials of aher-globalisation networks. Lastly. alter-
globalisation networks nmst engage in constant processes of becoming. in order to 
navigate and elude the co-optive powers of those actors which are co-present in the 
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spaces in which they operate. This is a necessary move in providing meaningful and 
inclusive legitimacy for aher-globalisation networks. 
8.3.4 What do the powers in alter-globalisation networks reveal about the power of 
them? 
I can now return to my initial and core research question, which in itself presupposed a 
certain approach to power ('powers") which understood it as muhiple and therefore 
potentially contradictory. This presupposition seemed valid throughout the conduct of 
this research. GCAP was an uneven and contradictory field of messy social relations, and 
there is no reason to suspect that GeAP would be unique as an alter-globalisation 
network in this regard. 
That alter-globalisation networks are therefore constituted by a multiplicity of powers in 
the form of productive relations, means that it is not possible to talk about the effects of 
aher-globalisation networks in the singular either. Their power is entirely dependent OD 
the manner in which the powers which constitute them in different sites converge. powers 
which include highly constraining and monitoring statist ones. as well as relations of 
potentially emancipatory cosmopolitanism. 
Alter-globalisation networks therefore might be understood as sites where alternative 
visions of the future, and discourses of the past converge. In doing so, these visions and 
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discourses produce each other and new versions of themselves in unpredictable and co-
constituting ways. The power of alter-globalisation networks therefore might be the 
manner by which they provide opportunities to expose neo-liberal and structural powers 
to manipulation through convergence with them. This is not necessarily an evolutionary 
or piecemeal approach to social change, but rather is predicated on the degree to which 
the convergent engagement in question is self-conscious and strategic. These 
opportunities are not always taken, again because of the dynamics of these powers in 
particular sites, yet the opportunities exist nonetheless. 
Strategically speaking, alter-globalisation networks need therefore to be sensitive to the 
manner in which what may appear to be a power-exerting relationship in one 
convergence space may be power-constraining in another context of convergence to 
which it also contributes (the obvious example with GCAP being its relationship with the 
UNMC and the MOOs). This happens because convergence is inevitably differential, 
dependent on the relative powers of the different productive relations which constitute the 
space in question. It is this inevitable differentiality which lends alter-globalisation 
networks their potential to navigate power, to take advantage of certain relations in 
specific contexts, but to outflank them in others. So, for example. undoubtedly GCAP's 
relationship with the UNMC and the MOOs has brought resources and prestige, but in 
other contexts it has brought domination. This suggests that the powers In a1ter-
globalisation networks are productive of the power o/them, but not in a straightforwardly 
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teleological sense; that these powers act in contradictory ways, but more importantly. are 
malleable and navigable. 
8.4 Key contributions and recommendations for further research 
This research has contributed in a number of key areas: 
i) GCAP is very large, possibly the largest alter-globalisation network of its 
kind. Despite the problematic manner in which it mobilises and is sometimes 
mobilised. it is still a network which can reach over 170 million people for a 
one-day mobilisation. This makes GCAP a very significant actor, yet, for all 
this, little research exists which makes GCAP its central unit of analysis. This 
research therefore represents a significant contribution to understanding a 
network which has close operational relationships with the United Nations. 
appears to be expanding year-by-year68• and whose co-cbair can secure 
meetings with everyone from Ban-Ki-Moon, the UN Secretary General. to 
Bono (LAG Fieldnotes. 2009). 
ii) This research has re-centred research on alter-globalisation networks. and 
particularly International NOOs. away from Europe and North America. 
61 Every year, more country coalitioos form to participate in the Stand Up mobiJiaatiOllI, and 
n~bers of mobilised people ina-ease. An extra 57 million people 'stood up' in 2009, compared to tho 116 
mIU~~ who 'stood up' in 2008 - see http://www,whitebandorglmedjalpress-infoiworld-recqd-sh,,,tercd-
by-gtlzetlHCfoss-globe-demanding-that-their-leadcrs-end-oovetlV1 
3S3 
Research on civil societies in what is taken to be the 'Global South' can 
sometimes be 'methodologically nationalist' (Beck 1997). This research has 
attempted to illustrate the manners in which civil societies in structurally 
disadvantaged societies are just as 'global' as the powers normally understood 
as dominating them This therefore contributes to the small but growing canon 
of literature in this regard. 
iii) This research has also contributed to an important understanding of the ways 
in which cosmopolitanism and post-colonialism are not distinct and 
competitive, universal against particular, but that cosmopolitanism itself is 
merely an other-regarding discursive resource which can be filled with 
distinctive discursive and ideological orientations and interpretations. 
iv) The manner in which this research showed the MOOs to be interacting with 
civil society in a highly ordering manner represents an innovation in research 
on the politics of international development agendas, and particularly on the 
MOOs, which has thus far been largely carried out within the paradigm of that 
particular agenda. In other words, research into the MOOs nonnalJy asks, 
'how do we achieve the MOOs?' (see Black and White. 20(4), or 'how can 
civil society contribute to their achievement?' (see Foster, 2003). This latter 
question is particularly lacking a counter and critical approach in the academic 
literature (i.e. what are the MOOs doing to civil society?), aDd so this research 
represents an important contribution in that regard. 
3S4 
These contributions are of course accompanied by a number of constraints on what I have 
been able to achieve with this research. I have been necessarily constrained by time, 
personnel, finances and expertise. There are therefore a number of areas where this 
research could be supplemented, as well as new avenues of research which have emerged 
whilst conducting it. 
It would certainly be relevant to investigate the constitution of other GCAP national 
coalitions. This study was narrow in that regard, and largely overlooked 113 of the 115 
national coalitions affiliated in some way to GCAP. Studies of similar depth to this, or 
indeed wider studies deploying quantitative methods would undoubtedly add to what 
little is currently known about GCAP, which is, after all, an incredibly large alter-
globalisation network, contributing to the mobilisation of millions of people, through its 
Stand Up and other mobilisations. 
In this regard it might be useful to study other alter-globalisation networks utilising a 
similar epistemological and methodological framework to which this study has been 
carried out. GCAP is but one of several similarly constituted alter-globalisation networks 
- the Global Campaign for Education (bttp;/Iwww.canmaianforeducation.o[gD being the 
most obvious comparative network. 
Another area in which this research was constrained was in its inability to generalise too 
much about the &etant power of the MOOs, both in a civil society context, but also with 
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regard to statist and multilateral governance strategies. Further research is required on the 
productive effects of the MDGs on national governments and civil society actors in 
structurally disadvantaged societies. One area of research which I therefore believe is 
particularly valuable and intend to pursue is the particular historical production and 
genealogy of the MOOs. This wilJ create the analytical framework in which to understand 
their effects on national governments and civil societies. 
Furthermore, and as was clear through this research, GCAP is immanent, always in-the-
making. This means that many of my conclusions are specUlative, or open-ended. That 
this can only ever be the case for research of this kind is a reason to keep on researching 
GCAP, not to stop. In particular. how GCAP continues to operationalise its interacting 
forms of cosmopolitanism will reveal 8 great deal about the potentials of alter-
globalisation networks to transcend or re-make structural discursive power. Likewise, as 
GCAP moves into a more centrally-formalised era, further research will be needed to 
reveal the degree to which these kinds of processes serve to narrow alter-globaJisation 
networks' bases, or provide opportunities for previously marginalised discourses to be 
mainstreamed. 
8.S Final COmments 
"The people who make social movements, often at great costs and under conditions of 
threat and danger, do so in the perverse beJiefthat their efforts can make ~e warJd bett"!"' 
more just, and indeed, that those actions are necessary to make substantial ciuUl,e. It 11 
professionally irresponsible to expend effcrts on projects that elucidate theories or advance 
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analyses that don't harken back to critical questions about the quality of our lives and of 
others. Social Science could be a powerful tool for social justice, a Promethean notion too 
readily abandoned" (Meyer, 2002: 6-7) 
"Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please" (Marx, 
1852/1991: 93) 
I often found myself feeling inspired during my interactions with GCAP. Whether this 
has always been apparent in this thesis I am not certain, but it· is the main reason why I 
am still involved with the Learning and Accountability Group. For all its imperfections, 
contradictions and sometimes the damage it colludes in, GCAP remains a set of spaces in 
which some people, some of the time, are able to imagine and try to affect an alternative 
and more equitable present and future. It is very easy sometimes to dismiss the sum of 
these efforts, and indeed scepticism is sometimes deserved. However, the commitment, 
belief and sense of injustice illustrated by many of the people who participated in this 
research I could not doubt, and it is to them and others engaged in alter-globalisation 
networks, attempting to re-make the structural conditions in which they fmd themselves, 
which I hope this research is useful for. 
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The descriptions vary in specificity according to the degree of anonymity requested by 
each participant. 
Code Location and Date Description or Invo lvement in 
Affiliation GCAP 
1 Delhi, 25.08.2008 WNT A Convenor; Member ofGCAP 
National Centre for Global Council 
Advocacy Studies, 
India 
2 Delhi, 04.08.2008 Regional 
3 Delhi, 16.08.2008 
agricultural network 
National Conference Chairs GCAP Social 
of Dalit Exclusion Taskforce 
Organisations 
4 Lucknow, State-level civil 
20.08.2008 society network 
5 Delhi,05.08.2008 Oxfam GB. India 
6 Delhi, 08.08.2008 OneWorld South 
Asia 
7 Delhi, 14.08.2008 National Campaign 
on Dalit Human 
Rights 
8 Delbh 14.08.2008 Christian Aid India 




10 Delhi, 22.08.2008 Save the Children 
India 
11 Shimla,02.09.2008 State-level civil 
society network 
12 London, 10.10.2008 OxfamGB OCAPOlobal 
Secretariat 
13 Lilongwe, CISANET-
16.07.2008 national agricultural 
network 
14 Lilo~~ Malawi Economic 
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05.07.2008 Justice Network 
15 Lilongwe, CSCQBE - national 
03.07.2008 educational network 
16 Lilongwe, Action Aid Malawi 
11.07.2008 
17 Lilongwe, National Nurse and GCAP Ambassador 
20.07.2008 Midwifery Union 
18 Mzuzu, 25.07.2008 Human Rights 
Education 
Or2anisation 
19 Lilongwe, Gender and 
12.07.2008 Development 
Network 
20 Blantyre, CONGOMA; 
14.07.2008 NCSTM Secretariat 
21 Lilongwe, Oxfam GB, Malawi 
28.07.2008 
22 Blantyre, Hope for the Elderly 
27.07.2008 








Malawi Congress of 
18.07.2008 Trade Unions 
26 Delhii 02.08.2008 WNT A Secretariat 27 Delhi, 02.08.2008 WNT A Secretariat Various GCAP 
mobilisations and 
GlobalAs~ties 
28 Mumbai, Youth for Unity and 
07.09.2008 VoilUJUlCY Action 
29 Hyderabad, Regional civil Member ofGCAP 
10.09.2009 society network Learnina and 
Accountability 
GrouP 




BthInt 1 Delhi~ 02.08.2009 WNT A Secretariat Various OCAP 
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27.08.2009 mobiJisations and 
inclusive Global Assemblies 





Email to research participants 
requesting participation for Interviews 
Clive Gabay <C.B.A.Gabay@open.ac.uk> wrote: 
Dear xxx, 
I am emailing you following xxx's email below introducing me and my project. I am a 
PhD student at the Open University in the UK, and I am studying the way in which the 
Global Call to Action against Poverty (G-CAP) facilitates the engagement ofNGOs at 
the national level. I am therefore interested in the relationships between you/your 
organisation and the other members of the National Civil Society Taskforce on MOOs in 
MaJaw~ as well as between you/your organisation and the global G-CAP structure. FuDer 
details of my research project can be emailed to you on request. 
I am keen to interview you for the purposes of this project. and will be visiting 
MaJawilIndia for xxx weeks in July/August/September. This should take no more than 
60-90 minutes, and will be recorded on a dictaphone to ensure I do not misrepresent your 
comments. Please be assured that if you wish to withdraw any of your comments at any 
time then all you need to do is contact me. Also, I will not share the recording of your 
interview with any other person, which will be kept in a secure and safe place. 
I would be tremendously grateful if you would agree to take part in this project, and you 
would be helping me a great deal if you could let me have the following information: 
I) Confirmation that you are willing to be interviewed and that you are available to do 
this in July/August/September - If you are willing and available then I will contact you 
shortly to arrange a date and time convenient for you. 
2) The name of your organisation and your position within it. 
3) The address and location of your organisation. 
4) Your position within the National Civil Society Taskforce on MDGs in MalawiIWada 
Na Todo Abhiyan 





Consent form and Information sheet 
shown to research participants at 
Interview 
Power witbiD 'Global Networks': A case study oftbe Global Call to Action .,ainst 
Poverty (GCAP) 
This research project is led by Clive Gabay (see http://cJw,o.pen,ac,uk/peqple/gabay,htm I 
+44 7734 902 708), a PhD student from the Development Policy and Practice Group of 
the Open University in the United Kingdom His supervisors are Dr, Giles Mohan 
(g,mohan@open,ac,uk I +44 1908 653 654) and Dr, Helen Yanacopulos 
(b,yanacopulos@qpen.ac,uk I +44 1908 654 893) and can be contacted should you 
require further details about this project. 
This project examines the relationships between individuals and organisations within the 
Global Call to Action against Poverty, Given the tendency to privilege Northern voices in 
research on global campaigns, social movements and networks, it is hoped that this 
project will provide some opportunities for Southern voices to be prioritised within 
debates over the role of such campaigns, movements and networks, and the role of local, 
national and international NGOs within them, Identifying where certain actors are 
empowered and others are disempowered within GCAP's various structures and 
processes will also assist GCAP in its own ongoing review of its operations DOW that it 
has decided to continue through to 2015, These issues will be examined through sub-case 
studies of the Indian and Malawian GCAP coalitions, Wada Na Todo AbhiyaD aad the 
National Civil Society Taskforce on MOOs in Malawi respectively, In particular the 
project will focus on relationships within the coalitions, and between the coalitions aad 
GCAP's regional and global structures, 
The research is based on semi-structured interviews with NGO representatives on the 
Indian and Malawian coalition steering groups, as well as with central UK-based NOOs; 
a survey of members of the wider Indian and Malawian coalitions; and web and 
document analysis, The fmdings will be of strategic importance to the natio~ coalitions 
concerned and to GCAP more widely at this time of fundamental revaew fo~ the 
organisation, and the project will undertake targeted dissemination amongst the natIOnal 
coalitions and GCAP, 
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Before agreeing to take part in the research Clive will fully explain the research and 
answer all your questions about it. Once agreed Clive will: 
(a) Tape and write up the interview 
(b) Send you a printed copy oftbe interview. together with some initial comments 
for your thoughts and amendment 
(c) Ensure your anonymity if you so wished. and use pseudonyms where necessary 
(d) Ensure the security of the interview content under the United Kingdom Data 
Protection Act (1998) 
( e) Ensure that you may withdraw from the study at any time simply by saying so 
and. if you wish. have any or all of the interview data that you have contributed 
destroyed 
By signing this form I agree to take part in this research. 
Name (please print): ....................................................................... . 
Date: .......................... .. 
Signature: ............................................................................................... . 
384 
APPENDIX FOUR 
Interview themes and questions'· 
Intern" themes - key informants; 
1) When and how was the coalition established? 
2) How many members are there in the coalition? 
3) Is coalition membership open to any organisation? 
4) How were the steering group members selected and are they rotated? 
5) Is there a sectoral configuration to the steering group? 
6) Who represents the coalition within GeAP globally and regionally? 
7) What do INoos contribute to the coalition? 
8) How is the coalition funded? 
9) Are there any other key people you think I should speak to? 
Intem" theme. - AU eoaBtiog membeni 
1) Tell me about your organisation and how it came to be involved in the 
taskforce/abhiyan? 
2) What is the purpose of the AbbiyanlTaskforce? (main issues, why they are 
important, etc) 
3) What would success and fililure look like? 
4) How bas your organisation/members benefited from being part of the campaip-
coalition? 
.. The themes and questions presented here were formulated pi« to my visits to the NSC!M and 
WNTA coalitions. They were subsequently adapted it«ativeJy in response to Ibe ICtUaUy clevelopml 
research process. 
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5) In asked you - 'What is GCAP?' - What would you say? 
6) What role does GCAP pJay in the national campaign-coalition? 
7) What is the role of the steering group? 
a. What specific methods does it use to interact with the wider campaign-
coalition membership? 
b. What expectations do you have of the wider campaign-coalition 
membership? 
8) What is your view on the mix of organisations on the steering group (lNooS, 
National Advocacy Noos, Constituency Noos) - How would you describe the 
collaboration? 
WNT A-specific guestions: 
I) Are there any contradictions in having the campaign's major funders (Oxfam, 
NOVIB, UMC) also playing central roles on the CCG and CSG? 
2) What are your views on India hosting the GCAP secretariat? 
3) What do you feel the CSG learnt from the Bihar process? 
4) Tell me about the decision to increasingly focus the campaign on Advocacy 
activities. 
NCSIM-mecific Questions 
1) Where does the campaign's funding come from? 
2) Are INoos involved in the taskforce, and ifnot why not? 
1. If they aren't involved, will that change in light ofGCAP's future 
strategy and the explicit sectoral breakdown that bas been proposed for 
coalition steering groups (tbirds)? 
386 
APPENDIX FIVE 
The Millennium Development Goals70 
1. End Extreme Poverty: 
Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people whose income is less 
than $1 a day 
Achieve full and productive employment and decent work for all, including 
women and young people 
Halve, between 1990 and 2015, the proportion of people who suffer from hunger 
2. Achieve Universal Primary Education: 
Ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be able to 
complete a full course of primary schooling 
3. Promote Gender EquaUty and Empower Women 
Eliminate gender disparity in primary and secondary education, preferably by 
2005. and in all levels of education no later than 2015 
4. Reduce Child Mortality 
Reduce by two thirds, between 1990 and 201 S, the under-five mortality rate 
5. Improve Maternal Health 
Reduce by three quarters the maternal mortality ratio 
Achieve universal access to reproductive health 
6. Combat HIV/AIDS, Malaria, and other Diseases 
Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the spread ofHIVIAIDS 
,. 
Available at: http://www,un.orglmilJenniumaoalslindex,shtmJ, .cceaed 011 20,08,2009 
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Achieve, by 2010, universal access to treatment for HIV / AIDS for all those who 
need it 
Have halted by 2015 and begun to reverse the incidence ofmaJaria and other 
major diseases 
7. Ensure Environmental Sustainability 
Integrate the principles of sustainable development into countIy policies and 
programmes and reverse the loss of environmental resources 
Reduce biodiversity loss, achieving, by 2010, a significant reduction in the rate of 
loss 
Halve, by 2015, the proportion of the population without sustainable access to 
safe drinking water and basic sanitation 
By 2020, to have achieved a significant improvement in the lives of at least 100 
million slum dwellers 
8. Develop a Global Partnenbip for Development 
Address the special needs of least developed countries, 1andlocked countries and 
small island developing states 
Develop further an open, rule-based. predictable, non-discriminatory trading and 
financial system 
Deal comprehensively with developing countries' debt 
In cooperation with pharmaceutical companies. provide access to affordable 
essential drugs in developing countries 
In cooperation with the private sector, make available benefits of new 
technologies. especially infonnation and communications 
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